著者
堀江 宗正
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, pp.1-13, 2019-03-30 (Released:2019-05-22)

In contemporary society, people are increasingly less likely to reject spirits on the grounds that they are not scientifically verifiable. Rather, they accept the reality of spirits if narratives about them heal the narrators. This article describes this phenomenon as the rise of a “narrative reality” of spirits. In order to understand this new attitude, I refer to psychological theories about the deceased, such as S. Freud’s theory on object loss and “mourning work,” D. Klass et al.’s notions of continuing bonds, C. G. Jung’s theories of complex and archetype, and V. Frankl’s ideas about the spiritual person. I then consider two examples of spiritualist practices called “demonstration” based on my fieldwork research in the U.K. and in Japan. I argue that stories of spirits sound realistic when they fit into a preset narrative pattern of the dead watching over the living. Stories of the deceased watching over us aid us in accepting death, of others and ourselves. At the same time, they imply that another Japanese narrative pattern in which the dead punish the living has receded into the background while an expectation that the benevolent dead watch over us has become dominant. Perceivable behind this shift is the fact that the range of sympathy toward the dead is narrowing to only include the deceased who are beloved by family, friends, or acquaintances. Inclusion of the lonely who die with no one to love them will be one of our society’s main tasks to tackle.
著者
土井 健司
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, pp.44-56, 2019-03-30 (Released:2019-05-22)

In this paper I would like to pursue two questions regarding the Passio Sanctarum Perpetuae et Felicitatis. The first is why Perpetua, a noble and educated young woman in Carthago, in 203 CE chose martyrdom, being fully aware of her death. The second question concerns the relation between the historical figure of Perpetua and the Passio as a literary product. It is often said that recounts of martyrdom intend to instrumentalize saintly people for the church. In this paper an alternative view with regard to the role of such books is considered. For Perpetua to be a Christian meant freedom (libertas) from Roman society and its gods (Passio, 18, 5). In the Roman Empire and cities many places were filled with statues of gods assigned to those places. Perpetua wanted to be free from these traditional places of symbolic “divine” presence. To her father she said (3, 1f) that, just as a vase could not be called by another name than ‘vase’, she could not be called by another name than ‘Christian’ (Christiana). To be called a Christian indicated her true identity and essence as a person which could not be given up without loosing herself. This is why she could not accept her father’s attempt at persuasion although she had been moved many times by his words. Recounts of martyrdom are commemorated in Christian churches for the purpose of community building and spiritual advancement. The saints of such recounts often become models for the believers, but sometimes seem to be mere products of the church. As to the Passio, the author indicates in 1, 6 the reason for writing his account, namely to enable believers to communicate with Perpetua. Perhaps the Passio was recited in the liturgy of her Memorial Day on May 7th. When it was read, believers could communicate with her through the Holy Spirit, because the church was to be the church of the dead and the living. I propose this to be the purpose of the Passio.
著者
佐藤 啓介
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, pp.29-43, 2019-03-30 (Released:2019-05-22)

Empirically, we say of the “Dignity of the dead”, which corresponds to the dignity of human being. On the other hand, theoretically, we don’t understand why and to what degree the dead should have the dignity. This article intends to found this reason and construct the foundation for the general ethics of the dead. The strategy in this article would be called “ethics of the dead from below”, which contrasts with “one from above” that emphasizes the Otherness of the dead and distance between the dead and us. There are two difficulties in admitting the dignity of the dead; the dead is the non-being who cannot suffer; we cannot affect and recover the way of being of the dead. But, recent philosophical investigations on the harm of death are solving the first difficulty by thinking that the dead can have ontological status in the symbolic or discursive levels. The second difficulty is solving by Ichinose’s thought how we would be harrowed by causal absence of the dead. These philosophical efforts would contribute to the universal and formal foundation for the ethics of the dead.
著者
竹内 綱史
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.43-56, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-03-10)

Die Absicht dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Beziehung zwischen dem Problem vom Nihilismus und Nietzsches Verständnis des menschlichen Leibes zu erörtern und die Wichtigkeit dieser Problematik für Nietzsche zu erklären.Der Nihilismus bedeutet, nach Nietzsche, zuerst eine gewisse Trennung von dem Ich und der Welt. Für das menschliche Ich sind die Werte, wie z.B. Nützlichkeit, Schönheit, Heiligkeit, usw., entbehrlich, nach denen es in der Welt leben kann. In dem modernen wissenschaftlichen Weltbild gibt es aber keinen Wert in dieser Welt selbst, sondern alle Werte sollten nur als menschlich, nämlich als Erdichtungen vom Menschen, gelten. Dieses Weltbild hat es also „wertlos“ gemacht, in der Welt zu leben.Nietzsche aber reduziert diese Trennung auf einen Zwiespalt innerhalb des menschlichen Leibes. Der Leib ist für ihn viel urspünglicher als das Ich. Zarathustra sagt, „Leib bin ich ganz und gar“ und der Leib ist, sagt Nietzsche, „ein Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen“. Weil wir modernen Menschen uns über Jahrtausende hindurch das wissenschaftliche Weltbild, das in der christlichen Weltanschauung seinen Ursprung hat, „einverleibt“ haben, bekam unser Leib als Gesellschaft endlich eine Moral, die uns verbietet, ungewisse Dinge zu glauben. Diese Moral innerhalb unseres Leibes, das heißt das „wissenschaftliche Gewissen“, trennt uns von der Welt der Werte.Für den Leib als Organismus oder Lebewesen ist aber die Welt der Werte eigentlich. Von diesem Standpunkt aus ist das wissenschaftliche „wertlose“ Weltbild eine Art der Idiosynkrasie vom modernen Menschen. Nietzsche behauptet, dass durch Veränderung unserer Einstellung zum Leib die Trennung von dem Ich und der Welt überbrückt werde und dann die große Spannung der Zwiespalt innerhalb unseres Leibes eine Energie erzeugen solle, um die Möglichkeiten menschlicher Zukunft zu erweitern.
著者
渡邉 学
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, pp.1-14, 2003 (Released:2019-03-21)

The focus of the psychology of religion is on conversion from the beginning of its history. The theme of “defection” was not focused on until recently. This theme concerns not only psychological change or disillusionment, but also the loss of a social identity and disaffiliation from a religious community. Formerly it was common that scholars of religion regarded defectors as sources of trouble for new religious movements. As a result, they tended to underestimate their importance for their study. However, scholars have changed their attitude toward defectors due to the high rates of dropouts after the second half of the 1970s. There are two kinds of studies on defectors: one by defectors themselves, and the other by scholars of religion. The former is divided into those by defectors who become disaffiliated through their own will, and another by defectors forced by their community to be disaffiliated. Scholars of religion have found three levels of defection: affective (disaffection) , cognitive (disillusionment), and social organizational (disaffiliation). And they have found temporal variability in defectors’ testimonies. In this essay the author takes the concrete example of a former executive member of Aum Shinrikyō in order to examine those findings. The defector is apparently a willing one, with some complications. He first showed disillusionment, knowing the assassination of Sakamoto family was done by Aum members, and disaffection followed. He was disaffiliated from Aum according to his own free will after he was arrested. He changed his testimony during the series of his trials.
著者
山本 和人
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.50-67, 1993 (Released:2018-03-29)

“Millenarianism” is a term originally employed by medieval and early modern European historians, but has been referred to in various studies of many cultural, religious and nativistic movement outside the western world, such as the Prophetism in Africa, the Ghost Dance in North America, and the Cargo Cults in Melanesia. There is no consistent use of terminology among historians and cultural anthropologists, and the aim of this thesis is to offer some prospect for the integration of these studies. Some fundamental standpoints are discerned among them. Critical examination of these standpoints —psychological, sociological— of science of religion, would make two opposite tendencies clear. One is the view that millenarianism is something absurd or eccentric, and that the absurdity is to be reduced to psychological or sociological deficiencies. This is nothing but “labelling”. The other makes efforts to understand millenarianism which is essentially alien to our secular world view. It must be the process of understanding to endeavor to explain what seems alien to us, and we call this kind of attitude “proper appreciation”. Most studies are situated between these two polaritic tendencies. How can we avoid the labelling? There is something to learn in the standpoint of science of religion. As the science of religion is concerned with the integrated understanding of various religious phenomena which seem, at a glance, so hardly to be identifiable that we have difficulties in comprehending them under one word “religion”,so we must make much of our identification of many millenarian movements, for we have the tacit understanding that we also have an element in our experience which causes millenarianism. That is why we can recognize millenarianism. Thus, the preliminary lines for the study are laid down. First, the proper appreciation should be pursued as far as possible, not only to avoid labelling, but to carry our tacit understanding of millenarianism into direct statements. Second, the proper appreciation results in extending the application of millenarianism, because any of its limitation might presume the prejudiced labelling. This is only an immediate plan for the study, but we must start from it.
著者
竹内 綱史
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, pp.65-76, 2003 (Released:2019-03-21)

Das Problem des Gewissens ist eines der zentralen Themen in Nietzsches Philosophie. Er erwähnt das Gewissen immer wieder und kritisiert das gemeine Gewissen. Dieses ist heteronom, denn als Sittlichkeit gehorcht es der Sitte. Nietzsche nennt dies das “Herdengewissen.” Er stellt dagegen das “intellektuelle Gewissen.” Es ist ein Gewissen gegen das Herdengewissen. Es sagt: “warum gehorchst du deinem Gewissen ?” Der Mensch, der auf diese Stimme horcht und sich ein solches Gewissen einverleibt, will nach eigenem Wissen handeln. Er ist also autonom. Nietzsche zielt darauf, diese Menschen zu züchten, und nennt sie “neue Philosophen.” Das Wort “Gewissen” stammt etymologisch von “mit-wissen.” Das Herdengewissen ist das Mit-wissen mit der Massen und das intellektuelle Gewissen das mit sich selbst. Dieses ist Autonomie und transzendiert sich auf eigene Möglichkeiten, auf die eigene Zukunft. Nun muß der Mensch die eigene Zukunft entwerfen von der Zeit des Todes Gottes her. Laut Nietzsche soll dieser Entwurf die Aufgabe der neuen Philosophen sein. Das intellektuelle Gewissen ist somit eine notwendige Voraussetzung für die neuen Philosophen. Es ist daher Nietzsches Aufgabe, dieses Gewissen zu pflanzen und neue Philosophen zu erziehen. Er ist der Philosoph der Philosophen, das heißt, er denkt über das Wesen der Philosophie nach.
著者
吉田 喜久子
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.60-77, 1988 (Released:2018-03-15)

Im neuplatonischen Denken wird alles als Resultat der Entfaltung des Einen, der ersten Hypostase, angesehen. Das Eine, welches in keinem Sinne Differenz und Andersheit enthält, ist für alles Seiende einschließlich der menschlichen Seele sowohl der Ursprung wie auch Ziel, zu dem die Seele über den Geist, d. h. über die in sich durch Differenz relationale Einheit, zurückkehren soll. Die Einheit des Einen wurde innerhalb des Christentums vor allem von den mystischen Strömungen tradiert. Erstmals bei Meister Eckhart ist das neuplatonische Eine mittels der proklischen negatio negationis, doch im von Eckhart veränderten Sinne, zum entscheidenden Element einer christlichen Ontologie geworden. Obgleich das Eine bei Eckhart, das grundsätzlich wohl aus seinen religiös erfahrenen Überzeugungen stammt, nicht nur vom Standpunkt der historischen Einflüsse oder Zusammenhänge zu erklären ist, kann die Notwendigkeit, warum bei Eckhart das neuplatonische Eine sich mit dem christlichen absoluten Sein verbinden muß, schon im neuplatonischen Einen selbst gefunden werden. Wegen dieses Einen konnte Eckhart, anders als Thomas von Aquin, das Sein, welches die ganze Struktur der mittelalterlichen Metaphysik stützt, auf seine Absolutheit hin untersuchen. Doch das Eine ist bei Eckhart nicht nur die Einheit als einziges Wesen der Dreiheit Gottes, weil es sowohl ontologischer als auch soteriologischer Grund für die Beziehung des Menschen zu Gott ist.
著者
小野 真龍
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.39, pp.14-28, 2022 (Released:2022-06-05)

The spread of the Coronavirus has severely impacted the practice of all mass religious rituals, and in Japan many of them are currently carried out without any visitors. To make up for this situation, religious rituals in Japan are often broadcast over the internet. The author of this article also participated in such a broadcast as a Gagaku performer in April 2021, but felt a certain apprehension. Can the religious consciousness of the individual experience a significant change only through observing the ritual on a monitor? Many religious organizations that partake in online broadcasts attach great importance to direct participation on the actual site of the ritual, but at the same time do not deem the internet broadcasts of their rituals as ineffective for the religious consciousness of the viewers. They seem to assume that an individual can somehow experience the sacred even through the monitor. Can the sacred appear on a monitor over the internet? This article tries to explore any possible theoretical grounds for this assumption and summarize the points of discussion. The study explores St. John of Damascus’ theory of divine image, Rudolf Otto’s concept of “Divination,” Emile Durkheim’s concept of “collective effervescence,” and Talal Asad’s notes on the concept of ritual before the modern age.
著者
長坂 真澄
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, pp.109-122, 2015-03-31 (Released:2018-08-28)

Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich damit, Derridas Lektüre Husserls in Die Stimme und das Phänomen (1967) unter dem Leitfaden der Diskrepanz zwischen dem Erkennen, dem Meinen und dem Ausdrücken zu erklären, und dadurch zu zeigen, dass diese Lektüre den Husserl’schen uneingestandenen Verrat des Glaubens am Wissen jenseits des Wissens, in der Gestalt des Ausdrucks des Meinens ohne Erkennen, ans Licht bringt. Um diese Diskrepanz zu zeigen, werden im vorliegenden Aufsatz die drei „Reduktionen“ betrachtet, die die Struktur des Werkes Die Stimme und das Phänomen ausmachen, und zwar die Reduktion des Anzeichens, die der Sprache und die der Anschauung. Die erste Reduktion behauptet die ideale Möglichkeit, einen Gegenstand zu erkennen und ihn auszudrücken, ohne ihn anzuzeigen. Die zweite geht von dem angenommenen Recht aus, einen Gegenstand zu erkennen und ihn zu meinen, ohne ihn auszudrücken. Dagegen fordert die dritte Reduktion die Möglichkeit, einen Gegenstand zu meinen und ihn auszudrücken, ohne ihn zu erkennen. Diese dritte Reduktion wird von Derrida mit dem Husserl’schen Begriff der „Idee im Kantischen Sinne“ verknüpft. Durch diese letzte Reduktion zeigt Husserl die Freiheit der Sprache, die eventuell über die durch die Anschauung gesicherte Erkenntnis hinausgeht. Derrida zeigt weiter, dass die Abwesenheit der Anschauung nichts anderes als eine notwendige Bedingung des Sprechens ist. Dadurch wird die Stimme zum Hören gebracht, die davon spricht, was unmöglich zu wissen ist.
著者
長谷 正當
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.21, pp.1-22, 2004 (Released:2019-03-21)

When it comes to pinpointing the key concept that guides Takeuchi Yoshinori’s thought and gives it its direction, we can say, I think, that it is the idea of trans- descendence. Takeuchi’s research covers Shinran’s Kyogyōshinshō, Early Buddhism, Philosophy of Religion, Phenomenology of Religion, etc., and the idea of trans-descendence resonates, while changing its form, in all these fields, as it were, as the carrying bass note. Takeuchi himself, however, stops at suggesting this concept, without formally discussing it. Therefore it gives the impression of floating in Takeuchi’s thought world, a bit like an iceberg the bulk of which is hidden under the water surface. I would like, therefore, to examine how it appears in each of the above mentioned fields and, by joining these forms together, to bring out the main motives of Takeuchi’s thought. The concept of Trans-descendence was first used by Jean Wahl. Takeuchi borrowed the term from him, but gave it a different meaning. In Jean Wahl the term denotes a descent into a level of deep experience that opens up reality, as seen in artists; Takeuchi uses it to signify a deepening of the awareness of the human finitude. He attempts, namely, with the help of this concept, to clarify the nature of the transcendence, which opens up through the self-awareness of finitude. Ordinarily, the attention to human finitude is thought to lead away from transcendence or even to negate it. There is, however, a transcendence that stands by being negated. Such a transcendence is what Takeuchi calls “trans-descendence (inverted transcendence).” This transcendence does not obtain by going beyond the finite; it opens up in the midst of the self-awareness of finitude. In order to show the special nature of this transcendence, Takeuchi often contrasts it with the “transcendental” standpoint. If the transcendental standpoint consists in having a foothold in the topical opening that reveals itself at the bottom of the existence of the self, according to Takeuchi, the particularity of the transcendence that is trans-descendence is to be found in grasping the existence of the self in the encounter with a “Thou,” that breaks through that topical expansion and comes from the other side of it. Takeuchi attempts to show this transcendence, which opens up in the self-awareness of finitude, in the fields of the Philosophy of Religion, Early Buddhism, Shinran’s thought, and so on. How would it be grasped in each of these fields?
著者
吉永 進一
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.85-98, 1990 (Released:2018-03-21)

As is often mentioned in his biographical studies, William James was greatly attracted to spiritual phenomena and continued psychical research to his last days. He conducted experiments with a trance medium, Mrs. Piper, whose mediumship was so strong that he was convinced of the genuineness of the phenomena. Although he arrived at no conclusive view on the spiritual matter, his thinking was greatly affected by psychical research. In this paper its effects are discussed in some respects. First James saw in psychical research a solution to the contemporary problem of how to settle the struggle between science and religion. He criticized mechanical rationalism and contrived a framework of the new science which would defend the value of personal experience. Secondly, influenced by his fellow psychical researcher F. W. H. Myers, James employed the subliminal-self theory, which says that everyone has a wider self under the realm of consciousness. This theory assured him of the possibility of telepathy, but at the same time it brought some contradiction to his own “stream of thought” theory that denies substantial beings in the mind, such as the soul. Moreover, as a result of his last experiments, James came near to believing in the existence of the soul. But unlike Myers he remained doubtful to the last because of his thirst for truth.
著者
魚住 孝至
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.29-42, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-03-10)

In „Zen in der Kunst des Bogenschießens“ schildert Eugen Herrigel den von ihm durchlaufenen Lern- und Übungsprozess unter Anleitung eines Meisters, für den die Essenz des Bogenschießens im Zen liegt. Herrigel führt aus, wie er durch die Übung des Bogenschießens zur Erfahrung der „absichtslosen Ichlosigkeit“ gelangt.In dieser Arbeit wird auf der Grundlage von Herrigels Werk analysiert, wie die Transformation von Körper und Geist mittels des Übungsprozesses erfolgt. Hierzu wird auch der schriftliche Nachlass von Herrigels Meister Awa Kenzo in die Deutung einbezogen. Außerdem wird untersucht, wie Herrigel die Erfahrungswelt des Zen-Buddhismus in seinem Nachlass „Der Zen Weg“ interpretiert.
著者
根無 一行
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.121-133, 2014-03-31 (Released:2019-08-08)

D’après Totalité et Infini, le « visage » est un mode de phénomène par lequel autrui qui commande « tu ne commettras pas de meurtre » apparaît au sujet comme un absolument faible, dépourvu de tout pouvoir. Puisque le visage se définit de cette manière, il faudrait, à la limite, que nous puissions reconnaître ce visage faible même dans un meurtrier. Certes, Levinas n’a pas explicitement développé cette question. Mais une lecture attentive de Totalité et Infini nous permet d’y discerner la description qui montre comment le meurtrier apparaît en tant que « visage ». En faisant face à celui qui veut le tuer, le sujet s’aperçoit, lui aussi, comme un meurtrier. C’est seulement alors qu’il reconnaît un visage dans le tueur même. Or, il me semble envisageable que la figure du « SS » puisse être mise à la place occupée par ce tueur. En introduisant le concept de « justice », le dernier Levinas ouvre la possibilité que le visage soit reconnu « en principe » dans un meurtrier, mais pas « en réalité ». Cependant, compte tenu du fait que Totalité et Infini semble situer le visage du meurtrier antérieurement à la justice, ne pouvons-nous pas en conclure que Levinas allait reconnaître « malgré lui » le visage du SS comme réel dans cet ouvrage ?
著者
古荘 匡義
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, pp.48-60, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-11-02)

To place Tsunashima Ryosen’s thought in the context of the philosophy of religion in Japan, the study clarifies the development of his philosophy of religion with the deepening of his religious experience. Until 1903, his philosophy of religion intendedto elucidate the reasons behind the objective reality and authority of religious symbols created by subjectivity. However, as he began to feel the existential God in 1903, he considered such thought unnecessary. Instead, he aimed to verbalize the human conditions of the Son of God by means of Christian and Pure Land Buddhist ideas. Furthermore, he began to practice Christian and Pure Land Buddhist prayer. In this manner, he developed his philosophy of religion as a post-religious philosophy that utilized the philosophy of religion and religious traditions. To the best of my knowledge, such thought is worthy of being placed at the origin of the philosophy of religion in Japan.
著者
垂谷 茂弘
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.78-95, 1988 (Released:2018-03-15)

The “individuation” is the process of breaking away from “participation mystique.” The participation mystique is based on “identity,” an a priori oneness of subject and object, which can be thought of as the ‘unconscious’ itself. The process of individuation is, finally, the separation of subject from object. Then the problem is whether the identity between subject and object disappears when one realizes his whole personality (the self). Jung himself thinks we cannot become conscious of the entire unconsious. So, the identity must remain even in self-realization. We can sublate (aufheben) the inner and outer worlds only through symbolism. Even then we must preserve the distinction between them. However, there ought to be something fundamental that underlies the two worlds. Then the suspicion will arise that symbolism, especially that pertaining to synchronicity, is a movement back to the participation mystique. I try to prove the individuation is not the work of a single individual, but the dialectical cooperative work of the consciousnesses and the unconscious of “I and thou.” The foundation of this work is the identity, which in clinical psychology is treated as the problem of transference. In chapter 2, I investigate the union of the self and the “unus mundus,” following Jung’s final line of thought with regard to the question of the identity. I demonstrate, however, that Jung wouldn’t go beyond the psychological framework. Thus, I find the foundation of Jung’s thought in the concept of “numinous” experience and the “world-creating significance of the consciousness”.
著者
和田 俊昭
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.54-67, 1986 (Released:2018-03-14)

What is the essence, the origin and the function of religion? To this important question in science of religion René Girard gave a very simple and clear reply in recent years. According to him, all religions come from sacrifice, and all sacrifices, after all, can be reduced to redemptive victims. The origin of the redemptive victims lies in human sacrifice, and animal sacrifice is the mere mimesis. To avoid mutual violence between people and to establish social-cultural order is the purpose of the human sacrifice. I think it is difficult to prove Girard’s theory of religion on the strength of the latest studies of sociology, anthropology and science of religion.
著者
大越 愛子
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.74-92, 1985 (Released:2018-03-01)

The study of religion, dealing as it does with the problems of finitude in human beings such as mortality, temporality, susceptibility and selfishness, has rarely recognized one of the most important problems of finitude: that of the distinction between the sexes. In my view, like many of the various disciplines these days, it reflects the way of thinking that “man” is the only sex and has ignored the problem of the other sex. As a result, the religious viewpoint has come to be a one-sided, male-dominated affair. Thus, the study of religion, though it seeks to overcome the problems of finitude, has itself unwittingly fallen into the pitfall of finitude by ignoring a distinction between the sexes. In order to restore religion to its original wholeness, I think it is necessary to reconsider the meaning of the distinction between the sexes in religion. In this essay I consider the problem from two aspects, the theoretical and the historical. In the theoretical, I discuss two types of human religiosity, the male and the female, and also elucidate two types of religion, the maternal and the patriarchal. In the historical, I analyze the religions which have appeared in history according to the above categories.
著者
伊藤 邦武
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, pp.16-31, 2006 (Released:2019-03-21)

Charles Peirce developed his cosmological system in the series of articles published in The Monist from 1891 to 1893. Peirce constructed his system on the foundation of the three doctrines of “Tychism”, “Synechism” and “Agapism”. Of these three doctrines the least known theory is “Agapism”. In this paper, I try to present the material necessary for the understanding of this doctrine. Peirce’s agapism or the theory of evolutionary love is a curious mixture of his criticism of Darwinism and his sympathy to Henry James, Sr.’s Swedenborgian theology. He contends that the evolution of the universe cannot be accounted for by means of Darwinian logic of chance. It is his contention that the process of cosmological evolution should be interpreted as the work of divine creative love, whose essence is to let the creatures be independent from, but at the same time, return to harmony with the creator. This doctrine of creation as evolution is adopted by Peirce and reinterpreted into a complex doctrine about the interactive relationship between mind and matter. The resultant picture of the evolution of the universe is that of getting more and more lawful but reasonable.
著者
上田 閑照
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.1-23, 1989 (Released:2018-03-19)

In dem In-der-Welt-sein ist die Welt als umfassender Sinnraum des Daseins wegen ihrer Struktur des Bedeutungszusammenhangs be-grenzt. Be-grenzt heißt dabei: vom Jenseits der Grenze, d. h. vom Un-begrenzten be-grenzt und eben an der Grenze vom Un-begrenzten umgriffen. Das Dasein wohnt in der wesenhaft be-grenzten Welt, die ihrerseits von der un-begrenzten, un-endlichen Offenheit umgriffen und durchdrungen ist. Gerade in der Welt wohnt das Dasein zugleich in der unendlichen Offenheit. Diese Welt, die sich ihrerseits in der umgreifenden unendlichen Offenheit befindet, nennen wir die Doppelwelt des Daseins. In der Doppelwelt wohnend versteht das Dasein, um ein Beispiel zu geben, ein innerweltliches Seiendes als “Zuhandenes” zum praktischen Gebrauch und zugleich begegnet ihm dasselbe Seiende als “Ding” aus der Sinntiefe, die sich unendlich in die un-endliche Offenheit vertiefen kann. Das Dasein wohnt aber zunächst und zumeist nicht auf diese Weise, sondern in der in sich verschlossenen Welt. Zur Selbst-bewegung des Daseins aus sich heraus zu sich zurück gehören eine Verkehrung seiner selbst in die verschlossene Welt und die Umkehrung zu sich selbst in der Doppelwelt.