著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.171-213, 1965-05-30

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The results of the Russo-Japanese War closed the honeymoon period between the United States and Japan that had lasted for fifty years since Perry opened the latter's door, and the two Pacific Powers were brought into rivalry which culminated in the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forty years after the Portsmouth Conference. The roots of the U.S.-Japanese War may stretch back directly or indirectly to Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931. But to make clear the nature of the Manchurian Incident and to throw light on the real causes of the U.S.-Japanese struggle, we must go back further. In a sense the conflict began when the Japanese interests and privileges established in South Manchuria cast a gloom over the future advance of American commercial activities thereto. Japan's "twenty-one demands" in 1915 and her desiderata resulting from the Chengchiatun Incident in 1916 crystallized the aggressive attitude toward China of the Japanese Empire in the course of World War I. Japan launched an offensive against China taking advantage of the war which made it hard for the major European powers to pay much attention to China. Under these circumstances the United States was the only great neutral power that could emulate Japan. What, then, were the reactions or decisions of the United States against these demands? With what intention and through what process were her decisions made? And what were their consequences? This paper proposes to answer these questions. The writer's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. The U.S. Note of March 13,1915 to Japan. III. The U.S. Notes of May 11,1915 to Japan and China. IV. The Chengchiatun Incident and the U.S. reaction. V. Conclusion. Great impetus was given to the writer when he read a few books on Lansing's foreign policy (e.g., Smith's Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1958 and Beers' Vain Endeavor, 1962). The latter in particular emphasizes Lansing's realistic approach to the Far East. Lansing as a statesman and a diplomat, however, should neither be judged by his observation of power politics, whether realistic or not; what he designed; nor what he wanted to do. But the judgment should rely upon how the U.S.-Japanese relations were affected by the performance of his decision and by the differences of policy and idea among Lansing and other decision-makers. Thus, in order to have a correct understanding of the American policy toward Japan in this period, the writer believes that it is necessary to reexamine the roles of Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and other policy-makers and the interrelation among them. After closely examining the process of preparation for the two notes of 1915 and U.S. reaction against Japan's movement in 1916,the following is the writer's conclusion. First, the note of March 13,1915 is a mixture of different ideas and policies of Wilson, Bryan, and Lansing. This is an awkward compromise among these top decision-makers. Here is the reason why some interpret this note as America's recognition of Japan's special interests in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and others as protest. It goes without saying that Japan took advantage of this questionable character in her negotiations with China. Second, the author of the note of May 11 was Lansing, and by this note he intended to make good the loss the earlier note caused. But we cannot overlook Japan's doubt and perplexity made by this note. And in 1916,although he was less dependent of Wilson and other policy-makers, Lansing was almost silent about Japan's renewed demands on China mainly because of the European war situation and to meet the needs of the domestic politics. Nobody would deny that to maintain the status quo in the Far East was one of the basic principles of the United States foreign policy in this period. However, the sequence of these reactions at variance (conciliatory attitude ⟶ stiffening ⟶ negative policy) toward Japan's movements in China seems to have made the