著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.4, pp.841-885, 1989-12-20

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Few studies have been made of the foreign policy of the Japanese Empire toward Italy and Ethiopia during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict which moved Benito Mussolini to the fateful conquest of Ethiopia in October 1935. This study is a reexamination of Japan's diplomacy toward Italy and Ethiopia as well as the latters' reactions thereto prior to the beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian war. The author's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. Italian-Japanese Relations before the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict. III. Ethiopia and Japan. IV. Ambassador Sugimura's Remarks and their Repercussions. V. The Mediterranean Crisis and Italo-Japanese Relations. VI. Conclusion.

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.279-315, 1986-06-30

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The first three chapters of this study have been printed in the last issue of this journal, in which the author made it appear that since the spring of 1932 the Fascist Italy's designs for the Ethiopian conquest had gradually found a shape and that in the fall of 1934 Mussolini and his Ministries of Colony and Foreign Affairs as well as the Military Services had assumed that they would open war against Ethiopia within two years or so. He also showed that the leadership of the Italian government had regarded it as of primary importance for its foreign policy to obtain the British and French consent before the conquest. In the third chapter, he traced the development of Mussolini's negotiations with Great Britain and France in the first half of 1935 and found that Fascist Italy had hardly been able to obtain the British agreement. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the author examines the way in which Italy's image of Great Britain was confused through the summer of 1935 and how and why the relations between the two powers were growing more strained. The author's paper consists of following chapters : I. Introduction. II. Fascist Italy's Designs for the Ethiopian Conquest. III. Mussolini's Negotiations with Great Britain and France. IV. Change of Italy's Image of Great Britain-from Confusion to Confrontation. V. Anglo-Italian Tensions and Mussolini's Vacillasion. VI. The Brink and Escape from Collision. VII. The Structure of the Mediterranean Crisis-A Chicken Game. VIII. Conclusion.

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.1-34, 1986-03-20

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Since the unification of the Italian Peninsula, friendly relations with Great Britain had been one of the basic principles of the modern Italian foreign policy. In the Fascist era, this principle remained a pivot of Italy's foreign policy until the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. Although it had been no secret for many months that Benito Mussolini was preparing the conquest of Ethiopia, Great Britain did not venture to prevent the disaster until the summer of 1935 when she finally decided to reinforce the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean by sending a great number of vessels of her Home fleet thereto. This British decision and Mussolini's reaction to it threatened the longtime good relations between Italy and Great Britain. This paper proposes to examine the nature of this Mediterranean crisis between these two powers, both of which had vital interests in this region. In particular, this study is a reexamination of Fascist Italy's motivations, purposes, and tactics in this crisis as well as the British 'appeasement' policy toward Italy on the eve of the conquest of Ethiopia. The author's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. Fascist Italy's Designs for the Ethiopian Conquest. III. Mussolini's Negotiations with Great Britain and France. IV. Change of Italy's Image of Great Britain-from Confusion to Confrontation. V. Anglo-Italian Tension and Mussolini's Vacillation. VI. The Brink and Escape from Collision. VII. The Structure of the Mediterranean Crisis-A Chicken Game. VIII. Conclusion. The first three chapters of this study are in this issue; and the latter part will appear in the next issue of this Journal.

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.4, pp.609-654, 1987-12-20

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This is the third and last part of the author's paper on the Mediterranean crisis between Italy and Great Britain just prior to the outbreak of Mussolini's aggression of the Ethiopian Empire in the autumn of 1935. In the sixth chapter, entitled 'The Brink and Escape from Collision', the author describes, first, how the conflict escalated in mid-September after Foreign Minister Hoare made a speech before the League Assembly and the British naval power was reinforced in the Mediterranean, and then, how the Anglo-Italian dispute de-escalated at a fairly rapid rate in the end of September. In the seventh chapter, the author describes the structure of the Mediterranean crisis at its final stage as a game of 'chicken' for both sides, and explains why the participants of this crisis could reach a solution, temporary though it was, employing bargaining strategies through conciliatory influence efforts by each. The author's paper consists of following chapters : I. Introduction. II. Fascist Italy's Designs for the Ethiopian Conquest. III. Mussolini's Negotiations with Great Britain and France. IV. Change of Italy's Image of Great Britain-from Confusion to Confrontation. V. Anglo-Italian Tensions and Mussolini's Vacillations. VI. The Brink and Escape from Collision. VII. The Structure of the Mediterranean Crisis-A Chicken Game and Bargaining. VIII. Conclusion.

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.255-292, 1968-06-30

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Fascist Italy's occupation of Corfu has been interpreted by many historians as an exception to its early foreign policy. In appraising Mussolini's foreign policy, the tendency of scholars as well as the contemporaries has been to regard the Corfu Incident as a manifest lapse of moderation, an incipient expansionism, or an exceptional event in the course of his early diplomacy. Such capable diplomats as Contarini and Russo are said to have effectively led and controlled Fascist Italy's early diplomacy, while their fortuitous absence from Rome in August 1923 made it possible for Mussolini to venture on the occupation of Corfu. Was this decision of Mussolini incompatible with the old doctrine which career diplomats had pursued since the beginning of the Kingdom? Is it not true that even some non-fascist diplomats and statesmen did contribute to this decision-making? The relation between Mussolini's decision and the traditional doctrine seems worthy of investigation. It is the purpose of this essay to explain how and why the occupation of the island was planned, formulated and executed. This paper is divided into three major parts. First, examined are the historical background of Italy's foreign policy and the milieu in which the Fascist regime was required to embark upon its policy in 1922. Among factors that influenced Mussolini in the formulation of his foreign policy, dominant was the psychology of frustration which had become more and more conspicuous in the Italian people's state of mind particularly since the end of World War I. The second part covers the several days from the murder of the Tellini mission to the occupation of Corfu. Here discussed are : what sort of information was transmitted to Mussolini; how Mussolini and other policy-makers recognized the situation; and with the informations received and the situation recognized how they carried out their policy. Third, two important facts are stressed to throw light on the origin and motives for the occupation of Corfu. In brief, one of these facts was that Mussolini wanted to send a naval squadron to the Dodecanese immediately after the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty. And the other was that some officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Navy had prepared before the incident the military operations including the occupation of Corfu. These two plans can be said to have been prompted by the same desire to recover and promote the prestige of Italy as a great power. Finally, it is emphasized that Mussolini and non-fascist statesmen could cooperate with each other in shaping and executing their foreign policy as far as Great Britain could or would give her support.

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.171-213, 1965-05-30

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The results of the Russo-Japanese War closed the honeymoon period between the United States and Japan that had lasted for fifty years since Perry opened the latter's door, and the two Pacific Powers were brought into rivalry which culminated in the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forty years after the Portsmouth Conference. The roots of the U.S.-Japanese War may stretch back directly or indirectly to Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931. But to make clear the nature of the Manchurian Incident and to throw light on the real causes of the U.S.-Japanese struggle, we must go back further. In a sense the conflict began when the Japanese interests and privileges established in South Manchuria cast a gloom over the future advance of American commercial activities thereto. Japan's "twenty-one demands" in 1915 and her desiderata resulting from the Chengchiatun Incident in 1916 crystallized the aggressive attitude toward China of the Japanese Empire in the course of World War I. Japan launched an offensive against China taking advantage of the war which made it hard for the major European powers to pay much attention to China. Under these circumstances the United States was the only great neutral power that could emulate Japan. What, then, were the reactions or decisions of the United States against these demands? With what intention and through what process were her decisions made? And what were their consequences? This paper proposes to answer these questions. The writer's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. The U.S. Note of March 13,1915 to Japan. III. The U.S. Notes of May 11,1915 to Japan and China. IV. The Chengchiatun Incident and the U.S. reaction. V. Conclusion. Great impetus was given to the writer when he read a few books on Lansing's foreign policy (e.g., Smith's Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1958 and Beers' Vain Endeavor, 1962). The latter in particular emphasizes Lansing's realistic approach to the Far East. Lansing as a statesman and a diplomat, however, should neither be judged by his observation of power politics, whether realistic or not; what he designed; nor what he wanted to do. But the judgment should rely upon how the U.S.-Japanese relations were affected by the performance of his decision and by the differences of policy and idea among Lansing and other decision-makers. Thus, in order to have a correct understanding of the American policy toward Japan in this period, the writer believes that it is necessary to reexamine the roles of Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and other policy-makers and the interrelation among them. After closely examining the process of preparation for the two notes of 1915 and U.S. reaction against Japan's movement in 1916,the following is the writer's conclusion. First, the note of March 13,1915 is a mixture of different ideas and policies of Wilson, Bryan, and Lansing. This is an awkward compromise among these top decision-makers. Here is the reason why some interpret this note as America's recognition of Japan's special interests in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and others as protest. It goes without saying that Japan took advantage of this questionable character in her negotiations with China. Second, the author of the note of May 11 was Lansing, and by this note he intended to make good the loss the earlier note caused. But we cannot overlook Japan's doubt and perplexity made by this note. And in 1916,although he was less dependent of Wilson and other policy-makers, Lansing was almost silent about Japan's renewed demands on China mainly because of the European war situation and to meet the needs of the domestic politics. Nobody would deny that to maintain the status quo in the Far East was one of the basic principles of the United States foreign policy in this period. However, the sequence of these reactions at variance (conciliatory attitude ⟶ stiffening ⟶ negative policy) toward Japan's movements in China seems to have made the

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

大阪観光大学

雑誌

大阪明浄大学紀要 (ISSN:13454684)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.25-31, 2000-04-01

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.3, pp.27-53, 1967-09

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In the present issue, an analysis is made of Sonnino's efforts to formulate and execute the Italian foreign policy from the beginning of World War I to the intervention of Italy in May 1915. The writer considers this analysis is necessary in order to understand the Italian claims and Wilsonian diplomacy as well as their interaction at the Paris Peace Conference. First, Sonnino's reaction to the outbreak of the war is studied. Through examining his letters sent to Prime Minister Salandra, the writer explains how and why Sonnino's pro-Triple Alliance bearing at the very beginning of the war shifted into neutrality within a couple of months. Second, attention is paid to the fact that, in his frame of foreign policy, the primary emphasis was placed upon Italy's political and territorial expansion toward the Balkans, especially toward Albania. Taking full advantage of the European conflict, Sonnino intended to promote this plan. It was mainly for this purpose that he attempted to take as many gains as possible out of the Entente Powers in the negotiations which led to the London Treaty of 1915. Third, a brief discussion is made regarding his attitude to Italia Irredenta. Sonnino could not but make "Trento e Trieste" play a very important role for the Italian government to obtain the support of its people for the policy of intervention : it can be said that, until immediately after the opening of Italy's negotiations with the Entente, Trieste was not included in its territorial claims. Besides the all-powerful slogan of "Trento e Trieste", there were a few other means that Sonnino utilized in order to switch over the anti-war sentiment of the people to enthusiasm for intervention in the war : Bulow's proposal not to the Italian government but to Giolitti for himself; propaganda maneuvers of some influential newspapers for support of the government; and a mighty campaign by D'Annunzio, a poet and fanatic nationalist, for Italy's intervention. Finally, the writer concludes that the national sentiment of the Italian people, which was made use of by Sonnino in order to intervene in the war according to a provision of the London Treaty, was guided and controlled by strong leadership of the government just before the intervention of Italy. It should be noted, however, that after the intervention the nationalistic sentiment of the people, once flared up by the political leaders, tended to go beyond their control, gave pressure to the formulation and execution of foreign policy and finally took the initiative. (to be continued)

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.525-559, 1965-10-30

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At the Paris Peace Conference, the Council of Four, consisting of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, actually played the role of an executive council during the period of primary decision-making on the world settlement. And Wilson was regarded by the world as primus inter pares among these four leaders. In the President of the United States most people found a Messiah who had liberated the world from the Teutonic autocracy and the devastation of war, and thought that he came to Paris in 1919 to realize the very world that they had hoped for. In a word, Wilson was the central figure at the Peace Conference. Consequently, it is no wonder that most of the praise or censure on the Peace Treaties and their results has been focused on him. It is a known fact that the Italian enthusiasm and esteem for Wilson reached the zenith when he visited Rome in January 1919 and they fell off as Orlando faced difficulties on the Italian claims at the Council of Four. And it is also known that Wilson's direct appeal to the Italian nation, in April 1919,to assume a conciliatory attitude toward territorial claims abruptly turned their zeal for Wilsonian principles into fears and hatreds of this American President. Italians were greatly angered and disappointed at the results of the Conference. In a sense, their hatred for the New Order made it possible for Mussolini's Fascists to make a sudden rise and come into power in such a short time and to remain in power for the next twenty years. On what grounds and for what reasons did the Italian Government ask at the Conference for such territorial claims as were obviously incompatible with Wilson's principles, seen in retrospect? In what environment did the delegates of the United States deal with Italian claims? What were the reactions of Woodrow Wilson against these demands strenuously proposed by Orlando and Sonnino? And why? The purpose of this essay is to answer these questions, drawing on documentary materials such as Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., Documents on British Foreign Policy and Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, as well as on historical literature and biographies. The contents of this paper follow : I. Introduction. II. Historical Background-Italia Irredenta and the change of Italian foreign policy. III. From Neutrality to Intervention. IV. The London Treaty of 1915 and the Fourteen Points. V. Italian Claims and the Wilsonian Diplomacy at the Peace Conference. VI. Epilogue. The first three sections are only treated in this number. Italy claimed that her demands were based on the principle of selfdetermination of peoples and the Treaty of London as well. In order to gain a better understanding of the Italian demands on this principle, a brief retrospect of Irredentism is necessary. Section II is concerned with the relations between the Italian foreign policy and Irredentism. Since 1870 Italia Irredenta was a source of diplomatic contention. But in Italy this issue occupied the attention of the statesmen and the public on one occasion, while it was neglected or denied on another. Italian Governments from 1870 to 1914 conceivably made a cat's-paw of Irredentism according to their policies. And it was not until after World War I that Irredentism became a strong idea and sentiment of the nation. The Treaty of London was an outward expression of Italy's sacro egoismo and also the fruits of Sonnino's diplomacy. Section III briefly sketches the contents of the treaty and the nature of Sonnino's policy. It might be reasonable to conclude that his personality and statesmanship acted as a limiting factor on Italy's foreign policy after 1915 by his failure of paying attention to the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, and that his diplomacy, together with Irredentism which was flared up by the public, contained therein the seeds of the crisis at Paris in 1919. (to be continued)

著者

岡 俊孝

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

法と政治 (ISSN:02880709)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.1, pp.601-615, 1962-03-30