著者

清塚 邦彦

出版者

山形大学

雑誌

山形大学紀要 人文科学 (ISSN:05134641)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.268-235, 2002-02

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This paper is a sketch for the philosophical theory of pictorial representation. After introducing the theme of pictorial representation, I shall divide my arguments into two parts. The first part (sec.2-4) contains a series of critiques against "eliminativist" theories of pictorial representation. By "eliminativism" I mean those theories which do not recognize the factuality of perception peculiar to pictures at face value. I criticize three theories in particular as specimens of eliminativism: Illusion theory, resemblance theory and convention theory (or semiotic theory). In the second part (sec.5-6), I give an outline of an anti-elimitativist theory of pictorial representation. The theory insists on two points, each of which forms, respectively, a "natural" and an "artificial" aspect of the concept of pictorial representation. The first point is that picture perception (perception of images in pictures) is grounded on the twofold operation of the natural abilities of perceptual recognition at a subpersonal level. When we see a picture of a horse, the fact of our looking at the picture triggers, at a sub-personal level, not only the perceptual ability to recognize a plain surface but also the perceptual ability to recognize a horse. As a result, we get a twofold visual experience: what we see is a plain surface of course, but in seeing it, we cannot but have an impression that it is as if we were looking at a horse. This kind of experience is not to be dismissed as mere illusion. It is a natural and normal product of our senses. The second point is that in order that images in pictures get peculiarly representational character, they must be combined with what R.Wollheim called "standard of correctness". When we see a natural object (say, a stump in the woods) that happens to look like a bear, we do not say that it "represents" a bear. It can only be said to "look like" a bear. But when we see a bear in a picture, we not only say it looks like a bear, but also say that it is, or "represents", a bear. And, if someone says that it represents something else, we think that at least either of us must be wrong. Judgements about the representational content of a picture obeys a certain standard which dictates that some judgements are correct and others not. Elucidation of the nature of such standards of correctness forms another essential part of the theory of pictorial representation.