著者

小林 道彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.4, pp.488-523, 600-602, 1989-04-20

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Conventional understanding about the 1907 Japanese government's "Imperial Defense Policy" may be summarized in the following three points. 1)This policy shows the extent of the "political independence" of the "military" after the Russo-Japanese War. 2)The conflict between army's "state of Asia" position and the navy's "island empire" position was not dissolved by this policy. 3)Therefore, the army's demand for 25 divisions and the navy's demand for 8 battleships and 8 armour-clad cruisers, an "excessive" military buildup, were both included in the section which outlined military power necessary for national defense. This article aims at reconsidering the above conventional evaluation of the "Imperial Defense Policy", through examining the 'defense environment' and the process by which the post Russo-Japanese War military buildup policy was formed. The author's conclusions are as follows. 1)After the Russo-Japanese War, the "defense environment" became very favorable for Japan because of the virtual disarmament of the Russian navy and of Japan's obtaining a lease over Kwantung region (northeastern China). Under this "new situation", the supreme commanders of the army and the navy shifted from a defensive to an offensive position, in their "1906 Strategic Plan for Imperial Army". Up until this time such a "Plan" was annually formulated upon a hypothetical attack on the Japanese mainland. In contrast, from this time, they began to plan an attack on Mainland China. It should be also noted that both the army and the navy regarded Russia as a real enemy. 2)The favorable turn which took place in the 'defense environment' influenced the planning of the Military Armament Management Plan. Due to the Russian army's retreated from Manchuria more speedily than Japan had expected, a compromise was struck between Yamagata's demand for 25 peace time divisions and Kodama's demand for 19 ; and the army's expansion target was put at 20 divisions for the time being. Due to the disappearance of an urgent "threat" from Russia, and the Russian ships which Japan got as spoils of war, naval strength was maintained as that expansion of the level. 3)The "Imperial Defense Policy" was formulated under close cooperation between the army and the navy. In order to respond to the "new situation" after the Russo-Japanese war, the conception of "small imperialism" was discarded, and the army was conceptualized as a direct military force assuring the maintenance and expansion of the Japanese interests on the Continent, while the navy was put in the context of an assisting force in such expantion through securing sea-lanes to the Continent. In terms of the necessary military force, 19 peacetime divisions and 5 battleships and 7 armour-clad cruisers were decided as the consequence negotiations between the military and the Ministry of Finance. In other words, this decision on the amount of armaments was realized only after agreement was received from the civil government. Therefore, the civilian part of the government did have something to do with this decision. Consequently, the process of deciding the "Imperial Defense Policy" does not prove the political autonomy of the "military" at that time.