著者

細川 武稔

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.113, no.12, pp.2004-2024, 2004-12-20

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The present article focuses on prayer rituals performed by temples of the Zen Sect in order to shed light on the relationship between that Sect and the Muromachi Bakufu and on the character of the mechanism of Bakufu-designated official temples (kanji 官寺), which tied the Zen sect, especially the five great temples of Kyoto (Gozan 五山), closely to the Bakufu. The author identifies three separate systems of prayer (kito 祈祷) : one centered on the kanji organization of the Gozan-Jissatsu-Shozan temple hierarchy, one made up of Bakufu-designated "prayer temples" (kiganji 祈願寺) and one centered around the Ashikaga family temple of Shokokuji 相国寺. At the time of the founding of the Bakufu, the kanji temples of Kyoto were ordered to conduct prayer rituals, but no preparation was made at that time to have similar rituals conducted in the provinces. The shoguns issued directives recognizing temples as kiganji to supplement the kanji organization ; and later these temples were gradually absorbed into the kanji hierarchy as they spread throughout the country, being perceived as the system of prayer for the unified aristocrat-warrior Muromachi regime. However, this prayer order went through tremendous change with the building of Shokokuji by the third shogun, Yoshimitsu, as Zen priests of this Ashikaga family temple (bodaiji 菩提寺) were requested to perform prayer rituals in honor of the shogun's birthday, pray in the Kannon Room of the Shogun's residence, and conduct specially requested ceremonies. In other words, Shokokuji was preferred to such temples as Nanzenji 南禅寺 and Tenryuji 天龍寺, which were ranked above even the kanji hierarchy. Taking the leadership in the organization of the prayer system was the Inryoshiki 蔭涼職 (the shogun's major domo) in cooperation with the Rokuon-Soroku 鹿苑僧録, the registrar and supervisor of the kanji organization. Although Shokokuji developed into the nucleus of the three prayer systems, the kanji organization was indispensable due to its traditional ties to the public and state aspects of the imperial court, thus making it possible for two different systems to stand side-by-side, indicating how the Bakufu made the Zen Sect serve its purposes in both its public and private spheres.

著者

藤波 伸嘉

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.6, pp.1083-1108, 2013-06-20

著者

河内 祥輔

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.117, no.11, pp.1950-1952, 2008-11-20

著者

坂口 明

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.115, no.5, pp.924-928, 2006-05-20

著者

田中 美穂

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.10, pp.1646-1668, 2002-10-20

著者

與那覇 潤

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.8, pp.1419-1428, 2010-08-20

著者

川口 琢司

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.109, no.4, pp.586-595, 2000-04-20

著者

平 智之

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.105, no.8, pp.93-102, 1996-08-20

著者

谷口 雄太

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.12, pp.2019-2042, 2013-12-20

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This article addresses a number of questions about the Ashikaga Clan that have remained unclarified in the research to date: namely, Who made up that Clan? What is meant by the Ashikagas being as a "clan" (ichimon 一門) ? What does "the Ashikagas becoming a clan" mean? By reexaming these questions, the author hopes to better understand how the Ashikaga period came to a destructive end. The author begins by showing that the heretofore vaguely used term Ashikaga-shi Goikka 足利氏御一家 has been used in the two different senses of Ashikaga Gosanke (Three Branches of the Ashikaga Family) and Ashikaga Ichimon. And about the comment by the Tokis of the Sengoku period--After the Goikka, I am the leader of the all the other families, the author shows that "Goikka" means Ashikaga Ichimon. Secondly, the author reexamines the similarly vague term "Ashikaga Ichimon" by identifying its members from the available medieval historiography. One characteristic feature that has not been noticed to date is that both the Nitta Branch of the Minamoto Clan and the Yoshimi Family were included among its members. In particular, 1) the Nittas regarded themselves as members from the very beginning, since the Ashikaga Clan was essentially part of "the Yoshikuni branch of the Minamoto Clan"; and 2) the perception that the Nittas did not consider themselves part of the Ashikaga Clan can be traced back to the exclusive self-identity "ware-ware 我々" consciousness described in the Taiheiki 太平記. Next, after stating that there is yet no piece of research that has tried to present the Ashikaga Clan in a holistic fashion, but should be, the author shows from the medieval historiography that the above-mentioned perception of the Tokis that the Ashikaga Clan surpassed in status and prestige all other warrior clans was universally widespread during the Ashikaga period. Finally, the author inquires as to why such families as the Miyoshis and Odas of the Sengoku Period tried to debunk and alter the above-mentioned perception of the Ashikaga Clan's superiority, concluding that it was necessary to first switch the prerequisite for "changing the system from above" from kinship (i.e., membership in the Ashikaga Clan) to actual organizational ability as one indispensable step in the destruction of the existing order.

著者

吉原 弘道

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.7, pp.35-59, 142-143, 2002-07-20

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The conventional research on the position held by Ashikaga Takauji 足利尊氏 within the government formed after the Kenmu 建武 imperial restoration (1334) tends to argue that the warrior leader was excluded from all of its affairs. However, Amino Yoshihiko 網野善彦 has proposed that such a view be reconsidered in the light that the Kenmu government officially gave Takauji charge over Chinzei 鎮西 (Kyushu) military affairs, a subject that is now being pursued by Mori Shigeaki 森茂暁 and Ito Kiyoshi 伊藤喜良. Nevertheless, the conventional skeptical view of Takauji's role has yet to be reconsidered ; and his involvement in the Kenmugovernment has by no means been thoroughly investigated. In the present article, the author conducts a detailed analysis of the time from Takauji's turn against the Kamakura Bakufu in the 4th month of Genko 3 (1333) through the post-coup de'etat settle ment. The research to date has tended to look upon Takauji's involvement in the settlement as anti-government in attitude ; however, it is a fact that 1) Takauji utilized his close relationship with Emperor Go-Daigo to raise troops during the conflict, and 2) petitions for Imperial recognition of deployment (chakuto-jo 着到状) to the battles fought in the Kanto and Chinzei regions were submitted to the Emperor through Takauji. Moreover, Takauji's receipt of these petitions stemmed not from any personal ambition, but rather from his position as an intermediary for the Emperor ; and the authority that Takauji assumed during the incident was not personally usurped, but always based on his relationship to the Emperor, and was finally officially recognized in his appointment as military commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu 鎮守府 on Genko 3/6/5. In addition, his investiture as a minister of state (kugyo 公卿) was an attempt by the Emperor to define his position within the imperial court's organization. The author concludes that rather than being excluded from the affairs of the Kenmu government, Ashikaga Takauji was placed in one of its positions of military responsibility, and from the standpoint of Takauji himself, this role was not the result of some move to expand his own political influence, but rather stemmed from the powers invested in him through his official appointment as commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu.

著者

上杉 和彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.11, pp.1855-1877, 1970-1971, 1990-11-20

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The Kamakura Bakufu from its inception carried out and tried to maintain three fundamental policies concerning its house vassals (gokenin): 1)the prohibition on unlimited official appointments; 2)an emphasis on the jogo 成功 insitution of selling official appointments; and 3)a commitment to continued service in the capital after appointments were made. However, the above three measures should not be regarded as a policy inherent only to the Bakufu, but rather as common to all the bureaucratic institutions urider the ruling elite (kenmon 権門) during those times. However, while these three measures continued to form the Bakufu's basic policy concerning its bureaucracy, amendment no.96 to its Joei Shikimoku 貞永式目 law code, which was promulgated in 1243 by Shogun Minamoto-no-Yoritsune while visiting the capital, contains language that significantly alters the existing customs governing the operation of the jogo institution. This amendment was epoch-making in the sense that efforts were now being made to follow the spirit of the traditional bureaucratic system more strictly than what the Bakufu had done up to that point. The jogo custom as practiced by the Bakufu increased in importance as a means of garnering revenues for the support of the court at Kyoto. However, on the other hand, due to the self-seeking attitudes of the functionaries in charge of selling official appointments, the actual fees paid were often reduced below the officially established rates. This in turn was causing a very unstable flow of funds into the royal treasury. While amendment no.96 quite correctly assesses the actual situation, in the background of its successful promulgation stood the royal court led by Kujono-Michie, who was closely connected to the Kamakura Shoguns. And so in this sense we can see the move to correct jogo practices as part of an overall effort in the movement for mutual cooperation between the aristocracy and the warrior class in controlling the capital bureaucracy. With respect to a bureaucratic polity centering around the jogo institution from this time on, we can observe quite contrasting approaches adopted by the court and the Bakufu. On the one hand, the court showed little initiative in preventing the reduction of fees paid for appointments, while the Bakufu took far more positive steps to insure that such fees were maintained at their official rates. In the background of this positive attitude taken by the Bakufu was the deepening involvement by the Hojo regents in appointing Kamakura house vassals to official positions, a practice that had traditionally been the sole perogative of the Shogun himself.

著者

山家 浩樹

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.94, no.12, pp.1855-1881, 1993-1994, 1985-12-20

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The most important mechanism for litigation concerning feudal proprietorship during the Kamakura Shogunate was the Hikitsuke (引付), or the court reaching a decision by mutual consent. However, during the Muromachi Shogunate we can see that fief related lawsuits were fundamentally decided at the discretion of the Shoguns themselves. This change in the way of rendering judgement is very important. In this essay the present writer investigates how the Muromachi Shoguns came to render judgement based on their authority and how the court presided over by them came to be established. First, the writer studies Naidangata (内談方), which is known as a court similar to Hikitsuke except for the presence of Ashikaga Tadayoshi (足利直義). The writer then indicates that the second Shognn Yoshiakira (義詮) started a new court called Gozenzata (御前沙汰)... that is, "a trial before Yoshiakira"... which dealt with the same kind of lawsuits as Hikitsuke and gradually surpassed it in authority. Thus, Hikitsuke gradually lost real power and virtually came to an end with the continuing reinforcement of Gozenzata's authority. However, Gozenzata could be overruled under the influence of another court held by the Shogun, namely OnShogata (恩賞方), which dealt with claims for fiefs granted as service rewards and which had existed since the biginning of the Muromachi Shogunate. Since Gozenzata was reduced to be composed of similar members to Onshogata, the secretary to the Shogun (Shitsuji 執事) came to be present at Gozenzata. In Onshogata this secretary controlled the only department, Tokorozukegata (所付方), Which assisted the Shogun on practical affairs. However, because Gozenzatd lacked such a department as Tokorozukegata, the secretary would often find himself at odds with the Shogun. Finally this secretary retired from Gozenzata to reopen and personally direct Hikitsuke. He was soon to retire from Onshogata as well. In this way Gozenzata turned into a court which was composed of Shogun and functionaries (bugyonin 奉行人) and which was fully established during the reign of the third Shogun Yoshimitsu (義満). During this period, too, the court presided over by the shitsuji was formed on the basis of the reopened Hikitsuke. And a similar relation-ship between Onshogata and Tokorozukegata was carried on between these two courts, which enabled them to exist side by side over a long period of time.

著者

東条 由紀彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.89, no.9, pp.1388-1417, 1502-1503, 1980-09-20

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This essay attempts to analyze the nature of labor in Japan around the turn of the 20th century. This is done with emphasis on the following : 1)the qualitatively indiscriminate handling of labor as an object. 2)The quantitative adjustments made on the basis of the existence of a relative surplus of labor, in the process of social reproduction. In other words, I will examine the handling of labor in that era and the nature of reproduction in terms of the notion of labor force as a commodity controlled by capital. But I will also show the extreme restrictions placed on the "individual" unit in Japan through capital's handling of labor and clarify the nature of these restrictions. I will analyze the concept of the household (ie) in Japan as a manifestation of the Marxist notion of the "individual." Thus doing, I hope to explain the extreme restrictions placed on the ability of the "individual" to resist or curb the inclusion of labor by capital in modern society in Japan. Chapter 1 examines the layered structure of occupational groups (doshoku shudan), and those social reproduction and handling of labor mainly in heavy industry. Section 1 focuses on the phenomena of the labor contractors (oyakata), the apprentice system and the travelling workers (watari shokko). It investigates the network of interpersonal restrictions which united the oyakata bosses and travelling workers in that era. Section 2 begins with the often mentioned fact that craft guild organization was relatively loose in comparison to the craft guilds of Europe. But section 3 makes the point that even in Japan occupational groups which were fairly exclusive in nature did exist, and that traditional character and mode of expression of their informal regulations must be studied. In summary, Section 4 pulls together these three sections and explains that artisans in indigenous crafts also fell into the category of labor organized into occupational groups. Through this analysis, the extremely restricted traditional Japanese characteristics and particular mode of expression of the "individual" in the process of reproduction, and the handling of labor as a commodity by capital, are made clear. Chapter 2 examines the hierarchical composition of major occupational groups among unskilled laborers and the poor. The informal regulations of occupational groups clarified in Chapter 1 are shown to have existed among major unskilled workers such as coolies at work on the railroads. I point out the existence of several tens of these occupational groups, as subdivisions of major sections of the labor force, arranged in hierarchical order. Also, in Section 2, I look at those workers unable to maintain such a group structure who sunk into the category of the poorest laborers. Chapter 3 examines the category of supplementary income laborers. This group was built upon the existence of branches of the household (ie) system, inextricably linked to the household system in rural villages, a system which served both as a means of reproduction and of handling labor. On the basis of the above analysis, Chapter 4 begins by explaining the unique character of the "individual," "individual property," and modern society built upon these concepts. In Japan these are seen to historically arise from the extreme restrictions placed on the labor force as controlled by capital (or existing as a premise to its formations), in a larger structure of reproduction and handling of labor based on the rural household unit. Section 1 points out that the household (ie) itself, in Japan a unit on one hand existing as the fusion of its members and on the other hand facing the society as the "individual" possessor of property, functioned in fact as an "individual." Further, Section 2 tries to make clear the particular structure in which this household handled the labor it possesed. Chapter 5 sums up my understanding of the particular situation structure and logic of reproduction and the labor force in Japan of this

著者

古川 隆久

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.4, pp.457-494, 605-606, 1990-04-20

被引用文献数

1

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From 1935 to 1945 reformist bureaucrats in Japan occupied virtually the center of policy making along with a group of politically and economically concerned military officers. These bureaucrats were not only able to exert influence in the complete bottom-up process of policy formation, but also, despite little formal powers, were also able to effect decision making to a far greater extent than in the era of the political party cabinets. These reformist bureaucrats belonged to a group of government officials who had received their formal university education in the 1920's in the Marxist tradition. They rose up through the ranks in the latter half of the 1930s from personal and professional relationships in the background of building a controlled economy. They philosophically refuted both Marxism and capitalism, which they viewed as degrading the human character by the strong emphasis on materialism. Focussing their views on success in Manchuria, they stressed domestic totalism (planned economy) according to political priorities (presuming of course the existence of the monarchical [Tenno] institution), and insisted on the "East Asian (toa) bloc" as the corresponding state of affairs on the foreign front. This way of thinking was based on German totalistic thought; however, we can also discern their Marxist educational background enabling them to adopt such an ideology. In terms of concrete goals, their totalism was commonly directed towards "reform" plans geared to increasing the military strength of the army. It was for this reason that these reformist bureaucrats joined hands with politically and economically concerned military officers in policy making and political action. The practical behavior of these reformist bureaucrats, being based generally on this kind of ideology, was geared towards carrying out within such integrative offices as the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in) a radical state reorganization effort (almost impossible in peacetime) as one link in the creation of a wartime system for supporting the war in China and the Pacific War. Their efforts meet with a fair amount of success. The true intentions of the whole "reformist faction", which included these bureaucrats and embraced totalism in the wake of the German victorids on the European front, came to light during the Konoe New Organization movement of 1940 and 1941. However, the "citizens organization" plan that they were most eager to put through was not realized fully due to resistance in the National Diet. In any case, these reformist bureaucrats, as a result of giving up on both Marxist and capitalist solutions, inevitably plunged Japan into the Pacific War and continued to hold this ideology even after the War was over. While we can say on the one hand that their criticism of both Marxism and capitalism was not completely irrelevant in that it can be linked in the end to Japan's postwar high economic growth, on the other hand, it was because of their hastiness in trying to reform the present situation that they brought a great many of human and material damages in the Pacific War. Furthermore, when looking at the problem in terms of comparative history and national system theory, in the sense that it was the army officers and reformist bureaucrats who exerted real political influence through their commitment to totalist ideology, but were able to realize only a part of their goals in very gradual steps, we could call this period in Japanese history "a wartime state regime tending gradually towards totalism".

著者

吉永 隆記

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.1, 2013-01-20

著者

小澤 実

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.113, no.12, pp.2088-2089, 2004-12-20

著者

岡本 託

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.8, pp.1497-1521, 2014-08-20

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This article discusses how high-ranking officials were trained under France's July Monarchy (1830-1848), at a time when government administration was becoming more and more complex and a bureaucratic organization was gradually being institutionalized. The author takes up the case of the Auditorat in the Conseil d'Etat, focusing on the logic behind the recruitment and training of its administrative officials. He describes the actual circumstances of recruitment and training of auditeurs via a synthesis of three approaches: 1) institutional analysis of the auditeur based on laws and ordinances, 2) prosopographical analysis utilizing the personal data of 211 auditeurs and 3) analysis of petitions for recruitment of auditeurs as well as their internal evaluation. The author concludes that first, two contrary opinions existed regarding the institution of auditeur during the time in question. One was the conservative idea which considered the auditorat as a stagiaire who would become merel a maitre des requetes or a conseiller in the Conseil d'Etat in the future; the other was the republican idea which considered the institution to be the grande ecole d'administration, in which trained officials who could be entrusted with any administrative post. The laws and ordinances pertaining to auditeurs promulgated under the July Monarchy all embodied the opposition between these ideologies. Secondly, the necessary conditions of auditeur recruitment were threefold: 1) the social background of the candidate, 2) the influence of recommenders and 3) the abilities of the candidate. However, it is impossible to determine which condition was the most conclusive, leading one to believe that it was a combination of them which led to successful recruitment. Finally, as to the system of auditeur training, the author points out that auditeurs were expected to acquire the skills of administrative officials through experience gained along different career paths, which included a central administrative post, a local administrative post and a post in the Conseil d'Etat. However, auditeur training was not very successful because of the customs surrounding the promotion of central administrative officials and the lack of administrative ability on the part of the auditeurs themselves. In addition, the lack of maitre des requetes posts in the Conseil d'Etat made the training of auditeurs more difficult. Nevertheless, approximately half of those who had trained at the auditorat under the July Monarchy were given administrative appointments and reappointed by the next political regime. This proportion of reappointments exceeded the number during the Napoleonic era and the Bourbon Restoration. Consequently, it can be said that the institution of auditeur under the July Monarchy served the function of training high-ranking officials to some extent and that this institution had a impact on both the struggle for hegemony in the Chambre des pairs and the Chambre des deputes, and on the institutionalization of the recruitment and the careers of high-ranking officials during the nineteenth century.

著者

張 東翼

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.8, pp.一三八七-一四〇八, 2005-08-20

著者

藤波 伸嘉

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.8, pp.1383-1420, 2015-08-20

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Unlike other Islamic polities that were colonized by the Western powers, the Ottoman Empire remained independent until the very end. Therefore, the relationship between Islamic law and the Empire's public law became an important topic in Ottoman jurisprudence, especially after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, when the principle of national sovereignty (hakimiyet-i milliye) was proclaimed as a basis of the state's new constitution. This article addresses the views of Ottoman jurists regarding national sovereignty by analyzing Babanzade Ismail Hakki's Hukuk-i Esasiye, one of the first textbooks on Ottoman constitutional law. While continuing his predecessors' endeavors to defend Ottoman sovereignty, Ismail Hakki introduced a new approach to understanding the character of the Ottoman Caliphate. To wit, sovereignty derives solely from the nation which is one and indivisible. The state is a juridical person representing the nation's natural sovereignty. Consequently, the monarch, namely, the Sultan-Caliph, was no more than an organ of the state. Ismail Hakki discussed the development of parliamentarism in a way that enabled him to construct an alternative approach to world legal history. While in the West parliaments were the product of feudal privilege, in the East there was no such privilege, due to the fact that Islamic law dictated that all men were equal and also that the Caliphate was, in essence, nothing but a form of universal suffrage, through which the nation's will was expressed in the form of bay'a (oath of allegiance). Therefore, for Ismail Hakki, there was no reason to respect the three "privileges" that had been introduced into the Ottoman state governance since the late eighteenth century-the Capitulations (imtiyazat-i ecnebiye), autonomous provinces (eyalat-i mumtaze), and the religious privileges of non-Muslims (imtiyazat-i mezhebiye)-because they were contrary to the principle of equality among Ottomans and formed exceptions to the rules of a sovereign state system. While he took it for granted that the Ottoman nation was composed of various ethnic and religious groups, Ismail Hakki kept silent on the question of how to legally define the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Ottoman constitution. He condemned the religious/ethnic quota system because, according to him, the Ottoman parliament represented the will of the one and indivisible nation as a whole. Religious/ethnic quotas contradict this fundamental basis of constitutional law. This attitude of Babanzade Ismail Hakki foreshadowed the subsequent legal tradition of the Turks to legitimize their Republic, which they alleged was ethnically homogenous.

著者

今澤 浩二

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.3, pp.309-344, 456-455, 1990-03-20

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This study attempts to examine early relations between Bayezid the Thunderbolt and Timur in the Five-Years' Campaign (1392-96) by means of considering several situations in Anatolia and Syria, and then analyzing a letter written by Timur to Bayezid. In studying this subject, the author use Bazm u Razm, an Anatolian source, which is little-known in Japan, as well as Ottoman and Timurid sources. The Bazm u Razm proves that Timur's intention for his Five-Years' Campaign was not only to recover the sovereignty of Il-khanid in Iran, but also to rule eastern Anatolia, namely, the former territory of Seljuqid of Rum, which submitted to Il-khanid. With this in mind Timur succeeded in ruling the whole of Iran, but fell into a difficult situation in Anatolia and Syria on account of the resistance of Barquq, the Sultan of the Mamluk Empire, Qadi Burhan al-Din Ahmad, the ruler of Sivas and Toqtamish, the Khan of the Golden Horde. It was in order to deal with such a situation that Timur wrote a letter to Bayezid in March, 1395 that proposed the establishment of friendly relations between the two. Therefore the conventional opinion should be corrected that Timur wrote to Bayezid in order to protect his back in carrying out an expedition to China after the Five-Years' Campaign. And he did not change his attitude toward Bayezid in the Seven-Years' Campaign (1399-1404), either. That is to say, Timur continually tried to seek the friendship of Bayezid and avoid struggling with him. On the other hand, Bayezid was extending his influence over Anatolia, but from the middle of 1393 he began to turn his attention to the situation on the Balkan peninsula, which had developed rapidly by the maneuvers of Venetia and Hungary, and in the beginning of 1394, he moved to Balkan. Under the circumstances Timur appeared in eastern Anatolia. And when Barquq and Burhan al-Din formed an alliance against him, Bayezid also joined it, refusing Timur's offer and strengthening relations with the anti-Timur nations. It is clear, therefore, that Bayezid intended to be hostile to Timur, and moreover, continued taking such an attitude in the Seven-Years' Campaign. But he also concentrated on strengthening his sovereignty over Balkan without taking measures against Timur during his approach, in contrast to Barquq and Burhan al-Din. This leads us to think that Bayezid adopted an intentional policy for Anatolia and Balkan. As for this supposition, however, we must carry out a further examination. In conclusion, we can say that the first relations established between Bayezid and Timur in the Five-Years' Campaign, lasted much longer after that.