著者
細川 武稔
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.113, no.12, pp.2004-2024, 2004-12-20

The present article focuses on prayer rituals performed by temples of the Zen Sect in order to shed light on the relationship between that Sect and the Muromachi Bakufu and on the character of the mechanism of Bakufu-designated official temples (kanji 官寺), which tied the Zen sect, especially the five great temples of Kyoto (Gozan 五山), closely to the Bakufu. The author identifies three separate systems of prayer (kito 祈祷) : one centered on the kanji organization of the Gozan-Jissatsu-Shozan temple hierarchy, one made up of Bakufu-designated "prayer temples" (kiganji 祈願寺) and one centered around the Ashikaga family temple of Shokokuji 相国寺. At the time of the founding of the Bakufu, the kanji temples of Kyoto were ordered to conduct prayer rituals, but no preparation was made at that time to have similar rituals conducted in the provinces. The shoguns issued directives recognizing temples as kiganji to supplement the kanji organization ; and later these temples were gradually absorbed into the kanji hierarchy as they spread throughout the country, being perceived as the system of prayer for the unified aristocrat-warrior Muromachi regime. However, this prayer order went through tremendous change with the building of Shokokuji by the third shogun, Yoshimitsu, as Zen priests of this Ashikaga family temple (bodaiji 菩提寺) were requested to perform prayer rituals in honor of the shogun's birthday, pray in the Kannon Room of the Shogun's residence, and conduct specially requested ceremonies. In other words, Shokokuji was preferred to such temples as Nanzenji 南禅寺 and Tenryuji 天龍寺, which were ranked above even the kanji hierarchy. Taking the leadership in the organization of the prayer system was the Inryoshiki 蔭涼職 (the shogun's major domo) in cooperation with the Rokuon-Soroku 鹿苑僧録, the registrar and supervisor of the kanji organization. Although Shokokuji developed into the nucleus of the three prayer systems, the kanji organization was indispensable due to its traditional ties to the public and state aspects of the imperial court, thus making it possible for two different systems to stand side-by-side, indicating how the Bakufu made the Zen Sect serve its purposes in both its public and private spheres.
著者
田中 美穂
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.111, no.10, pp.1646-1668, 2002-10-20
著者
吉原 弘道
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.111, no.7, pp.35-59, 142-143, 2002-07-20

The conventional research on the position held by Ashikaga Takauji 足利尊氏 within the government formed after the Kenmu 建武 imperial restoration (1334) tends to argue that the warrior leader was excluded from all of its affairs. However, Amino Yoshihiko 網野善彦 has proposed that such a view be reconsidered in the light that the Kenmu government officially gave Takauji charge over Chinzei 鎮西 (Kyushu) military affairs, a subject that is now being pursued by Mori Shigeaki 森茂暁 and Ito Kiyoshi 伊藤喜良. Nevertheless, the conventional skeptical view of Takauji's role has yet to be reconsidered ; and his involvement in the Kenmugovernment has by no means been thoroughly investigated. In the present article, the author conducts a detailed analysis of the time from Takauji's turn against the Kamakura Bakufu in the 4th month of Genko 3 (1333) through the post-coup de'etat settle ment. The research to date has tended to look upon Takauji's involvement in the settlement as anti-government in attitude ; however, it is a fact that 1) Takauji utilized his close relationship with Emperor Go-Daigo to raise troops during the conflict, and 2) petitions for Imperial recognition of deployment (chakuto-jo 着到状) to the battles fought in the Kanto and Chinzei regions were submitted to the Emperor through Takauji. Moreover, Takauji's receipt of these petitions stemmed not from any personal ambition, but rather from his position as an intermediary for the Emperor ; and the authority that Takauji assumed during the incident was not personally usurped, but always based on his relationship to the Emperor, and was finally officially recognized in his appointment as military commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu 鎮守府 on Genko 3/6/5. In addition, his investiture as a minister of state (kugyo 公卿) was an attempt by the Emperor to define his position within the imperial court's organization. The author concludes that rather than being excluded from the affairs of the Kenmu government, Ashikaga Takauji was placed in one of its positions of military responsibility, and from the standpoint of Takauji himself, this role was not the result of some move to expand his own political influence, but rather stemmed from the powers invested in him through his official appointment as commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu.
著者
堀川 康史
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.125, no.12, pp.1-24, 2016 (Released:2018-01-28)

応永2年(1395)閏7月、九州探題今川了俊は京都に召還され、翌年2月までに解任された。室町幕府の九州政策の大きな転換点となったこの解任劇は、足利義満期の政治史や地域支配を論じるうえで不可欠の事件として知られているが、その政治過程、とりわけ解任に至った理由・経緯については不明な点が少なくない。本稿は、1390年代前半の九州情勢との関わりを重視する立場から、これらの点について検討を加えるものである。 検討の結果、解任の理由は了俊と九州大名との協力関係の断絶とそれにともなう九州経営の崩壊に求められることが明らかになった。その経緯は以下の通りである。 まず両島津氏との関係について見ると、長く対立関係にあった了俊と両島津氏は、明徳2年(1391)に和平を結んだものの、探題派国人の権益保護と両島津氏との和平は両立せず、和平の成立後まもない時期から南九州では局地的紛争が発生した。了俊は反島津氏を掲げる南九州国人一揆の意向もあって和平の破棄を決断し、明徳5年(1394)2月以降、再び両島津氏との戦いに突入していった。 ついで大友氏との関係に目を転じると、応永初年に大友親世と有力庶家の田原・吉弘両氏の間で内訌が生じた際、了俊は反親世派を支援したことで親世と断交した。親世は大内義弘・両島津氏と結ぶことで了俊に対抗し、結果として応永2年までに了俊は大友・大内・両島津の三者と敵対関係に陥った。この九州大名との協力関係の断絶が、了俊の九州経営を崩壊に導いていくことになった。 最後に足利義満はというと、通説とは異なり京都召還の直前まで了俊を支援していた様子が読みとれる。しかし、有力大名が揃って了俊に敵対し、九州経営の崩壊が徐々に明らかになったことにより、最終的に義満は了俊の解任を決断したと考えられる。応永3年(1396)2月、渋川満頼の探題就任が九州諸氏に報じられ、20年以上に及んだ了俊の九州経営はここに終わりを迎えることになったのである。
著者
山家 浩樹
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.94, no.12, pp.1855-1881, 1993-1994, 1985-12-20

The most important mechanism for litigation concerning feudal proprietorship during the Kamakura Shogunate was the Hikitsuke (引付), or the court reaching a decision by mutual consent. However, during the Muromachi Shogunate we can see that fief related lawsuits were fundamentally decided at the discretion of the Shoguns themselves. This change in the way of rendering judgement is very important. In this essay the present writer investigates how the Muromachi Shoguns came to render judgement based on their authority and how the court presided over by them came to be established. First, the writer studies Naidangata (内談方), which is known as a court similar to Hikitsuke except for the presence of Ashikaga Tadayoshi (足利直義). The writer then indicates that the second Shognn Yoshiakira (義詮) started a new court called Gozenzata (御前沙汰)... that is, "a trial before Yoshiakira"... which dealt with the same kind of lawsuits as Hikitsuke and gradually surpassed it in authority. Thus, Hikitsuke gradually lost real power and virtually came to an end with the continuing reinforcement of Gozenzata's authority. However, Gozenzata could be overruled under the influence of another court held by the Shogun, namely OnShogata (恩賞方), which dealt with claims for fiefs granted as service rewards and which had existed since the biginning of the Muromachi Shogunate. Since Gozenzata was reduced to be composed of similar members to Onshogata, the secretary to the Shogun (Shitsuji 執事) came to be present at Gozenzata. In Onshogata this secretary controlled the only department, Tokorozukegata (所付方), Which assisted the Shogun on practical affairs. However, because Gozenzatd lacked such a department as Tokorozukegata, the secretary would often find himself at odds with the Shogun. Finally this secretary retired from Gozenzata to reopen and personally direct Hikitsuke. He was soon to retire from Onshogata as well. In this way Gozenzata turned into a court which was composed of Shogun and functionaries (bugyonin 奉行人) and which was fully established during the reign of the third Shogun Yoshimitsu (義満). During this period, too, the court presided over by the shitsuji was formed on the basis of the reopened Hikitsuke. And a similar relation-ship between Onshogata and Tokorozukegata was carried on between these two courts, which enabled them to exist side by side over a long period of time.
著者
東条 由紀彦
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.89, no.9, pp.1388-1417, 1502-1503, 1980-09-20

This essay attempts to analyze the nature of labor in Japan around the turn of the 20th century. This is done with emphasis on the following : 1)the qualitatively indiscriminate handling of labor as an object. 2)The quantitative adjustments made on the basis of the existence of a relative surplus of labor, in the process of social reproduction. In other words, I will examine the handling of labor in that era and the nature of reproduction in terms of the notion of labor force as a commodity controlled by capital. But I will also show the extreme restrictions placed on the "individual" unit in Japan through capital's handling of labor and clarify the nature of these restrictions. I will analyze the concept of the household (ie) in Japan as a manifestation of the Marxist notion of the "individual." Thus doing, I hope to explain the extreme restrictions placed on the ability of the "individual" to resist or curb the inclusion of labor by capital in modern society in Japan. Chapter 1 examines the layered structure of occupational groups (doshoku shudan), and those social reproduction and handling of labor mainly in heavy industry. Section 1 focuses on the phenomena of the labor contractors (oyakata), the apprentice system and the travelling workers (watari shokko). It investigates the network of interpersonal restrictions which united the oyakata bosses and travelling workers in that era. Section 2 begins with the often mentioned fact that craft guild organization was relatively loose in comparison to the craft guilds of Europe. But section 3 makes the point that even in Japan occupational groups which were fairly exclusive in nature did exist, and that traditional character and mode of expression of their informal regulations must be studied. In summary, Section 4 pulls together these three sections and explains that artisans in indigenous crafts also fell into the category of labor organized into occupational groups. Through this analysis, the extremely restricted traditional Japanese characteristics and particular mode of expression of the "individual" in the process of reproduction, and the handling of labor as a commodity by capital, are made clear. Chapter 2 examines the hierarchical composition of major occupational groups among unskilled laborers and the poor. The informal regulations of occupational groups clarified in Chapter 1 are shown to have existed among major unskilled workers such as coolies at work on the railroads. I point out the existence of several tens of these occupational groups, as subdivisions of major sections of the labor force, arranged in hierarchical order. Also, in Section 2, I look at those workers unable to maintain such a group structure who sunk into the category of the poorest laborers. Chapter 3 examines the category of supplementary income laborers. This group was built upon the existence of branches of the household (ie) system, inextricably linked to the household system in rural villages, a system which served both as a means of reproduction and of handling labor. On the basis of the above analysis, Chapter 4 begins by explaining the unique character of the "individual," "individual property," and modern society built upon these concepts. In Japan these are seen to historically arise from the extreme restrictions placed on the labor force as controlled by capital (or existing as a premise to its formations), in a larger structure of reproduction and handling of labor based on the rural household unit. Section 1 points out that the household (ie) itself, in Japan a unit on one hand existing as the fusion of its members and on the other hand facing the society as the "individual" possessor of property, functioned in fact as an "individual." Further, Section 2 tries to make clear the particular structure in which this household handled the labor it possesed. Chapter 5 sums up my understanding of the particular situation structure and logic of reproduction and the labor force in Japan of this
著者
古川 隆久
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.99, no.4, pp.457-494, 605-606, 1990-04-20
被引用文献数
1 or 0

From 1935 to 1945 reformist bureaucrats in Japan occupied virtually the center of policy making along with a group of politically and economically concerned military officers. These bureaucrats were not only able to exert influence in the complete bottom-up process of policy formation, but also, despite little formal powers, were also able to effect decision making to a far greater extent than in the era of the political party cabinets. These reformist bureaucrats belonged to a group of government officials who had received their formal university education in the 1920's in the Marxist tradition. They rose up through the ranks in the latter half of the 1930s from personal and professional relationships in the background of building a controlled economy. They philosophically refuted both Marxism and capitalism, which they viewed as degrading the human character by the strong emphasis on materialism. Focussing their views on success in Manchuria, they stressed domestic totalism (planned economy) according to political priorities (presuming of course the existence of the monarchical [Tenno] institution), and insisted on the "East Asian (toa) bloc" as the corresponding state of affairs on the foreign front. This way of thinking was based on German totalistic thought; however, we can also discern their Marxist educational background enabling them to adopt such an ideology. In terms of concrete goals, their totalism was commonly directed towards "reform" plans geared to increasing the military strength of the army. It was for this reason that these reformist bureaucrats joined hands with politically and economically concerned military officers in policy making and political action. The practical behavior of these reformist bureaucrats, being based generally on this kind of ideology, was geared towards carrying out within such integrative offices as the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in) a radical state reorganization effort (almost impossible in peacetime) as one link in the creation of a wartime system for supporting the war in China and the Pacific War. Their efforts meet with a fair amount of success. The true intentions of the whole "reformist faction", which included these bureaucrats and embraced totalism in the wake of the German victorids on the European front, came to light during the Konoe New Organization movement of 1940 and 1941. However, the "citizens organization" plan that they were most eager to put through was not realized fully due to resistance in the National Diet. In any case, these reformist bureaucrats, as a result of giving up on both Marxist and capitalist solutions, inevitably plunged Japan into the Pacific War and continued to hold this ideology even after the War was over. While we can say on the one hand that their criticism of both Marxism and capitalism was not completely irrelevant in that it can be linked in the end to Japan's postwar high economic growth, on the other hand, it was because of their hastiness in trying to reform the present situation that they brought a great many of human and material damages in the Pacific War. Furthermore, when looking at the problem in terms of comparative history and national system theory, in the sense that it was the army officers and reformist bureaucrats who exerted real political influence through their commitment to totalist ideology, but were able to realize only a part of their goals in very gradual steps, we could call this period in Japanese history "a wartime state regime tending gradually towards totalism".
著者
上杉 和彦
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.99, no.11, pp.1855-1877, 1970-1971, 1990-11-20

The Kamakura Bakufu from its inception carried out and tried to maintain three fundamental policies concerning its house vassals (gokenin): 1)the prohibition on unlimited official appointments; 2)an emphasis on the jogo 成功 insitution of selling official appointments; and 3)a commitment to continued service in the capital after appointments were made. However, the above three measures should not be regarded as a policy inherent only to the Bakufu, but rather as common to all the bureaucratic institutions urider the ruling elite (kenmon 権門) during those times. However, while these three measures continued to form the Bakufu's basic policy concerning its bureaucracy, amendment no.96 to its Joei Shikimoku 貞永式目 law code, which was promulgated in 1243 by Shogun Minamoto-no-Yoritsune while visiting the capital, contains language that significantly alters the existing customs governing the operation of the jogo institution. This amendment was epoch-making in the sense that efforts were now being made to follow the spirit of the traditional bureaucratic system more strictly than what the Bakufu had done up to that point. The jogo custom as practiced by the Bakufu increased in importance as a means of garnering revenues for the support of the court at Kyoto. However, on the other hand, due to the self-seeking attitudes of the functionaries in charge of selling official appointments, the actual fees paid were often reduced below the officially established rates. This in turn was causing a very unstable flow of funds into the royal treasury. While amendment no.96 quite correctly assesses the actual situation, in the background of its successful promulgation stood the royal court led by Kujono-Michie, who was closely connected to the Kamakura Shoguns. And so in this sense we can see the move to correct jogo practices as part of an overall effort in the movement for mutual cooperation between the aristocracy and the warrior class in controlling the capital bureaucracy. With respect to a bureaucratic polity centering around the jogo institution from this time on, we can observe quite contrasting approaches adopted by the court and the Bakufu. On the one hand, the court showed little initiative in preventing the reduction of fees paid for appointments, while the Bakufu took far more positive steps to insure that such fees were maintained at their official rates. In the background of this positive attitude taken by the Bakufu was the deepening involvement by the Hojo regents in appointing Kamakura house vassals to official positions, a practice that had traditionally been the sole perogative of the Shogun himself.
著者
池田 勇太
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.115, no.6, pp.1041-1078, 2006

The present article attempts to clarify the birth of monarchical constitutionalism on the occasion of a debate over a popularly elected parliament in 1874, by focusing on Motoda Nagazane (or Eifu) 元田永孚, who was Emperor Meiji's tutor in Confucianism. The introduction of a constitutional polity in the absence of a government not only displayed the strong character of a modernization measure and was thought to realize a political society supported by the masses and open public opinion, but also a parliament, constitution and separation of the legislative and administrative branches of government were expected to solve real problems that existed in local administration and politics at the time. The article begins with an examination of the actions taken by the Governor of Fukushima Prefecture Yasuba Yasukazu 安場保和 in order to clarify the era's parliamentary movement against the background of local administration and to argue that the fair and just nature (ko 公) of a constitutional polity was thought to be identical to traditional Confucian political ideals. Secondly, the introduction of a constitutional polity at that point in time was not the result of power politics fought along vertical, class lines, but was rather a specific political expression of what the Restoration bureaucracy thought desirable. On the other hand, the introduction of such a polity under well-meaning auspices from above also meant that the bureaucracy did not always seek broad pluralistic opinions on the subject, but rather tended to make policy decisions in a more theoretical manner. The 1874 debate over a popularly elected parliament brought the issue of mass popular political participation to the forefront in terms of "joint rule by king and citizen." It was here that Motoda Eifu suggested that in a monarchical state it was necessary to make a distinction between "public opinion" and "the just argument," arguing that it was the monarch who should employ the latter. Any parliamentary system in which the monarch enjoys ultimate prerogative, moreover, demands that the monarch have the ability to exercise that prerogative properly, which necessitated the development of a system of imperial advisors and educators. At that time there was also the idea that the position of senior political advisor (genro 元老) should be created outside of the cabinet to perform such a function. Motoda, on the other hand, reformed such an idea based on the necessity of a monarch performing his duties with the final say within a constitutional polity. This is why it can be said that both monarchical constitutionalism and the establishment of the emperor's prerogative within it was born out of the 1874 debate over a popularly elected parliament.
著者
谷口 雄太
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.122, no.12, pp.2019-2042, 2013-12-20

This article addresses a number of questions about the Ashikaga Clan that have remained unclarified in the research to date: namely, Who made up that Clan? What is meant by the Ashikagas being as a "clan" (ichimon 一門) ? What does "the Ashikagas becoming a clan" mean? By reexaming these questions, the author hopes to better understand how the Ashikaga period came to a destructive end. The author begins by showing that the heretofore vaguely used term Ashikaga-shi Goikka 足利氏御一家 has been used in the two different senses of Ashikaga Gosanke (Three Branches of the Ashikaga Family) and Ashikaga Ichimon. And about the comment by the Tokis of the Sengoku period--After the Goikka, I am the leader of the all the other families, the author shows that "Goikka" means Ashikaga Ichimon. Secondly, the author reexamines the similarly vague term "Ashikaga Ichimon" by identifying its members from the available medieval historiography. One characteristic feature that has not been noticed to date is that both the Nitta Branch of the Minamoto Clan and the Yoshimi Family were included among its members. In particular, 1) the Nittas regarded themselves as members from the very beginning, since the Ashikaga Clan was essentially part of "the Yoshikuni branch of the Minamoto Clan"; and 2) the perception that the Nittas did not consider themselves part of the Ashikaga Clan can be traced back to the exclusive self-identity "ware-ware 我々" consciousness described in the Taiheiki 太平記. Next, after stating that there is yet no piece of research that has tried to present the Ashikaga Clan in a holistic fashion, but should be, the author shows from the medieval historiography that the above-mentioned perception of the Tokis that the Ashikaga Clan surpassed in status and prestige all other warrior clans was universally widespread during the Ashikaga period. Finally, the author inquires as to why such families as the Miyoshis and Odas of the Sengoku Period tried to debunk and alter the above-mentioned perception of the Ashikaga Clan's superiority, concluding that it was necessary to first switch the prerequisite for "changing the system from above" from kinship (i.e., membership in the Ashikaga Clan) to actual organizational ability as one indispensable step in the destruction of the existing order.
著者
上田 純子
出版者
The Historical Society of Japan
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.109, no.11, pp.2014-2042, 2000-11-20 (Released:2017-11-30)

This paper explores the decision-making process of the Hagi Domain government during their Bunkyu era reforms, which began in March 1863 and were brought to an end in September 1869 after the bombardment of Shimonoseki and the outbreak of violence in Kyoto. Before the reforms, policy-making functions were carried out by two members of the Karo家老 class, called Ryoshoku両職, who were supported by a small group of lower level officials, the Goyogatachu御用方中. After the reforms, policy-making activities and appeals to the daimyo were both carried out at a newly established Seijido(政事堂;Hall of governance). The officials of the Seijido routinely conducted policy meetings in the presence of the daimyo. These measures aimed at involving a larger range of the warrior class in the consultative process give that process more authority, or potency. The abolition of the Ryoshoku system also aimed at better preparing the domain for war, by emphasising the military role of Karo members and moving the former Goyogatachu officers into military administrative roles.