著者

松枝 法道

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

經濟學論究 (ISSN:02868032)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.2, pp.71-88, 2005-09-30

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In a non-cooperative game of an international environmental technology transfer program, it is quite plausible that the transfer contribution of a donor country and the accommodating effort of a recipient country are "strategic complements" to each other. In this note, we first derive the conditions under which such strategic complementarity arises within a fairly general setup. We then discuss several economic consequences to which this strategic complementarity can lead. In contrast to the case of strategic substitutes, a Stackelberg leadership always leads to Pareto improvement from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the case of strategic complements. Moreover, even a unilateral environmental action by either country could result in Pareto improvement in the presence of strategic complementarity.