著者

銭谷 秋生 Akio Zeniya

出版者

茨城キリスト教大学

雑誌

茨城キリスト教大学紀要. I, 人文科学 = Journal of Ibaraki Christian University. I, Humanities (ISSN:13426362)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.89-106, 2006-01-01

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Thomas Nagel argues in The Possibility of Altruism that just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action, of which altruism is one. According to Nagel, the altruism, that is a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons without needing ulterior motives, is not to be confused with general affection for humanity. Altruism is not a feeling, but a rational requirement on desire and action, which one can't refuse in so far as one can recognize the reality of other persons and have the capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many. Can this claim be justified rationally? This article summarizes and examines the arguments for Nagel's claim. There are ethical views denying the rationality of altruism. The typical views are, according to Nagel, egoism and practical solipsism. He discusses these ethical views and tries to refute them. This article also examines his rebuttal, thereby clarifying the foundation of his own ethical theory.