著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.154-183, 2007-11-15

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The purpose of this paper is to distinguish "limited liberalism" which has the political notion that the political conception or principle of justice is established independently of comprehensive doctrines or one's own good as self-determined value from "comprehensive liberalism" which has the political thought that the political conception or principle of justice is formed based on the logic or the substance of the comprehensive doctrines or the cultural identity. By doing this I maintain that the latter rawlsian liberalism contains both limited liberalism and comprehensive liberalism which are incompatible with each other. And as a whole I indicate that a mixture of two kinds of liberalism is also inherent in the former rawlsian liberalism. This demonstration makes the general view that Rawls is a covert who abandons the former rawlsian liberalism and adopts the latter rawlsian liberalism cause a misunderstanding. Firstly I emphasize an ingenious idea of Rawls's own which distinguishes the essential definition of justice from the substance of justice differently from the others who construct the theory of classical social contract. Secondly, however, on the other hand, I indicate that the essential definition of justice is diluted and that the logic of the substance of justice is emphasized by using the theoretical device of reflective equilibrium. Thirdly I dinstiguish the reasonable pluralism from the pluralism. I demonstrate that the reasonable pluralism as a normative conception can be realized after the latter that the comprehensive doctrines is incompatible with one another is relieved. And I maintain that this resolution also contains both limited liberalism and comprehensive liberalism and that in this point the former rawlsian liberalism is identical with the latter rawlsian liberalism.