著者

松永 雄二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.65-77, 1977-03-29

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Aristotle observes in Met. Z, 6, 1031a23ff. that το κατα συμβζβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον (e.g. το λευκον)may be understood in two ways. They are: (a)ω συμβεβηκε λευκον (i.e. the white thing)and(b)το συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav;(i.e. the whiteness as a pathos). Of these two, the present writer believes that the distinction between το καθ' αυτο λεγομενον(e.g. the man) and το κατα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον(e.g. the white thing)is more fundamental to the Aristotelian grasp of being than that between the substance(e.g. the man)and its inhering attribute(e.g. the whiteness). The reason is that it is the only way to understand that the Aristotelian theory of substance is at the same time a theory of essence. I. Now, what is the difference between "being said per se" and "being said per accidens"? (1)This question is considered in the various realms of science as the problem of "that A is B". When B is A's so called accidens per se, the distinctionwhether "that A is B" is per se or per accidens depends, in the final analysis, on how to determine as a species in a series of genera-species that of which "is B" is directly predicated. (Ana. Post. A, 4-5) And it is there that the proposition in which the demonstration in sciences is made properly, namely the commensurately universal proposition is formed. (2) In what way, however, "being said per se" is distinguished from "being said per accidens" from the ontological viewpoint generally? I do not recognize the distinction between the so called essential predicates and accidental predicates asessential. Rather, what is fundamental is the following: Each term('F')signifies "being F" simply and fundamentally, in so far as it represents something that belongs to any one category. Then, we have the following: (a) On the one hand το λευκω ειναι≠το λευκον, and on the other hand to ανθρωπω ειναι=ο ανθρωπο&b.sigmav;. Properly speaking, the meaning of the distinction between "being said per accidens" and "being said per se" consistsin that. That is to say, oucricc is to be found in that in which εκαστον is identical with το τι ην ειναι(Met. Z. 6). "Being said per accidens", on the other hand, is to be expressed always as the predicate in a statement. II. A problem, however, remains here. To Aristotle, what is represented by the subject of a statement, namely τοδε τι, was συνλον, and was not pure form. Then, what does ουσια mean in the final analysis? This problem is to be solved through a consideration of the meaning of "to be in actu" from the viewpoint of the unity of being and knowing.