著者

松永 雄二 Matsunaga Yuji

出版者

九州大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学論文集 (ISSN:0285774X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.15, pp.p1-22, 1979-09

著者

松永 雄二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.73-87, 1962-03-31 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Plato's formula of the One and the Many, as ιδεα and the sensibles respectively, is comprised in the recognition of Beauty itself and many beautiful things, without regard to their being man, horse, clothes etc Strictly speaking, these beautiful things are not beautiful man and horse, etc, but simply 'the many beautifuls'-whereas in Aristotle such a concept is inadmissible in his system a horse as a substance must be recognized as the substratum of the 'beautiful' In Phaedo 102 B3 ff, however, Simmias is said to be grasped independently and absolutely as a participant in the ιδεα(e g in the ιδεα "the Tall" or "the Small") and always remains as he is (i e having identity), no matter what ιδεα he takes In this trend of thought, does Plato recognize Simmias as a kind of substance=substratum, as Aristotle hold ? If so, does not Plato explain only alteration (αλλοιωσιζ) in his "causal" theory of ideas ? And does he recognize the independent reality of the so-called particulars (i e of physical things) apart from the ιδεα ? αλλοιωσιζ, however, even in Aristotle, is not αλλοιωσιζ simply because it is the alteration of qualities In order to be αλλοιωσιζ, the qualities to be changed must be the proper qualities, winch belong to the Substance itself (Arist De gen et corr, A 4, 319b 10 ff) But in the case of Plato the change can never be explained satisfactorily in terms of the changeable things, but only in the fact of their participation in the ιδεα so also the above-mentioned change in Simmias is not the change of his properties, which are primarily attached to Simmias himself The case is, strictly speaking, not then that Simmias became beautiful, but that something beautiful happened in Simmias Therefore Simmias here is only a locus in which Beauty appears-never a substance which has the quality "beautiful" in itself What, however, is Simmias as a locus ? Indeed he may not possess such a quality as beauty, yet we tend to attribute the term "man" and other definitions to Simmias as his inherent qualities But Plato never recognized Simmias as a Substance qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, Even in Aristotle, Simmias qua Simmias is not the same as Simmias qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but only something combined with various attributes which belong to the respective categories In Plato, still more, Simmias is never identical with the "man as immanent ιδεα" -Thus, ultimately, both philosophers recognize that Simmias is different from ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but the understanding of the content of this so-called Simmias qua Simmias is utterly different in the two cases whereas in Aristotle qua Simmias is thought to have all the distinct qualities which characterize the concrete man Simmias, in Plato, the so-called Simmias qua Simmias is understood as having no distinct attributes, when he loses the connection with the ιδεα of man It is this "Simmias" of which Plato speaks when he describes him as the participant in the "Tall" and "the Small" For in the case of Plato two propositions (1) "This fire is hot" and (2) "This fire is beautiful" are differentiated from each other, and may be put as follows the former (1) shows that the ειδοζ "Fire" is combined with the ειδοζ "Hot" eternally and essentially So it is changeable into a universal proposition But in the latter (2), because fire is not always beautiful, it is not a combination between the ειδοζ "Fire" and ειδοζ "Beauty" So in this case we can only assert "this thing is beautiful" In Plato's thought we can never grasp this event in the form "This fire is beautiful" So it follows that the relation between substance and attributes in the system of Aristotle is, from Plato's standpoint, the reverse of the relationship of the One and the Many Aristotle refers the many(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

松永 雄二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.65-77, 1977-03-29

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Aristotle observes in Met. Z, 6, 1031a23ff. that το κατα συμβζβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον (e.g. το λευκον)may be understood in two ways. They are: (a)ω συμβεβηκε λευκον (i.e. the white thing)and(b)το συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav;(i.e. the whiteness as a pathos). Of these two, the present writer believes that the distinction between το καθ' αυτο λεγομενον(e.g. the man) and το κατα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; λεγομενον(e.g. the white thing)is more fundamental to the Aristotelian grasp of being than that between the substance(e.g. the man)and its inhering attribute(e.g. the whiteness). The reason is that it is the only way to understand that the Aristotelian theory of substance is at the same time a theory of essence. I. Now, what is the difference between "being said per se" and "being said per accidens"? (1)This question is considered in the various realms of science as the problem of "that A is B". When B is A's so called accidens per se, the distinctionwhether "that A is B" is per se or per accidens depends, in the final analysis, on how to determine as a species in a series of genera-species that of which "is B" is directly predicated. (Ana. Post. A, 4-5) And it is there that the proposition in which the demonstration in sciences is made properly, namely the commensurately universal proposition is formed. (2) In what way, however, "being said per se" is distinguished from "being said per accidens" from the ontological viewpoint generally? I do not recognize the distinction between the so called essential predicates and accidental predicates asessential. Rather, what is fundamental is the following: Each term('F')signifies "being F" simply and fundamentally, in so far as it represents something that belongs to any one category. Then, we have the following: (a) On the one hand το λευκω ειναι≠το λευκον, and on the other hand to ανθρωπω ειναι=ο ανθρωπο&b.sigmav;. Properly speaking, the meaning of the distinction between "being said per accidens" and "being said per se" consistsin that. That is to say, oucricc is to be found in that in which εκαστον is identical with το τι ην ειναι(Met. Z. 6). "Being said per accidens", on the other hand, is to be expressed always as the predicate in a statement. II. A problem, however, remains here. To Aristotle, what is represented by the subject of a statement, namely τοδε τι, was συνλον, and was not pure form. Then, what does ουσια mean in the final analysis? This problem is to be solved through a consideration of the meaning of "to be in actu" from the viewpoint of the unity of being and knowing.