著者

田中 利光

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.1-11, 1992

---

Plato said that names are instruments with which we differentiate things according to their nature and teach one another something(388B10-C1). The text is written in the figure Hysteron Proteron. It appears to be commonly unnoticed. By the correctness of names, Plato means two states which concern names. One is the correctness in the sense of using names as instruments correctly(cf. 387C1). The other is the correctness in the sense that names in themselves are fine as instruments(cf. 388D6-7). Plato's view on the correctness of names in the first sense is as follows : Determination is not according to a man's fancy, but according to their nature by names which their nature prescribes(cf. 387B11-C4, D4-8). In this connection 'names' does not mean the sound only, but the combination of sound and meaning. If we pay attention to sound only, we cannot understand why truth-falsehood of names and Protagoras' theory became the topic in the Cratylus. When Hermogenes first argues that the correctness of names is not natural but conventional and arbitrary, names which he has in mind are combinations of sound and meaning. When he later mentions that names for the same things differ with languages(385D9-E3)in order to support his view, names that he mentions imply their sounds only. In this point, he is confused. Plato denies Hermogenes' view, but it is a matter of course that Plato recognizes the fact Hermogenes mentions. Plato describes the fact in the style of a myth(390A4-7). The importance of Plato's view on the correctness of names cannot be understood well if we pay attention to their sounds only. It is best understood, in connection with what is said at Thucydides 3, 82, 4. Plato's view on the correctness of names in the second sense is as follows : It is to have a likeness to "that which is a name(Collective Singular)" (389D7). Also, names given by custom have it to some degree. To what degree? It is the dialectician that judges it case by case(388D6-390C12). If fine names are to be given as custom, it requires the dialectician as its supervisor (390D4-5). The nomothete is not the philosopher(Cf. Guthrie, ib. p. 6. n. 3.), but custom personified. Plato repeats a part of the above-mentioned view after an introductory phrase "Cratylus is right in saying that...."(390d9). Thus, Cratylus' view appears to be approved. However, in the rest of the Cratylus, Cratylus' theory of names is refuted completely. How should this point be interpreted? I understand that Socrates pretends that Cratylus is right in the view assumed to be his(an example of Socratic irony) ; otherwise, it should be understood that the circumstantial participle λεγων is used not modally, but conditionally(cf. Crat. 387C1, Phikb. 34A10, Laws 727A2, 862A1). The rest of the Cratylus considers what the correctness of names is like and shows that it is not as Cratylus thinks. Then, what is it like? I think we can see concretely what the correctness in the second sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 433A8-B1, 533D4-5 and what the correctness in the first sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 476D5-6.