著者

楊枝 嗣朗

出版者

経済理論学会

雑誌

季刊経済理論 (ISSN:18825184)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.5-14, 2008

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The thought of independence of central banking was generally accepted during 1990s. And then the relationship between money and state has hardly occupied the interest of monetary economists. Some of them emphasised that the central banking does not have any administrative power. Therefore, the query why the government must ultimately take the responsibility for the stability of financial system and why the central bank must contribute to it through the prudential policy, have not been drked theoretically. In the meantime the Free Banking School has insisted the abolition of the central bank because the central bank-money is state fiat money. And the Cartalists like L. R. Wray, S. Bell, and C. A. E. Goodhart have attached the importance of ties between money and state, and therefore they have been worried about the future of Euro money due to breaking its bond with governments. We understand the ties between money and government are essential; otherwise the capitalistic credit monies could not have been developed. Since private credit monies circulated among merchants and traders in modern times, state monies like coins became just small changes for private credit monies. In consequence governments lost the ability of raising fund to a great extent. There were no way other than accepting private credit monies as means of tax-payment to raise fund. Such an intervention by government assisted private credit monies to circulate all over their country. The central bank currency contributed to reduce the costs of commercial transactions and of tax-collection too. From the above point of view we inquire the relationship between money and state, and why a central bank has "the ambiguous presence as a semi-governmental corporation".