著者

黒川 修司(1949-)

出版者

東京女子大学論集編集委員会

雑誌

東京女子大学紀要論集 (ISSN:04934350)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.161-185, 0000

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Two weeks after the fall of Saigon, an American cargo ship on the high seas was captured by the Khmer Rouge. The Ford Administration wanted to cover the defeat in the Vietnam War, and took military action against Cambodian forces using helicopters and marines transported from Okinawa.Because of the lack of a good communication system and bad intelligence, the U.S.A. decided to bomb the Cambodian mainland and land on Tan Island, where the American sailors were believed to be. Not knowing that the sailors had been released, the American marines recaptured the ship. They were however attacked by superior Cambodian force when they landed on the small island, and fifteen marines were killed during the ensuing fourteen hour fight. Contrary to tradition, three marines who had been captured by the Cambodians and were later executed were left as missing.This paper used the records of the National Security Council, which were top secret at the time, to discover why the Ford Administration chose the military option from the start and what made the military operation difficult. Memories of the 1968 Pueblo Incident made this unnecessary military option attractive to top American decision-makers, and Secretary of State Kissiger influenced President Ford to take military action.サイゴン陥落から2週間の後、米国の貨物船がクメール・ルージュにより捕獲され、フォード政権は最初から軍事的手段を選択肢に入れていた。機密解除された国家安全保障会議の議事録からは、ベトナム戦争の苦い敗北から国民の自信を回復するためと、北朝鮮に捕獲され乗組員の釈放に苦労したプエブロ号事件という過去の経験から、カンボジアとの外交交渉などよりも軍事力の行使が選択された。しかしながら、利用できる軍事力に限りがあったこと、地理的距離と指揮命令系統の無理などから、現地の情報が入手できないままに、沖縄の海兵隊が輸送され、乗組員が捕えられていると思われた小島への上陸作戦で15名の死者を出した。この不必要だったが断固とした軍事行動は米国民から支持を得たのであった。