著者

池田 恒男

出版者

東京都立大学都市研究センター

雑誌

総合都市研究 (ISSN:03863506)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, pp.143-170, 2000

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1995年1月に発災した阪神・淡路大震災は、わが国大都市の先進資本主義国としては全く類い稀な脆弱さを強く印象づけたが、その後の震災論議は、その脆弱さを粛した中心問題であるわが国の国土構造・戦後国土政策や都市土地政策にはほとんど注意が払われないという奇妙な状況が続いている。本稿は、90年代の都市土地法制の展開を検証することを通して、この国が大震災の教訓を誠実に法制に反映させてきたか否か、もしこれが否定的に解されるようであれば、その原因を解明して、未来への指針を見出すことを課題とする。本稿の前半部分をなす本号掲載分では、予備的に日本の近現代都市土地法制を通観し、戦前期を通して形作られた日本的近代の土地法版といった趣のある特徴が、一連の戦後改革の影響をほとんど受けずに、官治性や強度の開発志向、土建的工学主義、市民社会的人権思想の欠如といった諸々の日本的特徴として戦後法制に受け継がれて行き、高度成長期を通していかに戦後型の特徴へと展開されてきたかを概観し、土地バブルの一つの政策的要因となった80年代の都市計画システムにおける反転、すなわち「民活」の名による金融・開発・土建業界への大盤振る舞いと「規制緩和」政策による戦後的土地利用規制システムへの破壊的作用への繋がりを一瞥した。検討項目の第一は、大震災の教訓としてインナーシティー問題すなわち市街地改造問題の切り札のように登場した1997年密集市街地防災街区整備促進法である。しかし、地方自治体にも膨大な財政支出を伴わせる「鉄とコンクリート」型の市街地整備事業によって、なるほど事業を実施する特定の街区から危険要因を抜本的に除去できるかもしれないが、資金力の乏しい零細な地権者や住民を疎外し、危険箇所を別の場所に拡散する町づくりになりかねず、都市防災対策法として決め手になるものとは思われない。検討項目の第二は、大震災後に展開する都市土地法の検証作業の前提としての90年代前半の都市土地法の展開内容である。80年代末に土地バブルの苦い教訓の上に立法されたはずの土地基本法の理念に基づいて展開する90年代の都市土地法制と国土法制の実質は、しかしながら、土地バブルの母体たるバブル経済の政策的要因である国土開発や都市開発への国を挙げての後押しと思典附与とを改めるどころか、様々に計画法的手法を強化して誘導し、思典の拡大強化に務めるものであった。これが大震災前夜の土地法制の状況であり、都市土地法制の展開に顕著に見られるこうした野放図な都市拡大主義と「官民一体」の都市開発推進姿勢が大震災の遠因たる政策的環境をなしたことは明らかである。It seems quite curious that discussions on prevention or mitigation of disasters after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster in 1995 have focused very rarely problems of Japanese way of urban development and land use which was regarded as one of the main causes of extreme fragility of large cities in Japan in terms of highly-developed capitalist countries what was impressed sharply by it. This paper focuses whether Japanese legal institution about urban planning and land use changed or not between before and after the Great Earthquake Disaster in the last 10 years, as well as how and why. The first half of the paper printed in current number, for the first of all, previously takes a bird's eye view of Japanese modem "public" land law (especially modem urban planning law) that had had very particular characteristics before the world war Ⅱ in comparison with European laws which almost all legal institutions of modem Japan received models from and imitated in shape: the urban planning law was privileged and separated categorically from the civil law, characterized as an immunity realm for the Emperor bureaucratically oriented civil engineering against democratic as well as judicial control, with lack of the thought of human rights, colored by determined preference of community-destructive urban development for the Empire's sake. What is more important is that such characteristics of Japanese land law were fundamentally preserved after the world war Ⅱ in spite of legalization and democratization of the post-war reformation. Little advancement on regulation of land use in urban areas gained by the people's power about 1970 owing to remarkable destruction of dwelling environment during the post-war extreme economic growth period (about in the 60's) was tumed over without much trouble in the late 70's and more clearly in the 80'th by the political wave of reaction caused by the oil-shock: the tum over in urban planning system such as so-called "urban-renaissance" provided enormous financial supports to such partial interests as urban development and civil engineering businesses as well as banker' s business behind them in the name of "MIN-KATSU"( =private sector supremacist), and destructive works to the feasible Japanese post-war regulation systems symbolized by the Urban Planning Act of 1968 caused unprecedented land-bubble in the second half of 80's as a policy environment. My first viewpoint is to examine Promotion of Readjusrment of Dangerous Blocks Full of Densely Built-up Wooden Houses Act of 1997 which was brought in as a trump for the solution To the inner-city disaster prevention problems for the lesson of the Great Earthquake Disaster. My conclusion is not so positive: although the implementation could clear severe dangers from operation blocks by way of "iron and re-forced concrete", such blocks would not be so many because the necessary financial expenditure would load heavily local govemments of which almost all suffer from tremendous debt caused specially by civil engineering operations central govemment pushed recent years in terms to stimulate the market, and urban disaster dangers might be expanded with the move of the social weakness such as the poor or the handicapped dwelling in operation blocks, who might not stand the change of circumstances and augmentation of living expenses. My second viewpoint is to examine the development of urban land law in the first half of 90's for preparation to compare with that in the second half of 90's just after the Great Earthquake Disaster. The development, which was guided by the doctrines of Land Fundamental Act of 1989 that had been announced to be enacted on the bitter lesson of the land -bubble, was in substantial terms to encourage urban development rush with new helpful frameworks of planning law no less than the law in 80's. That was the situation of land law on the eve of the Great Earthquake Disaster: it is clear that such wild urbanizationism and urban development promoted by "KANMIN-ITTAI' (="cooperated officials and business") formed the political environment being remote but highly probable cause of the Disaster.