著者

松田 克進

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.60-69,3, 1995

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Many contemporary philosophers disagree to Cartesian Dualism (CD) saying that it results in solipsism, but the author shows that this is not the case. Their argument against CD is based on the belief that we could not know another person has a mind if we accepted CD, and one of the essential reasons for this belief is the view that the connection between mental workings and corporeal behaviors is at best contingent. However, Descartes himself denies this view when he proposes the 'argument from language', which says that the impossibility of mechanical explanation of speech behavior enables us to attribute minds to others.