著者

鈴木 俊洋

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.58, pp.203-218,25, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

---

The main purpose of the paper is to call philosophers' attention to expertise, a form of tacit knowledge that is essential for expert problem-solving activities in the life-world. To this end, I construct a framework showing how mathematical objects emerge from omitprosses of expert problem-solving activities. First, I will refer to the framework of the historical genesis of mathematical objects that is presented by Enrico Giusti, an Italian historian of mathematics. His framework suggests that mathematical objects emerged from processes of technical omit-skills of problem-solving by mathematicians. Then I will explain how Husserl's genetic phenomenology analyzes the genesis of geometrical objects. The framework of the genesis of mathematical objects that is presented here strongly encourages philosophical investigations into expertise in order to study the nature of mathematical objects (and of ideal objects, generally). In addition, it provides philosophers of mathematics with an alternative way of interpreting mathematical objects, and I hopeit helps phenomenologists interpret Husserl's concept of the "life-world".

著者

長尾 龍一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.31, pp.88-103, 1981-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

河野 哲也 戸田山 和久

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.90-93, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

著者

和泉 悠

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.32-43, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

16

---

This paper examines the semantics of Japanese generic sentences that involve reference to gender stereotypes and considers how they possibly contribute to the presence and perpetuation of sexual harassment. The main strategy of the paper is, first, to uncover the possible ways in which sentences that contain the explicit deontic modal expression in Japanese beki (roughly corresponding to ought) contribute to the cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, and second, to compare the explicitly modal sentences and generic sentences that contain no explicit modal in order to show that the latter also express modal, normatively laden contents. As a standard theory of deontic modality, I apply Angelika Kratzer’s analysis of ought to Japanese sentences containing beki. For the sake of concrete illustration, I also introduce Asher and Morreau’s (1995) analysis of generics and extend it to Japanese examples. The comparison shows that, insofar as the uses of explicitly normative sentences such as “All women ought to wear a skirt” contribute to hostile environment harassment, implicitly normative sentences such as “Women wear a skirt” make a similar, if not equal, contribution to the legitimization of gender-specific norms. The paper concludes with the suggestion that we pay more attention to generic sentences with gender-specific terms, and that we use explicit quantifiers and singular terms more often than not to avoid ambiguity and possible inadvertent consequences.

著者

松田 克進

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.9-27, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

23

---

In this paper, the author offers an overview of some methods that have thus far been used in research on the history of philosophy. From the perspective of philosophical importance, the paper further discusses which kinds of methods are relevant or irrelevant. The examples which are specifically examined in this paper are those of Harry Wolfson, an expert in Medieval Philosophy who treated the history of philosophy exclusively from the view point of diachronic influences; Martial Gueroult, the renowned historian of twentieth century France who studied the internal structure or ‘order of reasons’ of several great philosophical systems of the past; and Jonathan Bennett who examined the history of modern philosophy in the manner of analytic philosophy. After indicating the problem with Wolfson’s method, as well as the difficulty with the idea of Dianoématique which Gueroult developed while producing his monumental works on great philosophers, the author concludes that another possible philosophically significant approach is a method which consists of analyzing the internal structure of some of the past’s philosophical doctrines (like Gueroult and others) and daring (unlike Gueroult) to criticize weaknesses, e. g. an inconsistency, in them. The author calls this method “non-idolizing or de-idolizing structuralism.”

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.10-24, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

10

著者

池田 喬

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.9-20, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

12

---

Suppose a male philosophy teacher states in the classroom: philosophy is not suitable for women. This paper examines reasons this statement is a morally impermissible harassment speech. First, it examines some characteristics of this speech such as lack of vicious intention on the side of speaker, based on which one could claim that the speech is unproblematic. In opposition to this claim, this paper argues that speaker’s intention is not relevant to the moral nature of harassment speech. It further points out that speech act theory offers useful methods to analyze the moral wrong of harassment speech, particularly based on the reason that this theory is capable of directly addressing the right and wrong of the speech itself, without referring to speaker’s intentions nor consequences of the speech, neither of which are likely not to be observed in trustworthy methods in cases of harassment. Second, I analyze the above statement as subordinating speech that ranks female students as inferior to male students in terms of capabilities regarding philosophical research. The analysis particularly pays attention to the move of conversation within the specific context of the classroom, and clarifies the normative power involved in this move that forces hearers to accept the belief women are inferior to men regarding philosophical abilities. Third, the paper focuses on silence of male students as a reaction to the teacher’s statement, and argues that it licenses this statement and reinforces the authority of the speech. Moreover, it is pointed out that third person’s statements such as “you worry too much” cause secondary damage in which the moral personality of harasser is defended, while the personality of victims is blamed Overall, the paper shows that seemingly unproblematic statements could be impermissible harassment speech, because they subordinate a group to other groups and are also unacceptable due to harms they cause.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.28-44, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

20

---

It is commonplace to distinguish two different approaches to the history of philosophy. According to the first approach, the point of studying a text from philosophy’s past is to learn something philosophically important for us today from it. In contrast, the second, more history-oriented approach refuses to read the past philosophical text for the sake of one’s own philosophical interest. For proponents of this approach, the text can be understood only if it is situated in its context in a broad sense. In this discussion, it is sometimes suggested (by Richard Rorty, for instance) that the two approaches do not constitute a dilemma; we can and must do both independently of each other. This suggestion of coexistence, however, would cause a problem for the second approach. Preferring to be exempted from the question of truth in discussing a past philosopher, proponents of this approach would be forced into a distorted understanding of philosophy’s past. In order to avoid this consequence, the present paper proposes a third approach to the history of philosophy, in which we can deal with philosophy’s past historically and philosophically at the same time.

著者

串田 純一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.151-165_L11, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

14

---

In seiner Vorlesung Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ (1931) hat Heidegger das Begriffspaar von δύναµις und ἐνέργεια nicht nur als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit interpretiert, sondern jeweils als Vermögen und Verwirklichung. Vor allem lobte er die Stelle 1047a 24-26, und übersetzte sie wie folgt „In Wirklichkeit vermögend aber ist dieses, dem nichts mehr unausführbar ist, sobald es sich in das Zeug legt, als wozu es das Zeug zu haben angesprochen wird “. Diese Stelle kommentierte er folgendermaßen : „Als völlig und wirklich im Stand ist nur jenes vorhanden, das im Vollzug nichts unausgeführt zu lassen braucht“. Heideggers Kommentar lässt uns „ein Vermögen zu haben“ so verstehen, dass man etwas genau dann auszuführt, wenn man es nicht unausgeführt zu lassen braucht. Diese Feststellung lässt uns verschiedene Modalitäten der Verhältnisse zwischen Verhalten und Vermögen aufgliedern und den infiniten Regress der Vermögen zu vermeiden. Die Bestimmung,dass man nichts unausgeführt zu lassen braucht, ist konsistent mit der anderen Bestimmung, nämlich dass man nötwendig etwas ausführt. Die erste Bestimmung hat ontologischen Vorrang vor der Bestimmung, etwas tun zu müssen. Wir wissen nämlich nicht immer, wozu unser Verhalten gebraucht wird. Darüberhinaus sind die notwendigen Bedingungen für unser Verhalten nur beschränkt bekannt. Trotzdem verstehen wir, dass wir etwas nicht unausgeführt zu lassen brauchen, wenn wir es tun.In Sein und Zeit bestimmt Heidegger den Vorrang von „Nicht“ als Nichtigkeit. Und dieses Verständnis von „Nicht“ wird nicht durch propositionale Erkenntnisse erschlossen, sondern durch Befindlichkeiten (Stimmungen, Gefühle, usw.). Dieser transzendentale Horizont, wo man etwas nicht unausgeführt zu lassen braucht,ermöglicht Vermögen überhaupt. Diesen Horizont entwirft das Dasein im Menschen,nicht unser „Ich“. Dieser Punkt wird durch die Stimmung der Langweile deutlich gemacht. In der Langweile haben wir nur Zeitvertreibe, die wir nicht unausgeführt zu lassen brauchen. Dieser Entwurf des transzendentalen Horizonts ist eine notwendige Bewegung des Daseins, und Heidegger nennt ihn „Freiheit“.

著者

水谷 雅彦

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.67-82_L5, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

22

---

Some say virtual reality is evil. It is easy to ridicule this remark as ignorant and naive: a virtual reality need not be regarded as fictional or spurious, but can be seen as an augmentation of the real world, which suffers from various limitations including our limited sensory abilities. In fact, from what source does this negative picture of virtual reality originate? In Plato's allegory of the cave, which is often quoted in the discussion of a virtual reality, the people who have lived chained in a cave are not supposed to return to the cave once released. How come they do not want to?This paper examines Nozick's experience machine argument, shows that theories of virtual reality do not necessarily assume psychological hedonism, and argues that they do not fail (with computationalism) through Putnam's ‘brain in a vat’ argument. This conclusion suggests that the difference between a real world and a virtual world can in principle be relative. While a virtual world as something artificial is not, at least in principle, inferior to the real world in terms of its factual (or theoretical) aspect, there remains the possibility that the former may be inferior to the latter in its evaluative (or practical) aspect. But it can also be said that this contention is only the expression of a conservative mentality, provided that one accepts, along with Alfred Schutz, world pluralism and asserts the superiority of the real world, which superiority is based upon a mere custom of ours. Given this perspective, a virtual reality can have the same power to criticize the real world as great novels and movies, the prototypes of a virtual reality, once had.

著者

永井 均

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1990, no.40, pp.19-35, 1990-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

黒田 亘

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.25, pp.38-53, 1975-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

柏端 達也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.53-67_L5, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)

参考文献数

26

---

In this paper for the colloquium “Metaphysics Revisited”, I would like to emphasizae the following points: (1) I am skeptical about the view that metaphysics has been revived in recent years or decades. Despite repeated attacks on “metaphysics”, debates in the many areas of metaphysics have always found a place in the main body of philosophical thought. It seems that, in reality, there have not been any “darkest times” in the history of metaphysics, at least during recent centuries. (2) However, this does not mean that there has been one big question which all metaphysicians have been trying to answer. The historical “identity” of metaphysics consists, in fact, in continuity: this is manifested in the form of successive references to a specific kind of philosophical puzzle, and in the chain created through the sharing of various conceptual tools. (3) Such continuity also has a synchronic aspect. Thus, metaphysics as a branch of philosophy has vague boundaries, and connects seamlessly with other branches of philosophy. This aspect suggests that contemporary metaphysics has good potential applicability in other fields.I illustrate the second point mentioned above by citing the example of the history of the “problem of universals”. Then, with regard to the third point, I show that metaphysical ideas are indeed applicable to concrete problems in other branches of philosophy, including moral philosophy.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04-01 (Released:2017-06-10)

参考文献数

1

---

In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of anti-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a deliberative sense; in its primal form, “pure” logic concerns descriptive laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the Prolegomena is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl’s criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl’s so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.

著者

森村 進

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.72, pp.36-48, 2021-04-01 (Released:2021-05-20)

参考文献数

25

著者

秋元 由裕

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.140-154, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

---

In den Pariser Manuskripten kritisierte Marx das kapitalistische Privateigentum als das, wodurch sich die Menschen von ihrem „Wesen“ entfremden. Innerhalb dessen erscheint die menschliche Arbeit nur als eine „Zwangsarbeit“, in der sich jeder „außer sich“ fühlen müsse. Seine Entfremdungskritik wird seit der Auslegung durch Marcuse essentialistisch verstanden und als eine normative Kritik aufgefasst; „normativ“ heißt, mit einer Konzeption des guten Lebens, die der Idee der Selbstverwirklichung des menschlichen Wesens entspricht, die entfremdete Gesellschaft zu kritisieren. Aber vom Standpunkt der Ideologiekritik aus wird oft bezweifelt, dass diese emanzipatorische Idee des guten Lebens zugleich ein Anzeichen für einen Essentialismus ist, bei dem es sich eventuell sogar um eine Art von Paternalismus handelt. Um sich mit einem solchen Ideologieverdacht auseinanderzusetzen, ist es für uns mindestens nötig, die zwei verschiedenen Verwendungsweisen des Wesensbegriffs bei Marx zu überprüfen und ihn damit in seiner ganzen Tragweite zu erkennen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob und inwieweit der Begriff des menschlichen Wesens bei Marx für essentialistisch gehalten werden sollte. Erst dadurch kann die kritische Zeitdiagnose von Marx erneut verteidigt und aktualisiert werden. So gliedert sich diese Arbeit ihrer Zielsetzung gemäß in vier Teile. Zuerst wird anhand der Darstellung im Ersten Manuskript das Modell der Vergegenständlichung analysiert. Dadurch lässt sich verdeutlichen, dass der Begriff des menschlichen „Gattungswesens“ auf einer essentialistischen Vorstellung der produktiven Fähigkeiten beruht, die nur dem Menschen eigen sind. Im Gegensatz zu diesem Anschein von Essentialismus versucht Marx bei der Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens, die essentialistische Annahme der Arbeitswerttheorie zu kritisieren. Anschließend werden vor dem Hintergrund dieser Kritik an der Nationalökonomie Überlegungen angestellt, ob Marx in Bezug auf die menschliche Körperlichkeit eine neue Idee entwickelt hat; der Mensch ist demnach kein substantiell bestimmbares Etwas, sondern für sich ein Prozess des „Verhaltens zum Gegenstand“ und damit der „Aneignung der menschlichen Wirklichkeit“. Abschließend lässt sich aus diesem im Dritten Manuskript formulierten Gedankengang die Schlussfolgerung ziehen, dass das, was in der Begriffsform des menschlichen Wesens enthalten ist, nichts anderes ist als ein Paradox, weil der Mensch selbst ein unendlicher Aneignungsprozess seiner Wirklichkeit ist, während der Wesensbegriff eigentlich eine unveränderbare Form der Sache voraussetzt. In einer solchen paradoxen Beschaffenheit des Wesensbegriffs besteht ein Unterschied zwischen dem frühen Marx und dem Essentialismus.

著者

宮崎 裕助

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.240-253,14, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

---

What new possibilities of communication are contained in Derridean deconstruction, which so severely dismisses the theory of communication as we have known it, especially from Habermas and Apel? Is there really any "serious" approach to the notion of communication for such a thought that radically calls into question the idealization and theorization of communication? The aim of this study is to examine and recast Derrida's critique of the theory of communication by incorporating the following insights: (1) Derrida's argument is based upon his own discovery of the necessity of what could be called "telecommunication"; (2) it is constitutive of an immanent criticism in that it disputes the idealizing assumptions of communication (the ideas of univocality, transparency, publicity, etc.) not from an empiricist standpoint (which clings to a diversity of everyday realities in communication) but from the very logic which makes possible the idealization of communication; (3) these arguments set out the precondition for communication to take place as event in a strict sense, and it is from this point of departure that one can search for the "minimal consensus." By taking these steps, this study attempts to characterize Derrida's thought of language as the "logic of telecommunication."

著者

中村 信隆

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.215-229, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

19

---

Many philosophers suspect that the emotion of shame cannot play a significant role in morality because shame is the reaction to others’ contempt and therefore, a heteronomous emotion. This paper aims to defend the view that shame is a morally significant emotion by focusing on one form of reproach —“shame on you.” We employ this reproach, for example, with a President who establishes discriminatory policies or a scientist who falsifies data in his academic paper and in these cases, we assume this reproach is morally important. Therefore, what does “shame on you” imply? How can it be morally justified? Moreover, what are its characteristics? In this paper, I answer these questions by clarifying the notions of shame and self-respect. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I resolve the issue of autonomy and heteronomy in the emotion of shame based on Gabriele Taylor’s observation that shame contains two elements — a self-directed adverse judgment and a notion of an audience. I argue that the adverse judgment is always rendered autonomously, but the audience can be either autonomous or heteronomous; essentially, agents feel shame either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others. Second, I explain the meaning of “shame on you” and demonstrate the moral validity of this reproach by referring to the nature and classification of self-respect. Finally, I examine the distinctive significance of “shame on you.” Examining the different characteristics of shame and guilt, I argue that this form of reproach involves more a comprehensive assessment of the agent than other forms of reproach that concern, for example, the violations of moral rules.

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.9-24_L3, 2013 (Released:2014-07-10)

参考文献数

16

---

This paper explores how analytic social epistemology has incorporated social aspects of inquiring activities into epistemological research, and how non-epistemic values can be related to it. Since the 19th century, science as a kind of inquiring activity has been socialized in many senses. Scientific community is institutionalized and the research itself is often conducted collectively; outside influence became also visible through national funding system and increase of so-called ‘mode 2’ knowledge production. Given such socialization of science, analytic social epistemology, such as Goldman's veritism and social falsificationism of several authors, has expanded epistemology to include institutional and collective aspects as objects of epistemic appraisal. Non-epistemic values are also included as parts of such social aspects. However, the standards of epistemic appraisal, such as truth conductivity and objectivity through mutual checking, remain epistemic. Some authors, such as Stephen Stich and Steve Fuller, criticize such epistemological conservatism and advocate non-epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and scientific institutions. Even though they both make good points, the role of analytic social epistemology as a part of total assessment of an inquiring activity should not be denied. What epistemologists need is the awareness that their enterprise is an indispensable part of such a larger project.

著者

佐藤 和夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1976, no.26, pp.163-172, 1976-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)