著者
Nakar Eldad
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.117, pp.89-123, 2007-03

特集記憶の社会学投稿論文はじめに2. 第二次世界大戦を題材とする日本のマンガ 2.1. 1950年代後半から1960年代後半まで 2.1.1. 英雄的な戦闘 : 羅憲的語り 2.1.2 プロットの構成に見られる類似点 2.1.3. 単純なプロット,可愛らしい登場人物,歴史的リアリズム 2.1.4. 悲惨な戦争 : 拒絶された語り 2.2. 1960年代後半から1970年代後半まで 2.2.1. 悲惨な戦争 : 羅憲的語り 2.2.2 プロットの構成の類似点 2.2.3. 個人の証言と女性の記憶 2.2.4. 英雄的な戦闘 : 薄れゆく語り3. 自己を映す鏡 3.1. 1945年~1954年 : 時間の隔たり 3.2. 1950年代後半から1960年代後半まで : 肯定的な過去のイメージの出現 3.3. 1960年代後半から1970年代後半まで : 忌まわしい過去の記憶4. マンガの社会的枠組As the literature on collective memory acknowledges, when individuals recall their past, their memory is a collaborative product, influenced by society, and modeled by the collective frame of the day. Collective memory, scholars agree, is substantiated through multiple forms of communication. To infer on how a certain society remembers its past, scholars, thus, take on the task of investigating various mediums and different cultural productions. In Japan, it seems, however, that scholars failed to include manga into the above comprehension. As if manga is not a medium of communication that abide by the collective memory frame of the day, whenever the issue of collective memories of World War II in Japan has been addressed-and there were ample investigations on the issue so far-only few scholars looked at Japanese manga. Responding to the above tendency, in my paper, I choose to concern myself solely with the fictional representation of WW II over the manga. I seek to put manga tales of WW II against the social environment from which I argue they draw their ideas and worldview. I apt to demonstrate that manga narration of WW II is also a reflection of the different times in which it was produced.
著者
長尾 龍一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.31, pp.88-103, 1981-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
串田 純一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.151-165_L11, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)
参考文献数
14

In seiner Vorlesung Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ (1931) hat Heidegger das Begriffspaar von δύναµις und ἐνέργεια nicht nur als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit interpretiert, sondern jeweils als Vermögen und Verwirklichung. Vor allem lobte er die Stelle 1047a 24-26, und übersetzte sie wie folgt „In Wirklichkeit vermögend aber ist dieses, dem nichts mehr unausführbar ist, sobald es sich in das Zeug legt, als wozu es das Zeug zu haben angesprochen wird “. Diese Stelle kommentierte er folgendermaßen : „Als völlig und wirklich im Stand ist nur jenes vorhanden, das im Vollzug nichts unausgeführt zu lassen braucht“. Heideggers Kommentar lässt uns „ein Vermögen zu haben“ so verstehen, dass man etwas genau dann auszuführt, wenn man es nicht unausgeführt zu lassen braucht. Diese Feststellung lässt uns verschiedene Modalitäten der Verhältnisse zwischen Verhalten und Vermögen aufgliedern und den infiniten Regress der Vermögen zu vermeiden. Die Bestimmung,dass man nichts unausgeführt zu lassen braucht, ist konsistent mit der anderen Bestimmung, nämlich dass man nötwendig etwas ausführt. Die erste Bestimmung hat ontologischen Vorrang vor der Bestimmung, etwas tun zu müssen. Wir wissen nämlich nicht immer, wozu unser Verhalten gebraucht wird. Darüberhinaus sind die notwendigen Bedingungen für unser Verhalten nur beschränkt bekannt. Trotzdem verstehen wir, dass wir etwas nicht unausgeführt zu lassen brauchen, wenn wir es tun.In Sein und Zeit bestimmt Heidegger den Vorrang von „Nicht“ als Nichtigkeit. Und dieses Verständnis von „Nicht“ wird nicht durch propositionale Erkenntnisse erschlossen, sondern durch Befindlichkeiten (Stimmungen, Gefühle, usw.). Dieser transzendentale Horizont, wo man etwas nicht unausgeführt zu lassen braucht,ermöglicht Vermögen überhaupt. Diesen Horizont entwirft das Dasein im Menschen,nicht unser „Ich“. Dieser Punkt wird durch die Stimmung der Langweile deutlich gemacht. In der Langweile haben wir nur Zeitvertreibe, die wir nicht unausgeführt zu lassen brauchen. Dieser Entwurf des transzendentalen Horizonts ist eine notwendige Bewegung des Daseins, und Heidegger nennt ihn „Freiheit“.
著者
浅野 光紀
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.135, pp.25-43, 2015-03

投稿論文Panpsychism is the view that all things have mind or a mindlike quality, whether or not they are parts of living organisms. The purpose of this paper is to clarify this basic thesis and examine the historical meaning of the recent resurgence of panpsychism in the contemporary mind-body debate.Modern Physicalism inherited the Cartesian, dualistic conception of matter, which is lifeless and devoid of any experiential character. I will argue that this makes it difficult even for the weakest form of physicalism, namely emergentism or non-reductive materialism, to coherently reconcile its two basic doctorines 'physicalist ontology and reality of mind' and panpsychism more plausible.
著者
大貫 挙学
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.106, pp.183-229, 2001-03

特集変容する社会と家族投稿論文1. はじめに2. ジェンダー概念の言語論的転回とジュディス・バトラー 2-1. 反本質主義のジェンダー概念 2-2. ジェンダーのパフォーマティヴィティ 2-3. 法の産出機能と異性愛のマトリクス3. マルクス主義フェミニズム理論の再考 3-1. マルクス主義フェミニズムと「家父長制」 3-2. 近代における公私の二重構造 3-3. マルクス主義フェミニズムの意義と課題4. 近代家族と異性愛主義 4-1. セクシュアリティの発明と「同性愛者」の誕生 4-2. セクシュアリティのジェンダー化 4-3. 有性生殖と再生産5. ジェンダー/セクシュアリティ/主体 5-1. ゲイ・アイデンティティの成立 5-2. レズビアンの不可視性と「女」という主体 5-3. 主体と(非)主体6. おわりにThe purpose of this study is to consider the subjection of gender/sexuality in modern society from the viewpoint of antiessentialism (social constructionism). My special concern here is to describe how gender category and sexual identity (or gendernization of sexuality) have been constructed, and how that has made modern society experienced. Though modernity appears very pluralistic and complicated, in this paper I focus my attention on the public/private dichotomy in terms of the modern family. Referring mainly to Marxist Feminism and Judith Butler's theory on performativity of gender, I tried to define the subjection of gender/sexuality in relation to a social structure or a social institution. I would like to make it clear how the subjection of gender/sexuality is acted out between public and private spheres, production and reproduction processes, and the subject and the (un) subject.
著者
田中 克佳
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.109, pp.135-147, 2003-03

投稿論文はじめに一. 三田村鳶魚の「江戸っ子」ニ. 西山松之助の「江戸ッ子」結び"Edokko (江戸っ子)" is the unique human image which a newly-established city Edo produced in Tokugawa Japan. Then what is the human image? And what are the social background which produced that image and the concrete substance corresponding to the image? These are questions which should be grappled in advance to research the education in the city Edo in Tokugawa Japan.
著者
植村 玄輝
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04-01 (Released:2017-06-10)
参考文献数
1

In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of anti-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a deliberative sense; in its primal form, “pure” logic concerns descriptive laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the Prolegomena is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl’s criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl’s so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.
著者
水谷 雅彦
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.60, pp.67-82_L5, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)
参考文献数
22

Some say virtual reality is evil. It is easy to ridicule this remark as ignorant and naive: a virtual reality need not be regarded as fictional or spurious, but can be seen as an augmentation of the real world, which suffers from various limitations including our limited sensory abilities. In fact, from what source does this negative picture of virtual reality originate? In Plato's allegory of the cave, which is often quoted in the discussion of a virtual reality, the people who have lived chained in a cave are not supposed to return to the cave once released. How come they do not want to?This paper examines Nozick's experience machine argument, shows that theories of virtual reality do not necessarily assume psychological hedonism, and argues that they do not fail (with computationalism) through Putnam's ‘brain in a vat’ argument. This conclusion suggests that the difference between a real world and a virtual world can in principle be relative. While a virtual world as something artificial is not, at least in principle, inferior to the real world in terms of its factual (or theoretical) aspect, there remains the possibility that the former may be inferior to the latter in its evaluative (or practical) aspect. But it can also be said that this contention is only the expression of a conservative mentality, provided that one accepts, along with Alfred Schutz, world pluralism and asserts the superiority of the real world, which superiority is based upon a mere custom of ours. Given this perspective, a virtual reality can have the same power to criticize the real world as great novels and movies, the prototypes of a virtual reality, once had.
著者
佐々木 掌子
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, pp.159-184[含 英語文要旨], 2010-03

特集 : 教育学の射程投稿論文The purposes of this paper are to look back on arguments whether DSM (Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders) should include Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in children and adolescents or not, and to review the research outcomes on how treatments and interventions have been implemented and have produced effect. First, this paper discusses whether gender nonconforming children should be diagnosed as having a mental disorder or not and where an underlying problem of the disorder lies; in a society, a family, or child oneself. Depending upon where clinicians stand, treatments and interventions differ. Approaches to therapy can be placed into 4 categories: 1) therapy for aiming at changing cross-gender identity, 2) therapy that exhibits a nonjudgmental attitude to cross-gender identity, 3) therapy that affrmatively accepts cross-gender identity, 4) physical interventions for sex reassignment. Because no controlled comparison study has been conducted, we do not have any evidence for different outcomes by selected approaches. Finally, referring to researches in Western countries, the paper discusses support for children and adolescents with GID in Japan. For children, because of the possibility of gender identity change, we should provide a family a choice of the approaches 1), 2), or 3) as previously indicated. On the other hands, for adolescents, a family should be presented a choice of the approaches 2), 3), or 4). However, in Japan, as use of pubertal delaying hormones in GID treatment has never been discussed, we can not present the approach 4). Further discussion on physical interventions for adolescents is necessary.
著者
中畑 正志
出版者
The Philosophical Association of Japan
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.47, pp.55-73, 1996

Recently some philosophers have cast doubt on the causal relevancy of the mental. In particular, they complain that functionalism and anomalous monism fail to make the mental causally efficient. However, both the critics and the defenders of these views share a common picture of causation that generates the problem of mental causation : they sharply contrast causation with normativity or rationality and take it to be prior to and independent of our explanatory practice. Rejecting this assumption, this paper argues that there is a deep connection between psychological explanation and the attribution of causal powers of the mental.
著者
柏原 勤
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.128, pp.207-234, 2012-03

特集 : 社会学 社会心理学 文化人類学投稿論文The purpose of this investigation is to regard "2 -channel thread editing blog" as a new form of news communication, to identify the characteristics and processes of the news communication, and to present the possibility that these blogs can be examined from the perspective of several mass communication theories. "2-channel thread editing blog" is a famous blog genre for many Japanese Internet users. It contains articles whose recourses are selected from threads on "2-channel", the most popular anonymous bulletin board in Japan.This study classifies these blogs and its articles into two groups, "news" and "non-news", and considers the former a new form of news communication. This type of blogs functions as a news media by mediating news articles reported by traditional media, or reporting social events particularly occurring on the Internet.As a novel type of news media, "2-channel thread editing blog" presents some potentialities to be studied from the point of and by methods of mass communication theories or news communication researches, such as double geetkeeping, media effect theories, and so on.
著者
宮崎 裕助
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.57, pp.240-253,14, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

What new possibilities of communication are contained in Derridean deconstruction, which so severely dismisses the theory of communication as we have known it, especially from Habermas and Apel? Is there really any "serious" approach to the notion of communication for such a thought that radically calls into question the idealization and theorization of communication? The aim of this study is to examine and recast Derrida's critique of the theory of communication by incorporating the following insights: (1) Derrida's argument is based upon his own discovery of the necessity of what could be called "telecommunication"; (2) it is constitutive of an immanent criticism in that it disputes the idealizing assumptions of communication (the ideas of univocality, transparency, publicity, etc.) not from an empiricist standpoint (which clings to a diversity of everyday realities in communication) but from the very logic which makes possible the idealization of communication; (3) these arguments set out the precondition for communication to take place as event in a strict sense, and it is from this point of departure that one can search for the "minimal consensus." By taking these steps, this study attempts to characterize Derrida's thought of language as the "logic of telecommunication."
著者
植村 玄輝
出版者
日本哲学会 ; 1952-
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04
著者
菅沼 聡
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.51, pp.278-288, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
15
被引用文献数
1

いかなる部分的存在者でもない存在者全体は存在するか。つまり、世界全体は、その個々の部分と同じく存在するだろうか。これは、形而上学全般にとって重要であり得るにもかかわらず、十分に検討されてこなかった問題である。本稿で我々は、この問題を主として現代の英米系の哲学の流れをもとに検討する。我々はまず、存在者全体、世界全体の存在の問題を明確にし ( (1) )、その上で、その存在についての主要な疑問点を考察し ( (2) ~ (3) )、その考察から得た結論を示す ( (4) ) ことにする。
著者
菅沼 聡
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.62, pp.283-298_L17, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)
参考文献数
24

In this paper, reality-in-itself and the absolute whole (of everything) —two of the most radically metaphysical ideas—are critically examined from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint. The legitimacy of both ideas has long been doubted, particularly since the criticisms of Kant's thing-in-itself (by Fichte and others), and since some paradoxes of set theory (such as Cantor's paradox), respectively. In section 1 of this paper, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of something real-in-itself are presented, and examined to confirm (more explicitly than ever before) that the idea of reality-in-itself cannot be easily maintained. Likewise, in section 2, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of the absolute whole (of everything) are presented, and examined to confirm that this idea cannot easily be maintained either. In section 3, however, the concept of an absolute whole of reality-in-itself (hereafter, |R|) is introduced by combining the above two ideas. Because this concept is formulated by combining two of the most radically metaphysical ideas, |R| can/could be called the “most metaphysical” reality. In view of the results presented in sections 1 and 2, the existence of |R| might be expected to be doubly doubtful. However, the results presented in section 3 are quite the opposite. It is argued that both the truth/ justification conditions are exceptionally satisfied in |R| (hence |R| exists), and thus, both ideas can be exceptionally maintained in |R|.
著者
植村 玄輝
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015

<p></p><p>In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the <i>Prolegomena</i> of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of <i>anti</i>-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a <i>deliberative</i> sense; in its primal form, "pure" logic concerns <i>descriptive</i> laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the <i>Prolegomena</i> is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl's criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl's so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.</p>