著者

長澤 英俊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.52, pp.267-275,303, 2001

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Science systematically re-organizes our ordinary experience. It seems to me that we can speak of the idea of a conceptual scheme here, while avoiding difficulties which Davidson points out. The idea of a conceptual scheme does not necessarily lead either to scheme-content dualism or to relativism. We have our ordinary experience as organized from the outset, not as totally unorganized. We do not need the notion of totally unorganized content. If a defender of the idea of a conceptual scheme distinguishes incomparability and incommensurability, he does not have to be committed to relativism. Davidson claims that translatability makes the difference of conceptual schemes nonsensical. But his identification of a conceptual scheme with a language is disputable. For we can use the words 'elm' and 'beech', even if we cannot tell an elm from a beech. The principle of charity that Davidson resorts to does not work well for such highly theoretical knowledge as science, though it is important in itself. The process of coming to know is analogous to an action in that it follows a certain set of norms. A conceptual scheme serves as a system of norms. Davidson ignores the normative aspect of conceptual schemes. For he accepts only causation as the source of knowledge.