著者
串 信考
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, pp.85-91, 2006-10-24 (Released:2018-02-01)

This research is intended to consider ethical problems posed by the legal precedents established in cases concerning posthumous reproduction in Japan, Britain, and America. In Matsuyama, Japan, a woman gave birth through artificial insemination using the frozen sperm of her deceased husband. The undisputed facts in this case are as follows: The biological father, who was undergoing treatment for leukemia, clinically donated a sample of semen in 1998 to be preserved for artificial insemination, since said treatment had the potential of rendering him sterile. After his death in 1999, his wife gave birth to a child in 2001. The child was conceived through in vitro fertilization embryo transfer using the husband's preserved semen. The Matsuyama District Court ruled in November 2003 against recognizing the legal relationship between the deceased father and the child born from posthumous reproduction. The wife appealed this ruling. In July 2004, the Takamatsu High Court subsequently ruled in favor of recognizing the legal relationship between the deceased father and his child. I examined six cases similar to the case in Matsuyama involving posthumous reproduction. There were four such cases in Japan, one in the United States, and one in Britain. In the case in Matsuyama, Japan, relatives of the deceased husband testified in court that the wife in question intended to bear child through posthumous reproduction. In one case in Japan, a wife seeking posthumous reproduction told her doctor that she wanted to artificially inseminate her husband's mother as well. This is did not involve the cases in Britain and the United States. In Japan, the family's consent is required for the organ transplants. I believe that there is a family characteristic peculiar to the Japanese with regard to posthumous reproduction.
著者
串 信考
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, pp.89-93, 2009-10-01 (Released:2018-02-01)

In Japan, 4 children were born by posthumous reproduction from 2001 to 2004 (1 in Shikoku, 1 in Tokyo, 1 in Osaka, and 1 in Nagano). In the case in Shikoku, the Supreme Court denied the legal child-parent relationship between the child whom the wife bore using her dead husband's frozen sperm and the deceased husband. Japan does not have a law that specifies posthumous reproduction, and the Supreme Court used this lack of existing legislation to deny the child-parent relationship. I am opposed to the judgment of the Supreme Court. Posthumous reproduction should be admitted under certain conditions. Firstly, before the man dies, he has to agree to posthumous reproduction. Secondly, the man has to freeze his sperm based on his own free will. The example of Shikoku fulfills the two conditions. About 60% of the general public approve of posthumous reproduction in Japan. However, there are many dissenting opinions among obstetricians such as the Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Japanese society has strong views about the family, which may relate to its general approval of posthumous reproduction. It may become the pressure which has it forced that a woman bears a child. I am opposed to the pressure. However, if the pressure on a woman bearing a child is refused and she wishes to perform posthumous reproduction based on her own free will, I will respect her decision.
著者
串 信考
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.21, pp.184-190, 2003-10-05 (Released:2018-02-01)

In December 2000, The Welfare and Science Council of the Japanese Government released the final report concerning Assisted Reproductive Technology. That report agreed to the use of donor sperm, ova and for the In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. I think that the final report of the Council has two problems. Firstly, it is objectionable that the client's brothers and sisters are included among the donors. This is an exception to the rule that the donor's name is withheld. Secondly, it is objectionable that children have a right to know their genomic parents. Children born by using donor sperm, ova and embryos, have three kinds of parents. They have real parents, foster parents and genomic parents. The right of these children to have access to the identity of their genomic parents is growing. The first and second problems are closely related. I try to clarify this close relationship in my report. The rights for children to know their genomic parents contradicts the rule of the anonymous donor. If these children know their genomic parents, the donor is not anonymous. I think that the client's brothers and sisters form majority of all donors. Children have been born by their uncles' sperm and their aunts' ova. The children are very shocked to learn their origins. The parent-child relationship becomes very complex. A new Council of the Assisted Reproductive Technology started in 2001. This Council discussed the rights for children to know their origins. But the Council members have, as yet, not formed any definite opinion. I think that the rights for children to know their origin is more important than the rule of anonymous donor, because children's rights take priority over parental desires.