著者
江口 聡
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.19-28, 2010-09-24 (Released:2018-02-01)

After briefly reviewing the philosophical controversy on abortion, I will introduce Don Marquis' "future-like-ours" argument and its various critiques. Marquis insists that (1) it is seriously immoral to kill us because killing deprives us of our valuable futures, and (2) a human fetus has a future like ours, therefore (3) it is seriously immoral to kill a human fetus. His argument is very simple but plausible, and not easy to rebut. Possible objections to his argument are (1) an objection from negligence of the women's viewpoint, (2) a ruductio ad absurdum objection from contraception, (3) an objection from metaethical analysis of "loss" and "deprivation", (4) an objection from personal identity and non-similarity of a fetus and us, and (5) a metaethical objection from relation of value and desire. I argue that objection (5), which relies on the desire account of value, is most powerful, if we are to account for modifications and qualifications of "desire", such that desire should be interpreted as "dispositional desire" and desires should be "rational and well-informed". But these objections also have a significant burden of philosophical justification.
著者
菅原 潤
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, pp.21-30, 2006-10-24 (Released:2018-02-01)

The German philosopher Juergen Habermas, who emphasizes the significance of communicative rationality in constructing social theories, has recently made active proposals in bioethics. To the extent that he insists on duties analogous to moral ones with regard to the moral status of animals, he remains in step with the opinions of some English-speaking ethical theorists. Indeed his acceptance of communications between men and other animals is consistent in part with the position of Peter Singer, who represents such opinions and objects to differentiating between humans and animals with reference to moral duties. However, Habermas fears that valuing various lives only for their sensible capacities, regardless of special differences, might result in assignment of priority to the lives of healthy higher animals over those of handicapped babies, and therefore maintains that we are after all different from the other animals in moral status. This conclusion by Habermas is built on the philosophical edifice of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, the author of the Dialectic of enlightenment, in accordance with the idea that we should not instrumentalize the living activities of humen beings. This is why he insists that research in reproductive medicine should be carefully considered. Accordingly, his attitude toward bioethics results in a kind of anthropocentrism, though we must not overlook the need for expansion of communicative relasions between humans and other animal species. The opinions of Habermas on bioethics have affected the ethics of nature, as outlined by Angelika Krebs and Martin Seel under the influence of Frankfurt School in the contemporary Germany.
著者
児玉 正幸
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.21, pp.167-175, 2003

The medical staff of Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, Kagoshima University was considering plans to conduct clinical trials to test the embryos of Duchenne muscular dystrophy patients, but they were unable to gain approval from the Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Groups and organizations that support the handicapped pointed out that there are problems with trying to make life and death decisions based on such tests. They argued that such testing implies a desire to lower the level of social services for the handicapped and to inflame the public's prejudices. In other words, the tests are considered as another example of discrimination towards families with a history of genetic disease, in the tradition of discrimination in jobs and marriage. However, as long as the freedom of the clients (the parents of the unborn child) for whom the tests are conducted is preserved, and their right to decide what to do with the results is protected, this reproduction medical technology does not threaten the constitutional rights of the handicapped, as provided in Articles 13, 14, and 25 of the Japanese Constitution. Allowing parents to decide whether to give birth to a handicapped child is not inconsistent with a policy aimed at improving welfare services.
著者
新山 喜嗣
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.30-40, 2015-09-30 (Released:2018-02-01)

We are afraid that our non-existence continues forever after our death. Lucretius spoke on this fear, stating, "Because no one fears the eternal nonentity which is in front of our birth, it isn't also necessary to fear the eternal nonentity in our after death," as a way to convince people to be rid of this fear. This statement is called Lucretius' "symmetry argument". Yet despite this, almost all modern debaters have insisted that the relation between pre-birth non-existence and post-mortem non-existence is asymmetrical. The main purpose of this article concerns the following two points about this statement of asymmetry; namely, that this statement is premised on a specific view of metaphysics and that the meaning of the claim of asymmetry must be examined from a viewpoint of metaphysics as it relates to time and the world. In this study, I first pointed out that the opinion of debaters included the assumption that we ourselves could identify non-existence. Next, I pointed out that the disputants would actually be insisting that the dead continue to exist in some form. Third, I examined which specific theories on time from twentieth-century analytic philosophy suited the disputants' opinion, and found that no ideas on time were entirely consistent with their view. Lastly, I examined non-existence before birth and non-existence post-mortem from a viewpoint of the possible worlds semantics of analytic philosophy. From this, both non-existences are located in their own possible worlds, and in addition to this, there is the real world in which the subject is alive. My examination concluded that there is a difference in existence qualification between a possible world and the real world, but that there was no such difference between two possible worlds. This suggests that the relationship between pre-birth non-existence and post-mortem non-existence is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical.
著者
加藤 穣
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.41-51, 2015-09-30 (Released:2018-02-01)

The objective of this paper is to discuss the reasons that some individuals in the United States refuse to be vaccinated, focusing on those reasons usually described as "conscientious." This paper discusses current compulsory vaccination practices and the most common categories of reasons objectors in the United States give for refusing vaccinations (on medical, religious, or philosophical grounds, the latter two of which are often described as conscientious reasons). Possible ways to handle refusals are examined from the perspectives of the three categories of refusals mentioned above, the particularities of vaccination within biomedical ethics, and public health ethics discussions. Although refusals based on divergent perceptions of risk are commonly classified as refusals for philosophical (personal) reasons, objectors in this category are trying to present medical reasons, which do not convince experts. Even if experts try to persuade the public by presenting scientific evidence, there remain fundamental difficulties in convincing objectors. Refusals for religious reasons are to a certain extent established historically, but few major religious groups nowadays explicitly refuse vaccinations per se. Refusals in this category are not necessarily plainly "religious." Certain refusals on religious grounds, including those based on repugnance for the use of components derived from aborted fetuses, can be avoided by technological advances in the medical field. Refusals based on philosophical reasons should be handled in more sensitive, individualized ways than they are now. The inquiry ventured in this paper is important for Japanese society in that it deals with general questions surrounding the contradictions between the autonomy principle, which is paramount in biomedical ethics, and the compulsory schema of public health policy, and asks whether and how the different qualities or characters of decisions regarding health care and public health should be translated into practice.
著者
安藤 泰至
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, pp.16-30, 2001-10-20 (Released:2018-02-01)

In the argument of bioethics, more often in the public argument than in the academic one, the concept of "Dignity" has been used as a protector of a human's irreplaceable value. For example, "Dignity of Life", "Human Dignity", " Dignity of Individual", and "Death with Dignity". But in many cases, the various terms of "Dignity" are ambiguous and at times oppose one another. One main reason for this is that the word "Life" has various meanings. In Japanese, at least four words, "seimei", "seikatsu", "jinsei", and "inochi" (each has rather different implications) are equivalents to the word "life". In this paper, I have reflected on the concept of "Dignity" in Human Life in some topics of bioethics, classifying the meaning of "Life" in each case. The concept of "Dignity" has a rather ambivalent character. On the one hand, it works as a protector of a human's irreplaceble life in various dimensions, such as fundamental "seimei", individual personal "jinsei", or the interrelational "inochi". But on the other hand, it can be exclusive priciple that devalue certain forms of human life as unworthy of human dignity and so cut off the possibility of encounter and self-awareness of "inochi-beings" in advance. Today, we cannot be too cautious of the danger when the exclusive principle of the concept of "Dignity" prevails and suppresses the quest for Dignity itself.
著者
村岡 潔
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, pp.166-178, 2001-10-20 (Released:2018-02-01)

We usually take it for granted that an event that some people fall ill has no connection with another event that the others can keep healthy, because we generally judge the matter from an atomistic or individualistic daily life standpoint. Many people believe that the main cause of illness is their bad lifestyle such as drinking, smoking or working too much so that the sick only have themselves to blame. This popular idea is called "victim-blaming ideology." However, from a macroscopic mass standpoint, we can find that healthy people are dependent upon the sick. That is, for people to be healthy there must be people who are sick instead of the healthy. This paper is an introduction to this paradoxical idea. First, I reconsidered the social function of the medical diagnosis of an illness and found it is to divide all the members of a society into two groups : one that is ill and the other that is not (that is., healthy). This means that the healthy cannot be healthy without the sick unfortunately being sick instead. This substitution is a kind of altruism. "Ri-tagyo", a Buddhist encouragement of altruism also supports this idea. Secondly, some epidemiological statistics also support this altruistic relationship. Finally, we concluded that sick people are neither useless nor a nuisance, but they play a great role in society because of their being-ill altruism. Healthy people, therefore, must show extreme kindness to those who are sick. This act of kindness may be an ethical origin of clinical medicine.
著者
森 禎徳
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.10-20, 2015-09-30 (Released:2018-02-01)

Withholding medical treatment to neonates born with congenital diseases has been prevailed in many countries since the 1970s. In Japan, several guidelines have been established that classify the cases in which we are permitted to withhold life-prolonging treatment. Nonetheless, no definite social consensus has been reached about whether and how withholding treatment because of disability can be ethically valid. Our aim in this study was to clarify the standards of withholding medical treatment to handicapped neonates that are ethically justifiable. First, we point out that withholding treatment to infants is essentially different from ordinary cases because the infant patients utterly lack autonomy. Then, we argue that "intolerable suffering," "quality of life," and even "the best interest" can never compensate for the lack of autonomy. These principles are inadequate for the standard we seek because objective validity is required for the criterion to justify selective nontreatment of infants with handicaps but aforementioned principles can acquire only subjective and individual validity. Consequently, we examined the justifiability of deciding selective nontreatment, which can be both ethical and feasible, claiming the importance of changing our point of view from an individual to a social level, and of a decision-making system based on a broad consensus, not on personal will. Meanwhile, we propose introducing palliative care for terminally ill neonates in order to provide them with dignified end-of-life phase.
著者
長田 蔵人
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, pp.60-68, 2009

We usually recognize instinctively that it is unreasonable to be blamed for something beyond our control or expectations, and that we should be morally evaluated in terms of motives or intensions, which are insusceptible to luck. On the other hand, however, we admit in many cases that luck exerts some influence on agents' moral evaluations. This inconsistency has long been discussed as the problem of 'moral luck'. This paper shows that the same inconsistency can be found in our attitude toward medical malpractice, and considers how to deal with it. According to D. Dickenson, who introduced the concept of moral luck into discussions of medical ethics, bad luck in medical accidents means doctors' misfortune of being blamed for inevitable accidents that occur beyond their control. Medical malpractice, which is caused by negligence and therefore can be prevented, is thus excluded from her consideration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that even regarding cases of negligence, if there are structural, technical factors that can induce such negligence, anybody could make medical errors, and it is in this sense that there exists moral luck in the cases of malpractice. This consideration leads us to the following conclusions; (1) even in the cases of negligence, it may be unreasonable to inflict criminal punishment on doctors, for we cannot clearly distinguish according to criminal law between cases of vicious negligence and those of mere moral luck; (2) a criminal suit is not a proper means to investigate what really occurs in medical malpractice.
著者
財吉拉胡
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, pp.43-52, 2014 (Released:2018-02-01)

Traditional Mongolian medicine is a system that assimilates both the theory and practice of Tibetan medicine, which entered into Mongolian society along with the spread of Tibetan Buddhism over the last several centuries. Traditional medicine in Inner Mongolia was then forcibly modernized when the Japanese colonial medical enterprise developed in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia during the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, after the establishment of People’s Republic of China, western modern medicine was popularized throughout China, including Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile, traditional Chinese medicine too became widespread into the Mongolian-settled areas, as ethnic Han Chinese people settled in Inner Mongolia. Mongolian medicine was then admitted into the official professional medical sector by the government, alongside Chinese medicine. Subsequently, the government established institutions in the higher educational system for traditional Mongolian medicine and set up traditional medical hospitals. In recent decades, however, with the spread of globalization, this medicine has lost its main position in the medical order of Mongolian society and gradually been transformed into an ethnically sustainable form of alternative medicine. For traditional Mongolian medicine to sustain itself alongside other types of practice will involve continuing modernization to satisfy the needs of local consumers.