著者

北林 雅志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.4, pp.42-70,iii, 1992-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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In the last quarter of the 19th century, the history of eastern banking was dominated by the depreciation of silver in terms of gold. The continuous decline in the value of silver was a problem for all eastern exchange banks. The Oriental Bank, which was the largest bank in Asia, fell into a business crisis and stopped payment in 1884. Under these circumstances, the Hongkong Bank extended their business, made remunerative profits and became the largest bank in Asia. How could the Hongkong Bank get over the difficulties produced by the exchange fluctuation, and grow up in such bad times? The Hongkong Bank's activities in this era were marked by the Even Keel Policy. One purpose of this article attempts to examine what the Even Keel Policy was through contemporary evidence. Even though the Hongkong Bank adopted the Even Keel Policy, the Bank could not overcome all difficulties. The Bank suffered considerable losses on the exchange business in 1886. The other purpose of this article is to try to investigate why the Bank suffered heavy losses in 1886. The foreign exchange banks had to lay in fund largely at Hankow as preparation for the Chinese tea season. They had remitted a very large amount of their funds to Hankow in Shansi bankers' drafts since 1875. But this mode of remittance was stopped by the Shanghai financial crisis of 1883. Therefore, the Hongkong Bank had to send their fund in the form of “Sycee” to Hankow. In the spring of 1886, the silver panic happened suddenly, when the Hongkong Bank remitted large “Sycee” to Hankow. As a result, the Hongkong Bank could not avoid suffering heavy losses from the silver panic of 1886.

著者

北林 雅志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.4, pp.1-28, 1987-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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The price of silver began to fall after 1873. The silver question was one of the most difficult problems facing British colonial banks in the 19th century. British colonial banks, whose operations involved financial transfers between Europe and Asia, suffered from constant fluctuations in exchange rates. This paper is an attempt to investigate how British colonial banks coped with this problem.The violent fluctuations in exchange rates were undermining their business with all silver using countries by introducing into it a strong element of speculation and uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the nature of China's foreign trade, especially the import trade, was undergoing a cmplete change from the late 1880s to the early 1890s, The very unsettled state of exchange rates had been compelling foreign importers to alter their mode of doing business, the socalled “Indent trade”. Under this “Indent trade”, a good deal of the import business passed into the hands of chinese merchants, while foreign importers were becoming merely commission agents. After the Indian mints stopped producing silver coinage in June 1893, the bulk of the “Indent trade” changed from a silver basis to a sterling basis. At this stage, it became possible for manufacturers in Manchester to quote for their piece goods in sterling and to obtain payment by drawing bills of exchange payable sterling on chinese indentors. In this system, the exchange risks inherent in the trade were transferred to chinese importers.As a result, sterling bills came to be widely used in the East and most of the “Indent trade” was conducted on a sterling basis. Through this mode of business, British colonial banks were able to carry on exchange operations on a stable basis, and to make remunerative profits.