著者
田中 智晃
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.1, pp.1_49-1_74, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of technical innovation on marketing channels and the Yamaha Music School under the mature Japanese piano market since the 1980s. The dilemma of the piano industry (e.g., the low diffusion rate, about 25%) drastically changed due to digital technology. In this new competitive environment, Yamaha carried out the three strategic changes: releasing low cost digital instruments, recasting sales channels, and reconsidering the Yamaha Music School's management policy.In the early 1980s, newcomer Casio began producing and selling the Casiotone, a low cost digital instrument. Although Yamaha did not want to release cheap keyboard instruments which might decrease the demand for their leading products (the piano and electronic organ), in the late 1980s they launched Portasound (a Yamaha-made cheap keyboard) to compete against the Casio product. Moreover, Yamaha distributed this new product through the same mass retailers which dealt in Casiotones. Recasting their sales channel this way caused the old channel, the traditional exclusive distributor system, to struggle. However, it was important for Yamaha to maintain the traditional system, because exclusive distributors were skillful at selling expensive goods (pianos etc.) through consulting sales. Therefore, Yamaha reinforced the exclusive distributors by changing their form of profit-earning music schools from one in which the schools supported Yamaha through sales, to one in which Yamaha supported the schools through licensing. These schools became an important source of income in the face of reduced piano demand from 1980.Yamaha maintained their position as market leader through these three strategic changes in spite of the technological paradigm shift in which they lost the first mover advantage. Although the double structure of their sales channel (comprising exclusive distributors and mass retailers) resulted in lower sales capacity for their exclusive distributors, the exclusive distributors were able to change their primary focus to the music education business. Yamaha's unique sales channel, with educational facilities, continues to transform while developing new keyboard instrument businesses.
著者
佐藤 達男
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

This study aims to investigate Nakajima Aircraft Company's airframe business and its production efficiency during WW II in comparison with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.During the Pacific War, Japanese aircraft production was essentially based on job shop system for parts fabrication and sub-assembly. Nakajima Aircraft Company the largest aircraft manufacturer of war-time Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the second largest utilized both job shop and production line systems for their airframe final assembly lines depending on each plant situations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports evaluated that Nakajima's airframe production system was more developed than that of Mitsubishi, which adhered to original, old-fashioned job shop system. This was substantiated from the fact that Nakajima expanded its production by 1944 to more than eight times of its 1941 production, and Mitsubishi produced only three times for the same period.However, in production efficiency measured by airframe weight produced per month per employee, Mitsubishi was predominant until August to October 1944. A positive correlation was observed between production efficiency and monthly number of airframe production. Mitsubishi's improvement degree of production efficiency agreed well with the estimation by learning curve theory, but Nakajima's improvement of production efficiency far exceeded the estimation. This is considered to be the effect that Nakajima's labor utilization rate, which was approximately half of that of Mitsubishi in September 1943, might have increased rapidly as the monthly airframe production increased. The difference of the final assembly line did not have decisive influence on the production efficiency, but the increase in the number of monthly airframe production was influential.The production efficiency continuously increased as the monthly airframe production increased, and then dropped sharply from the end of 1944 and after due to the rapid decline of monthly production, which was caused by shortages of essential materials and engines, US air raids from November 1944 and after, factory evacuation, and labor shortage.
著者
前田 裕子
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.2, pp.23-49_1, 1998-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

During the decade finishing in 1944, a drastic change of production method occurred in aircraft industry in Japan, as in the U. S.Japan had joined late in the field of modern high-technological industry, then paid a great energy in catching up to develop world-level aircraft engines. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries played a big role for this. After developing some kind of excellent engines, Mitsubishi met a more difficult issue. It was the so-called mass production method (if not used in an accurate terminology), which they had not experienced in the field of such products that consist of so many parts, need long and precise mechanical operation processes.Under a strong leadership of J. Fukao, who was the key man of the engine department of the company, Mitsubishi strove for building a new method. First, they tried to imitate the system of the U.S. aircraft engine factories, and succeeded only a part. The industrial circumstances of Japan were not matured for a company to realize the same system. Mitsubishi ought to seek another way and their method might show the limits of the industrial abilities of a late-coming country. The most outstanding feature of the method could be expressed as the simultaneous capacity building in the total area of the production processes, including those of casting, forging, making special parts or machine tools as well as mechanical operation and assembly.The result was awful. However, this cumulative and self-generating experience formed the basis of production engineering of the next generation.
著者
大久保 いづみ
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.4, pp.4_25-4_51, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

This paper examines the influence of foreign alliances on competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry prior to World War Ⅱ. In pre-war Japan, the main industry competitors were Nihon Chikuonki Shokai (NCS), Nihon Victor Chikuonki (NVC), Nihon Polidor Chikuonki (NPC), King Record (King), Teikoku Chikuonki (Teikoku), and Dainihon Chikuonki (Dainihon). NCS and NVC had alliances with companies in the United Kingdom and the United States, while NPC and King partnered with German record companies. In contrast, Teikoku and Dainihon remained purely Japanese companies, without foreign affiliations.What benefits did the record companies receive from their foreign partnerships? And, how did the alliances influence the strategies of their counterparts?As concerns Western music recordings, the companies with foreign alliances maintained a formidable competitive advantage throughout the pre-war period. On the other hand, for recordings of Japanese music, technological disparity between firms with foreign alliances and solely Japanese firms were essntially erased, and the latter rose to competiveness with the former, especially in the so-called “ryukoka” (Japanese popular songs) market. Thus, the foreign-allied-companies were forced to focus on Japanese music more than ever, this in turn accelerated the expansion of the Japanese music records market. In this context, foreign-partnered companies, such as NCS and NVC, made important contributions to “the golden age of ryukoka”.Until the beginning of the 1930s, the keys to competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry involved the introduction of new technologies and the sale of Western music records, based on alliances with foreign companies. After the mid-1930s, however, the capability to produce and sell records of Japanese music played a larger role in determining competitive advantage within the industry.
著者
佐藤 達男
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015-12
著者
渡邉 恵一
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

The main thrust of this study is to shed light on the management situation at the coastal industrial railway, which performed the function of linking factories of the coastal industrial area with the main trunk line, and also to shed light on its relationship with the companies in the coastal industrial area. This is a case study of the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway Co. that was built in the Keihin Industrial Area after the World War I.What was epoch-making about the coastal industrial area was that it functioned as an ‘industrial port’ which allowed large ships to berth at private wharves. Many companies in the Keihin Industrial Area of the 1920s required overland transport for procurement of materials and resources, and to ship their goods to Tokyo and Yokohama in the hinterlands. Initially, the coastal industrial railway was a plan which petitioned for construction of a branch link from the main trunk line by the government railway. However, in 1924, this changed to a plan where a private railway called the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway would be built after it received investment from land reclamation companies and other companies.The choice of a private railway helped to rapidly open up the Keihin Industrial Area rail system to traffic, but there were more than a few problems that arose from this. In particular, the high fares for straight-through transport with the government railway led to growing dissatisfaction from the recessionary companies along the railway line during the 1930s.Many similar problems faced by the management of the private coastal industrial railway receded into the background for a period from the war boom in 1937. However, the protracted nature and worsening course of the war, particularly with respect to freight transportation, were a crushing burden on the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway and was a factor in it being nationalized in 1943.
著者
長島 修
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.1-26, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

Japan's iron and steel supply depended upon the import from European countries. Japanese traders could hardly deal with the imported goods because foreign traders almost occupied the iron and steel import dealing. Hikitorisyo (Japanese import trader) intermediated between Japanese distributors and foreign traders. Tsuda Katsugoro who came from Hikitorisyo was one of the most famous distrbutors at Osaka. At first when he worked for Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., he was headhunted by H.E. Reynell who lived at Kobe and imported wine, spirits and so on. He worked for Reynell and Co. After he was independent of Reynell's financial help because of his bankrupt, Mitui Bank, one of the biggest Japanese bank, gave him the financial help so that Tsuda, though he could refuse foreign trader's financial dependence, deeply had to depend upon Mitsui's finance. He started as the dealer, chiefly sold to government office and Navy, and built his local branches in order to sell foreign goods. He sold ship equipments, steel machines, steel goods and so on, which he imported through foreign merchants and big home traders, to home small traders and iron makers. After his independence from Reynell, he changed his business strategy, firmly dealt with the imported iron and steel and distributed them to local merchants, because he also experienced the risk of Hikitorisyo business in spite of the fact that he made a profit during Japan China War (1894-95). In the Meiji era extending business chance, he was one of the innovative successful merchants in a short period. The small merchant such as Tsuda played an important part in the industrialization in Meiji era.

2 0 0 0 OA 工場と都市

著者
パトリック フリーデンソン
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.3, pp.55-65, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)
参考文献数
20
著者
中瀬 寿一
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.3, pp.28-55,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)

No previous analysis has been made of Japanese advertising (advertising industry and capital) from a social scientific point of view. The study of the history of advertising has also been limited to discussions of custom and fashion.This paper outlines the history of Japanese advertising in relation to the growth, development and crises of Japanese capitalism, by considering the functions of advertising in several periods of history. It also shows how and when the advertising agency came about and has continued to develop in Japan.
著者
三島 康雄
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, no.2, pp.23-51,ii, 1983-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

The origin of Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was opened by Kichirobei Yamaguchi (first) as a draper at Osaka in 1824. Kichirobei (second) changed his business to money-changer in 1863. After the Meiji Restoration, Yamaguchi family established 148th National Bank in 1879, and this bank changed to private. Yamaguchi Bank in 1898. Thereafter, Yamaguchi family invested to Nihon Seimei (life insurance), Osaka Chochiku Ginko (savings bank), Kansai Shintaku (trust company), Kyodo Kasai Kaijo (fire and marin insurance) and so on. Yamaguchi family established Yamaguchi Limited Partnership (¥10, 000, 000) as holding company in 1920 and formed Yamaguchi Zaibatsu. It had developed as a middle-scale financial Zaibatsu untill the end of second World War. The reasons of development were : 1. delegations of management power to able managers, 2. good selections of investments to stable financial and insurance companies, 3. effective utilizing of capitals by reducing the percentage of investment to 10-50% in all capitals of these companies. After the second World War, Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was not designated to Zaibatsu holding company by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, but it was going way of dissolution by the huge property tax, and the decreasing of values of holding stocks. Yamaguchi Limited Partnership closed its 30 years history in 1950.
著者
田付 茉莉子
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.4, pp.1-24, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

After World War I, Japanese shipping suffered for a long time from an excess of tonnage and severe competition. How could Japanese shipping companies cope with the depression when they were mostly latecomers with less cargo and with small company size? The smaller trampers and owners were disadvantaged by these circumstances because they could not keep sufficient volumes of cargo to operate their ships. Many of them, of course, went bankrupt. But a considerably large number of small companies survived, changing their strategies; some of them found cargo in Near Seas, and others specialised in ownership. It was the growing demands of in the chartering market that offered them new business opportunities.S. Tsutsui and Kaiyo Steamship Co., which he established later, were also small owners. Although a very small owner, he became acquainted with G. Hori, a broker in Yamashita and achieved steady growth, chartering out his ship mainly to Yamashita. Kaiyo Steamship took advantage of the government's “scrap and build policy” and acquired bigger ships, which brought good performance to its business. Kaiyo Steamship grew steadily even under the wartime economic controls and built new ships. They chartered them out to the shipping authority and lost most of them in Japan's defeat in World War II.The growth of small owners was, undoubtedly, a consequence of the development of Japanese shipping. I would like to put emphasis, however, on their contribution. Operators could not have extended their business rapidly and widely without chartering significant tonnage at greatly reduced fees, because they had to play second fiddle in the world shipping market. From this point of view, the activities of small owners are one characteristic of Japanese shipping, though it was evident not only in shipping but also in most manufacturing industries.
著者
四宮 正親
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, no.3, pp.35-72, 1994-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the foreign affiliated companies contributed to the Japanese modernization of management system in production, marketing and employment mechanism in the pre-war period. In production, the Japanese companies studied production technology, mass production system and Taylor system. In marketing, the Japanese companies studied franchise system and sales in installment system. In employment mechanism, the Japanese companies did away with subcontract system and introduced the direct employment. In conclusion, the Japanese modernization of business management has been done throughout the transfer of business system that the foreign affiliated companies had introduced. At the same time, both the Japanese companies and the foreign affiliated companies have taken a positive attitude to R & D.
著者
齊藤 毅憲
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.3, pp.86-96, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)