著者
林 采成
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wartime transportation control of Japanese National Railways (JNR) and make it clear that the management of JNR reached the limit, as the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid became intense.Since the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR had to cope with the sharply increased transportation demand caused by the industrial development as well as the military operation. In addition to the demand increase, JNR was always requested to supervise and support other companies, especially colonial railways as not only a transportation enterprise but also a regulatory agency to transportation companies. However, JNR was not a passive existence but the one to secure human and physical resources aggressively to some degree in case of negotiations with other ministries as one of the government ministries. As far as the railroad operation was possible, the profit seeking was a subsidiary matter. The persistent cooperation of JNR with Japanese Government and Army was shown by maximum transportation capacity even when JNR had insufficient management resources. Especially, after the breakout of WWII, Japanese wartime economic management could be difficult without the land transportation of JNR which substituted for marine transportation. Nonetheless, JNR resisted Japanese Army's intention to seize the railroad management right, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Army until the end of war.As a result, an efficient railroad operation system was accomplished according to the evolution of wartime economy and military situation. But, it reached the limit because of the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid.
著者
田中 智晃
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.1, pp.1_49-1_74, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of technical innovation on marketing channels and the Yamaha Music School under the mature Japanese piano market since the 1980s. The dilemma of the piano industry (e.g., the low diffusion rate, about 25%) drastically changed due to digital technology. In this new competitive environment, Yamaha carried out the three strategic changes: releasing low cost digital instruments, recasting sales channels, and reconsidering the Yamaha Music School's management policy.In the early 1980s, newcomer Casio began producing and selling the Casiotone, a low cost digital instrument. Although Yamaha did not want to release cheap keyboard instruments which might decrease the demand for their leading products (the piano and electronic organ), in the late 1980s they launched Portasound (a Yamaha-made cheap keyboard) to compete against the Casio product. Moreover, Yamaha distributed this new product through the same mass retailers which dealt in Casiotones. Recasting their sales channel this way caused the old channel, the traditional exclusive distributor system, to struggle. However, it was important for Yamaha to maintain the traditional system, because exclusive distributors were skillful at selling expensive goods (pianos etc.) through consulting sales. Therefore, Yamaha reinforced the exclusive distributors by changing their form of profit-earning music schools from one in which the schools supported Yamaha through sales, to one in which Yamaha supported the schools through licensing. These schools became an important source of income in the face of reduced piano demand from 1980.Yamaha maintained their position as market leader through these three strategic changes in spite of the technological paradigm shift in which they lost the first mover advantage. Although the double structure of their sales channel (comprising exclusive distributors and mass retailers) resulted in lower sales capacity for their exclusive distributors, the exclusive distributors were able to change their primary focus to the music education business. Yamaha's unique sales channel, with educational facilities, continues to transform while developing new keyboard instrument businesses.
著者
矢島 桂
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_59-2_84, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

This article analyzes the basic characteristic of the investment in Korean railways, centering on a relationship between the colonial Government and the investors. We deal with the case of a merger with six railway companies in 1923 as an example.In Korea in the era of colonization, a lot of railway companies were established in 1918-20. But, after the crisis of the postwar period, they could not make profits on their business. The Government had given the railway companies protections and aids to encourage establishing a network of railways, and railway companies, given the Government grants, could keep paying dividends.Early 1920s, the railway companies had difficulties of their business, and their investors were made fluctuated. The government enacted the Private Railway Aid Act to calm down the investors. On the other hand, railway companies bargained about merger as a means of breaking difficulties of their business. Although the Government, at first, opposed it, under the curtailed budget, it became to back up the merger.The railway company which was merged with six companies in 1923, wanted the Government to take burdens to break its difficulties. Kaichi Watanabe who was the president—director of the company, urged that the Government should set up the big project including buying out the lines of the railway companies. He tried to make its difficulties broken by the nationalization of the lines.The Government needed private companies to build a part of railways network. The investors wanted colonial government to take burdens in order to break difficulties of their business. Thus, there was a relationship between colonial government and investors, which restricted each other. While the Government should secure the investments in railways, the investors could parasitize on the Government budget in this scheme.
著者
菊池 航
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.3, pp.3_3-3_26, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)
参考文献数
65

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate one aspect of competition between firms in the post-war Japanese automobile industry, using the development competition surrounding the rotary engine as a case study. This paper examines the evolution of development competition, while focusing on the factors underlying Toyo Kogyo’s success in achieving practical application of the rotary engine, and the reasons why competing firms participated in the development of rotary engines.The late 1960s was a time when Toyota and Nissan increased their shares of the Japanese market, establishing an oligopolistic system dominated by two companies. Toyota increased its market share by outsourcing some assembly and development to itaku firms, and realizing a full-line strategy. Toyo Kogyo, on the other hand, successfully developed the world’s first practical rotary engine in 1967, and executed a differentiation strategy of supplying automobiles equipped with rotary engines. Toyo Kogyo believed that new expressways and road networks would increase demand for rotary engine automobiles with superior acceleration performance. Key factors which enabled Toyo Kogyo to achieve the technical innovation of a practical rotary engine were their outstanding technical capabilities, based on their high rate of in-house production, and the existence of a dealer network which learned the special maintenance techniques needed for rotary engines.For competing firms, the rotary engine was one possible technology for complying with emission regulations. Taking the new emission regulations as an opportunity, GM, Ford, Toyota, and Nissan participated in rotary engine development, which had thus far been led by Toyo Kogyo, thus resulting in broader development competition. This was a competition to find environmental technology, and involved firms from the U.S. as well as Japan. Therefore, when fuel prices rose due to the oil crisis, and practical three-way catalysts meeting emissions standards were developed, the competing companies withdrew from rotary engine development.
著者
佐藤 達男
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

This study aims to investigate Nakajima Aircraft Company's airframe business and its production efficiency during WW II in comparison with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.During the Pacific War, Japanese aircraft production was essentially based on job shop system for parts fabrication and sub-assembly. Nakajima Aircraft Company the largest aircraft manufacturer of war-time Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the second largest utilized both job shop and production line systems for their airframe final assembly lines depending on each plant situations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports evaluated that Nakajima's airframe production system was more developed than that of Mitsubishi, which adhered to original, old-fashioned job shop system. This was substantiated from the fact that Nakajima expanded its production by 1944 to more than eight times of its 1941 production, and Mitsubishi produced only three times for the same period.However, in production efficiency measured by airframe weight produced per month per employee, Mitsubishi was predominant until August to October 1944. A positive correlation was observed between production efficiency and monthly number of airframe production. Mitsubishi's improvement degree of production efficiency agreed well with the estimation by learning curve theory, but Nakajima's improvement of production efficiency far exceeded the estimation. This is considered to be the effect that Nakajima's labor utilization rate, which was approximately half of that of Mitsubishi in September 1943, might have increased rapidly as the monthly airframe production increased. The difference of the final assembly line did not have decisive influence on the production efficiency, but the increase in the number of monthly airframe production was influential.The production efficiency continuously increased as the monthly airframe production increased, and then dropped sharply from the end of 1944 and after due to the rapid decline of monthly production, which was caused by shortages of essential materials and engines, US air raids from November 1944 and after, factory evacuation, and labor shortage.
著者
前田 裕子
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.2, pp.23-49_1, 1998-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

During the decade finishing in 1944, a drastic change of production method occurred in aircraft industry in Japan, as in the U. S.Japan had joined late in the field of modern high-technological industry, then paid a great energy in catching up to develop world-level aircraft engines. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries played a big role for this. After developing some kind of excellent engines, Mitsubishi met a more difficult issue. It was the so-called mass production method (if not used in an accurate terminology), which they had not experienced in the field of such products that consist of so many parts, need long and precise mechanical operation processes.Under a strong leadership of J. Fukao, who was the key man of the engine department of the company, Mitsubishi strove for building a new method. First, they tried to imitate the system of the U.S. aircraft engine factories, and succeeded only a part. The industrial circumstances of Japan were not matured for a company to realize the same system. Mitsubishi ought to seek another way and their method might show the limits of the industrial abilities of a late-coming country. The most outstanding feature of the method could be expressed as the simultaneous capacity building in the total area of the production processes, including those of casting, forging, making special parts or machine tools as well as mechanical operation and assembly.The result was awful. However, this cumulative and self-generating experience formed the basis of production engineering of the next generation.
著者
大久保 いづみ
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.4, pp.4_25-4_51, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

This paper examines the influence of foreign alliances on competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry prior to World War Ⅱ. In pre-war Japan, the main industry competitors were Nihon Chikuonki Shokai (NCS), Nihon Victor Chikuonki (NVC), Nihon Polidor Chikuonki (NPC), King Record (King), Teikoku Chikuonki (Teikoku), and Dainihon Chikuonki (Dainihon). NCS and NVC had alliances with companies in the United Kingdom and the United States, while NPC and King partnered with German record companies. In contrast, Teikoku and Dainihon remained purely Japanese companies, without foreign affiliations.What benefits did the record companies receive from their foreign partnerships? And, how did the alliances influence the strategies of their counterparts?As concerns Western music recordings, the companies with foreign alliances maintained a formidable competitive advantage throughout the pre-war period. On the other hand, for recordings of Japanese music, technological disparity between firms with foreign alliances and solely Japanese firms were essntially erased, and the latter rose to competiveness with the former, especially in the so-called “ryukoka” (Japanese popular songs) market. Thus, the foreign-allied-companies were forced to focus on Japanese music more than ever, this in turn accelerated the expansion of the Japanese music records market. In this context, foreign-partnered companies, such as NCS and NVC, made important contributions to “the golden age of ryukoka”.Until the beginning of the 1930s, the keys to competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry involved the introduction of new technologies and the sale of Western music records, based on alliances with foreign companies. After the mid-1930s, however, the capability to produce and sell records of Japanese music played a larger role in determining competitive advantage within the industry.
著者
佐藤 達男
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015-12
著者
山藤 竜太郎
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

The purpose of this article is to determine how and why Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system at its Shanghai branch. We investigated the case of Mitsui & Co. because it is the oldest and biggest general trading company (GTC), and it has increased its Chinese branches in the years straddling the 1900s. We focus on Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch because it was the first Chinese branch for Mitsui & Co., and it served as the headquarters for its Chinese branches. Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch abolished the comprador system in 1899. This was a precedent for the other Chinese branches of Mitsui & Co. and other companies, for example, other Japanese and German trading companies.We illustrate three reasons for the abolishment of the comprador system at Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch. The first reason was Mitsui & Co.'s comprador himself. The comprador had a distinctive character. He drew salary as an employee, earned commission as an agent, and had a group of staffs. A typical comprador has the character of an employee and an agent and a group of staffs.The second reason was the influence of the off-the-job training (off-JT) program. The overseas off-JT program was launched in April 1898 and January 1899. Preceding studies advocate that the off-JT program undermined Mitsui & Co.'s comprador system. However, Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system in July 1899 at its Shanghai branch; thus, the trainees employed thereafter were on training and not on the job.The third reason was the human resource practices of Mitsui & Co. Employees that they cultivated during their professional practice in Mitsui & Co. and went on to become managers to deal with some goods in 1899.Mitsui & Co. cut down costs on the salary and commissions provided to the comprador, increased its trading partners, and adopted a long-term marketing strategy because of the abolishment of the comprador system.
著者
渡邉 恵一
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

The main thrust of this study is to shed light on the management situation at the coastal industrial railway, which performed the function of linking factories of the coastal industrial area with the main trunk line, and also to shed light on its relationship with the companies in the coastal industrial area. This is a case study of the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway Co. that was built in the Keihin Industrial Area after the World War I.What was epoch-making about the coastal industrial area was that it functioned as an ‘industrial port’ which allowed large ships to berth at private wharves. Many companies in the Keihin Industrial Area of the 1920s required overland transport for procurement of materials and resources, and to ship their goods to Tokyo and Yokohama in the hinterlands. Initially, the coastal industrial railway was a plan which petitioned for construction of a branch link from the main trunk line by the government railway. However, in 1924, this changed to a plan where a private railway called the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway would be built after it received investment from land reclamation companies and other companies.The choice of a private railway helped to rapidly open up the Keihin Industrial Area rail system to traffic, but there were more than a few problems that arose from this. In particular, the high fares for straight-through transport with the government railway led to growing dissatisfaction from the recessionary companies along the railway line during the 1930s.Many similar problems faced by the management of the private coastal industrial railway receded into the background for a period from the war boom in 1937. However, the protracted nature and worsening course of the war, particularly with respect to freight transportation, were a crushing burden on the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway and was a factor in it being nationalized in 1943.
著者
牧 幸輝
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.2, pp.2_49-2_73, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

This article aims to explore the business vision of Risaburo Toyoda and examine his management of Toyoda Gyoudan [Toyota Industrial Group(TIG)] with emphasis on his entrepreneurial network. Although, Kiichiro Toyoda is well known as the “founder” of Toyota Motor Corporation, in fact, he was not in a position to make final decisions. His brother-in-law, Risaburo, was the president of Toyota Motor Corporation as well as the CEO of TIG. Therefore, the study of TIG including Toyota Motor Corporation must devote special attention to Risaburo. Nevertheless, he has not been judged rightly, and has often been regarded as a hindrance to Toyota's rise in the automobile business. This article aims to reexamine his positive role and the organizational structure of TIG, regarded as a “local Zaibatsu”.One of the most important facets of Risaburo was why he decided to enter the automobile industry. This article shows that in the 1930s, he had predicted the rise of Japan's heavy industry and the decline of its textile industry, and he managed to convert TIG's basic business from textiles to heavy industries.It is well known that Zaibatsu and Emerging Corporate groups were disorganized during the wartime economy due to diversification of affiliated companies. On the other hand, TIG, which was a late-comer in the corporate group, was still primarily controlled by the Toyoda family. A lack of external capital needed to enter the automobile business along with wartime corporate controls had threatened its management structure, but Risaburo secured cooperative stakeholders and reorganized TIG, making Toyota Kinyu [Toyota Finance Company] a holding company. Consequently, TIG kept the family-controlled management structure. In this process, Risaburo made the most of his entrepreneurial network and exercised leadership as the CEO.
著者
長島 修
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.1-26, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

Japan's iron and steel supply depended upon the import from European countries. Japanese traders could hardly deal with the imported goods because foreign traders almost occupied the iron and steel import dealing. Hikitorisyo (Japanese import trader) intermediated between Japanese distributors and foreign traders. Tsuda Katsugoro who came from Hikitorisyo was one of the most famous distrbutors at Osaka. At first when he worked for Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., he was headhunted by H.E. Reynell who lived at Kobe and imported wine, spirits and so on. He worked for Reynell and Co. After he was independent of Reynell's financial help because of his bankrupt, Mitui Bank, one of the biggest Japanese bank, gave him the financial help so that Tsuda, though he could refuse foreign trader's financial dependence, deeply had to depend upon Mitsui's finance. He started as the dealer, chiefly sold to government office and Navy, and built his local branches in order to sell foreign goods. He sold ship equipments, steel machines, steel goods and so on, which he imported through foreign merchants and big home traders, to home small traders and iron makers. After his independence from Reynell, he changed his business strategy, firmly dealt with the imported iron and steel and distributed them to local merchants, because he also experienced the risk of Hikitorisyo business in spite of the fact that he made a profit during Japan China War (1894-95). In the Meiji era extending business chance, he was one of the innovative successful merchants in a short period. The small merchant such as Tsuda played an important part in the industrialization in Meiji era.

2 0 0 0 OA 工場と都市

著者
パトリック フリーデンソン
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.3, pp.55-65, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)
参考文献数
20
著者
中瀬 寿一
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.3, pp.28-55,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)

No previous analysis has been made of Japanese advertising (advertising industry and capital) from a social scientific point of view. The study of the history of advertising has also been limited to discussions of custom and fashion.This paper outlines the history of Japanese advertising in relation to the growth, development and crises of Japanese capitalism, by considering the functions of advertising in several periods of history. It also shows how and when the advertising agency came about and has continued to develop in Japan.