著者

城坂 真治

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.142-158, 2018 (Released:2020-01-29)

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It is widely known that Nishida examined the problem of action in a concrete historical reality in his later philosophy. However, little research had been done focusing on the problem of intention and action in Nishida’s middle period works. After he arrived at the idea of‘Basho’(場所), Nishida developed a philosophical system of universals. In developing this system, Nishida adopts the terms noesis and noema from Husserl’s theory of intentionality; giving these terms important roles in describing the ordered relations among universals. Nishida, however, criticizes Husserl’s theory of intentionality and argues that the internal determination of intentional action is based on self-awareness by analyzing the temporal nature of expressive activity. He concludes that the ground of intentionality is volitional self-awareness. Despite critiquing Husserl, Nishida’s practical philosophy in his middle period, which is argued from the standpoint of the development of self-awareness, has a problem in that it does not focus on actions in the real world. In this paper, I will investigate the practical philosophy in Nishida’s middle period and make it clear how it interacts with Nishida’s system of self-aware universals. Through this research, I hope to shed light upon the characteristics of Nishida's practical philosophy and provide a means to compare his middle and later thought.

著者

城坂 真治

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.111-124, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

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The aim of this study is to reveal the influence of Aristotle’s concept of ‘hypokeimenon’ upon Nishida Kitaro’s logic of locus. In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida discussed two characters of pure experience: (1) Pure experience does not refer to the contents of the ‘that-clause’ which is the object of knowledge as expressed in discursive judgment, rather pure experience refers to the event (or state) of seeing something, hearing something etc., (as it is, prior to discursive discrimination). (2) Pure experience is the original source of our knowledge, which we then proceed to elucidate via judgment(or propositions). In the process of developing his logic of locus, Nishida adopted (1) as a base, and modified aspects of (2) in light of this. He found in Aristotle’s thought about the ‘hypokeimenon’ an argument that knowledge of perception of objects with non-conceptual content is justified by reference to the individual object itself, prior to(discursive)judgment. Under the influence of this aspect of Aristotle’s thought, Nishida came to develop his logic of locus as a means to locate events within the sphere of reason. However, there is a crucial difference between Aristotle and Nishida. Nishida was concerned not with the ‘hypokeimenon’ as a means to interpret knowledge of objects with non-conceptual content; but rather with what he termed ‘locus’. With it, Nishida attempted to relate knowledge to our various forms of commitment to the world, thus making it possible to consider knowledge from a practical, rather than purely theoretical, point of view.