- 著者
-
大久保 文彦
- 出版者
- 公益財団法人史学会
- 雑誌
- 史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.103, no.6, pp.1059-1095, 1222-1224, 1994-06-20
In this article the author investigates the background and origins of the discharge of Inspector-General of Army Education Mazaki Jinzaburo in July 1935, which resulted in a dispute over army personnel. He focuses on 1)the three Army Chiefs Council (陸軍三長官会議), which was the scene of the discharge procedures, 2)the formation process of 1913 the Arrangement Regulating Duties of three Army Departments and 3)related the Agreement of three Chiefs. In the first chapter, the author analyzes the defense offered by Mazaki up to his discharge, showing, in contrast to conventional opinions, that his views concerning both the Council and the agreement related to the Arrangement surfaced just before the finale to the case. In chapter two, the author demonstrates how Army Minister Hayashi knowing of the Arrangement provision devised counter-measures on how to deal with the Council, intentionally ignoring the Agreement. In chapter three, the author traces the formation process of the Arrangement back to 1913, indicating that the Army Ministry bureaucratic reforms aimed at abolishing the ministerial appointment of active duty military officers was opposed by the Army. This opposition appeared in a revision of the ministerial duties item in provisions. This was the direct cause of the establishment of the Arrangement in the midst of peacetime institutional revisions that the Army feared would enable Imperial edicts to override military decrees. In chapter four, the author takes up the personnel aspect, showing the evolution within negotiations between the General Staff, who wanted to nominalize the authority of the Army Minister and a reluctant Army Ministry over a plan for a personnel section with the three chiefs to be the major decision makers. In opposition to the General Staff who wanted the establishment of such a section according to peace-time organization, the Army Ministry Personnel Bureau Appointments Section attempted to eliminate its effectiveness and authority. What happened in the end was the inevitable division in personnel affairs known in the research literature as "Addenda to Army Secret Memorandum No.120 : The A and B proposals". The "B Proposal", which contained many of the elements for a Personnel Section, should not have gone any farther than simple agreement between the three Chiefs and in fact the authority over the June petition to the throne was held by the Army Minister. But, being only a provisional action, the petition clearly asked for a decision to be made at a later date. After the promulgation of bureaucratic reforms and the consequent resignation of the Army Minister, the right to petition the throne was transferred to the Chief of General Staff, who thus had the last word on the final petition submitted in July. The research up till now has denied the effectiveness of the "B Proposal" on the grounds that its contents were missing from the final petition. However, at the June phase of the petition the "B Proposal" was clearly stated as a subordinate provision to the "A proposal" ; and if the July petition is considered to be a final decision concerning a revised "A Proposal", it is impossible to state for certain that the "B Proposal" was not also accepted. If we keep in mind the sense of urgency shown by the Army, the content of both the June and July petitions should be considered as one entity. Therefore acceptance was given to the June petition through a process that lasted until July. It is for this reason that the effectiveness of the "Agreement" between the three Chiefs cannot be refuted, and the three Army Chiefs Council, given elements of a Personnel section by this petition, became, as Mazaki Jinzaburo reasoned, a personnel decision making apparatus with each Chief having an equal say in the matter.