著者

奈良 毅

出版者

清泉女子大学

雑誌

清泉女子大学紀要 (ISSN:05824435)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.1-11, 1996-12-25

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Human language can be defined as having the following characteristics: (1) Linguistic reality differs from phenomenal reality. It is supposed that within his/her own brain each human being possesses a unique mental dictionary registering a lemma of {dog}, for instance, with its semantic feature(s) as minimum requisite yet sufficient condition which is associated with the phonological sign called /inu/. This lemma can be associated either with a ilving dog really existing in this mundane world or with a picture of a dog illustrated in a children's story book. The mental image of {dog} consisting of certain semantic features registered within the cerebral dictionary of a blind person must be different from that within the dictionary of a person with eye-sight. Thus, the image of {dog} existing in someone's cerebral dictionary-which I term as 'linguistic reality'-differs from the image of {dog} which is created in the brain due to the stimulation of pulse signals transmitted through nerve systems of various sense organs (such as the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue etc.) from either a living dog or a toy dog or a picture dog etc.-which I term as 'phenomenal reality'-. To support the above statement one may refer to the fact that human beings can tell a lie-namely, one can create an image of something which never exists in the phenomenal world. (2) The cerebral dictionary has two aspects-a social & stationary aspect versus a personal & fluctuating aspect. Sometimes it so happens that while a person sees a dog and think of it as a {lovely} dog on the basis of criteria associated with certain features, another person seeing the same dog judges it otherwise. In this case it should be so interpreted that one person's criteria differs from another person's. Furthermore the criteria may fluctuate according to the mood or mental condition of the speaker at the time of his/her utterance. When the speaker is very happy, the applicable range of the feature(s) associated with the criteria of {loveliness} tends to expand and become loose-in this case the speaker may perceive almost every dog as a lovely dog. On the contrary, when the same speaker feels unhappy or angry, the range of criteria surely tends to contract and become rigorous-in that case any dog hardly looks lovely to the speaker's eyes. It is presumed that semantic features of a given lemma registered in the cerebral dictionary of a person are almost the same as those of the lemma concerned in the cerebral dictionary of any other person belonging to the same speech community. Without this presumption no one can expect smooth interpersonal communication among the members who speak the same language. Thus, it can be said that the cerebral dictionary contains a socially common & stationary aspect and also an individually unique & fluctuating aspect. (3) The speaker gets involved with double egos-implicit or 'Inner-Self' and explicit or 'Outer-Self'. The meanings of Japanese motion verbs {go (=iku)} and {come (=kuru)} are described as described respectively as follows: {go (=iku)}: -departing and moving away from the speaker's standing spot, {come (=kuru)}: -approaching and reaching the speaker's standing spot. Then how is it possible for any Japanese speaker to say either [A] or [B]? [A] "I will go(=iki-masu) to your house tomorrow". [B] "I will come(=ki-masu) to your house tomorrow". The explanation becomes possible only if one postulates that for [A] 'Inner-self' of the speaker will be at his/her own house tomorrow and see his/her 'Outer-self' departing and moving away from the house towards the hearer's house and that for [B] 'Inner-self' of the speaker will be at the hearer's house tomorrow and see his/her own 'Outer-self' approaching and reaching the hearer's house. Thus, the speaker's 'Inner-self' can move freely transcending space and time and observe his/her own 'Outer-self'. In most cases the former remains implicit while the latter is explicit and manifests itself in the form of the 'Subject' of a sentence. When a speaker says to himself/herself "What a fool I am who failed to do such an easy thing !" or "0 Great! I have done rather well, haven't I ?", 'I' here indicates the speaker's 'Outer-self' and the real one who states the sentence concerned is the speaker's 'Inner-self' though not manifested in any linguistic form. (4) A mode of thought peculiar to the members of a given speech community is closely interrelated to a certain linguistic form. Modern colloquial Tamil motion verbs {po-} and {va-} have almost the same meaning as Japanese motion verbs {iku} and {kuru} respectively. When a Japanese speaker notices someone visiting Mr. N, living in the speaker's neighbouring house, he/she may say "That person came(=ki-masi-ta) to see Mr. N." However, a Tamil speaker may say either [C] or [D]. [C] "That person came(=va-ndaan) to see Mr. N." [D] "That person went(=po-onaan) to see Mr. N." The reason for this lingustic discrepancy can be found in the speaker's mental attitude towards Mr. N. Namely, if this Tamil speaker considers Mr. N as his/her intimate friend or friendly neighbour, then he/she may utter the sentence [C]. But if the speaker does not consider Mr. N as a person belonging to his/her friendly circle, then he/she may utter the sentence [D]. The inclusion of someone in a speaker's mental circle or the exclusion of someone from it seems to be a characteristic form of cultural behaviour of the Tamil people. This peculiar mode of thought by Tamil people is reflected in the distinction between the two linguistic forms indicating 1 st person plural: -i.e. inclusive {naam} 'we(=including the hearer)' versus exclusive {naaNkaL} 'we(=excluding the hearer)'.