著者
宇野 光範
出版者
香川高等専門学校
雑誌
高松工業高等専門学校研究紀要 (ISSN:03899268)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, pp.19-35, 2009-03

Arguments on minds and machines using G?del's incompleteness results are reexamined. Starting with the so-called naive criticisms against mechanism, Benacerraf's argument is analyzed by especially making a closer attention to the assumptions of his argument. Then, Crispin Wright's argument is discussed, where he attempts to overcome a certain consistency problem through the aid of intuitionist logic. Finally, it is shown that Wright's conclusion wouldn't follow, that his argument should be taken as a half of the argument from a larger perspective, in which the other half, if completed, seems to be consistent with mechanism.
著者
宇野 光範
出版者
香川高等専門学校
雑誌
高松工業高等専門学校研究紀要 (ISSN:03899268)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.47-59, 2005-03

There is a huge gap between a sentence being undecidable and a true sentence being unprovable. Although being a Platonist, Godel had been reluctant to explain his incompleteness theorems in terms of the notion of truth. Instead, he mentions on absolutely undecidable Diophantine problems with regard to his first incompleteness. This together with his distinction of objective/subjective mathematics, Godel's intended philosophical implications of his theorems are discussed. Difficulties under subjective math, when no Platonism is presupposed, are examined.