著者
小島 明彦
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.39, no.1, pp.1-14, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
6

This paper aims to show a picture of self-knowledge in light of Moran's view. What kind of feature does self-/other-knowledge asymmetry have? Characterizing the first-person authority (FPA) as cognitive immediacy to one's own thought involves the unacceptable Cartesian picture. But any formal or "grammatical" characterization of it cannot explain a distinctively first-personal feature in turn. I suggest that the best way to see self-knowledge with the FPA as substantial one is to take it as consisting of cognitive stance plus practical stance to one's own thought. The source of the FPA itself is not cognitive immediacy, but the kind of immediacy the latter stance has. It is the intrinsic capacity for us to be rational agents, though what does not work in a particular case.