著者
尾崎 恭一
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, pp.81-94, 1996-10-01 (Released:2018-02-01)

Not a few people in Japan are killed in active euthanasia. However, most cases are hidden, as active euthanasia is prohibited in any situation. Consequently some people are killed by immoral ways, for example involuntarily or cruelly, though they could survive with handicaps, or though they could die calmly in voluntary active euthanasia. Voluntary active euthanasia should be permitted legally, and the Involuntary one should be prohibited strictly. Why is Voluntary active euthanasia prohibited? Because people think that no one has the right of death and believe in the theory of the slippery slope. But everyone has the right of self-determination. Does this right imply that? And cannot we put the brake on unlimited killing performed under active euthanasia? In order to answer these questions, I first investigated how the right of self-determination is justified by two theories which differ from each other:social contract theory and utilitarianism. This call give an impartial solution for them. The solution is that each person has the right to decide all one's own affairs and even commit suicide if the right is not misused and makes no one unhappy. Secondly I studied the meaning of death for the dying person, especially with regard to its positive meaning, i.e. the completion of his life. It is important what he does as the last act in his life when he suffers terribly from fatal wounds or diseases. Is it morally good that doctors prolong the severe pain of the patient as long as possible? It is bad that they rob him of self-determination and his happiness. He doesn't only have the right to die,but also should exercise the right in oder to get rid of his fatal pains. Thirdly I think through the new legal systems which permit the right to die and prevent patients from misusing it. Judging from the above, these systems must be based on the principles of self-determination and state of necessity. In the case of voluntary active euthanasia, to help one commit suicide can be legally justified. However, to kill one based on the one's serious request cannot justified, but only irresponsible for the murder.
著者
尾崎 恭一
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, pp.1-14, 1994-10-01 (Released:2018-02-01)

How can we judge medical treatment ethically? We could do so from common ethics, if such ethics existed. But they do not. Therefore we must know first of all how medical treatment can be judged from various ethical viewpoints. In this report, the main ethical viewpoints concerning sex selection in reproduction are investigated. In addition, what kind of ethics are necessary for agreement on the subject are studied. What are the main ethical views? First, these must mediate between incompatible views of value supporting conventional ethical views. The main ethical views are based on fundamental values, or they are formalistic and have no material values. Secondly these views must also be have social reality. Namely these must be produced by our society and be supported by it too. Such views include the theory of natural rights, utilitarianism and personalism. These three views take different attitudes toward motives for sex selection in impregnation selecting acts and their effects. The reason why they cannot reach the same conclusion is that these views insist on different values from each other, though such values are fundamental. Therefore in order to reach the same conclusion we must agree about fundamental values, i. e. in order to obtain common ethics we must form the same view of value. But it is one of the most difficult tasks. Because one's value consciousness depends on one's own community, in order to form it we must integrate various communities of various people. Can we integrate them merely by communications about ethics?
著者
尾崎 恭一
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.12-24, 1992-10-23 (Released:2018-02-01)

In the discussion on informed consent, we find some doctors may think they should not give patients some information, even if the patients think it indispensable. And vice versa. This results from moral gaps. Therefore, informed consent needs to bridge moral gaps. L. Kohlberg points out gaps among developmental stages as well as among ideas about values. He suggests bridging the former by making the latter comprehensible to all concerned. However, doesn't the person on the higher moral stage think the lower inmoral? No, according to Kohlberg, because the higher moral stage includes the lower stages as reintegrated components. But K. Wilber criticizes Kohlberg saying that the higher moral stage doesn't include the lower, unlike the higher cognitive stage. Which is right? In order to answer this question, I investigated the relation among stages and sent out questionnaires. Theoretically speaking, the higher moral stage doesn't include the lower stages, because unlike cognitive stages, moral stages don't have only cognitive structures, but also content formed by the structures, namely, the meaning of roles as human relations. The higher moral stage includes the lower cognitive structures, but no lower social meanings. Thus the morally higher person won't discuss things on the lower stage. Therefore, to bridge these moral gaps is possible only by raising the lower people up to the higher stages. And the higher stage 5 is easy to reach for adults, because they have already reached the cognitive stage necessary to reach moral stage 5. Furthermore this stage itself enables moral development by promoting role-playing, another antecedent of moral development. And my questionnaires also show that stage 5 can bridge moral gaps. Thus the discussion for informed consent must be based on moral stage 5. Concretely speaking, hospitals should offer not only doctors but also patients as many chances to participate in their everyday decisions as possible.