著者

嶋 理人

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.28-42, 2012-10-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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This article examines a case in which an electricity service district in Chiba Prefecture was transferred from Tokyo Electric Light (Co.) to Keisei Electric Railway (Co.) (hereafter referred to as the "Chiba Case"). It focuses on two points: first, the principal features of the 1931 Revised Electricity Business Act (hereafter referred to as "The Revised Act"); and second, changes in the relationship between the Revised Act and State management of electric power. The research is based mainly on the diary of OOWADA Teiji, who was a Ministry of Communications (MOC) bureaucrat. The agreement to transfer the electricity service district from Tokyo Electric Light to Keisei Electric Railway was concluded in 1934, but in 1936, the Ministry of Communications decided not to approve it. The 1931 Revised Act had originally established electricity service district monopolies, as well as systems for approving electric bills, granting permission for mergers and transfers, and so on. Under the Revised Act, public regulation over the monopolies was strengthened. Five major electric power companies imposed self-regulation by organizing the Electric Power League (cartel). The driving force behind the Revised Act was HIRASAWA Kaname, an MOC bureaucrat who was specialized in electricity administration. The evolving regime reflected his ideas. He insisted on electricity service district monopolies and on the system for approving the electric bill (the introduction of the fully distributed cost method). He also respected the spirit of enterprise, however. His supervision of the electric power industry was therefore not oppressive but rather encouraged self-regulation by the companies. Meanwhile, OOWADA, who had opposed HIRASAWA, played an important role in establishing State management of electric power (1938). OOWADA insisted that the electric power industry should not be managed by private enterprise but should be controlled directly by the state, to correspond with the move to total war and to revive farming areas. Similar views gained influence in the Ministry of Communications in the reforming climate of the times. Finally, TANOMOGI Keikichi, who had long sought state management of electric power, was appointed Minister of Communications. He removed HIRASAWA as chief of the electricity bureau and appointed OOWADA in his place. OOWADA and others dismissed HIRASAWA's policy as antireform: as a result, the Chiba transfer agreement was rejected. The Revised Act regime had aimed to balance an enterprising spirit with the public interest, but bureaucrats like OOWADA criticized it as insufficient for establishing state control of electricity. Some previous studies have argued that the Revised Act regime paved the way for State management by tightening public regulations. However, the above case reveals the discontinuity between electricity management under the Revised Act and State management. The rejection of the Chiba Case was a sign of the changes taking place in electricity administration at that time, and thus suggests a universal problem in the relationship between the spirit of enterprise and the public interest.

著者

嶋 理人

出版者

熊本学園大学経済学会

雑誌

熊本学園大学経済論集 = Journal of Economics, Kumamoto Gakuen University (ISSN:13410202)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1-4, pp.349-379, 2020-03-31

著者

嶋 理人

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会 ; 2002-

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.28-42, 2012-10