著者

李 優大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_49-201_65, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

92

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Fedor Rotshtein began his tenure as the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia soon after the signing of the Soviet Iranian Treaty of Friendships on February 26, 1921. He was later succeeded by Boris Shumiatskii. This article reviews Russia’s Foreign Policy towards Iran during the “New Economic Policy (NEP)” era by examining Rotshtein’s diplomatic activities in Tehran with the aim of answering two key questions: 1) how did Soviet Russia handle the ‘tough-negotiator’ tactics adopted by Iranian diplomacy during this period; and 2) how, and under what circumstances, did the tone of Russia’s approach towards Iran change during the NEP era? This article will argue that the main feature of Soviet Diplomacy during this era lies in its historical trajectory moving between a realist policy aimed at normalizing relations with neighbouring states and a conventional revolutionary foreign policy.During his tenure, Rotshtein’s primary diplomatic engagement was the pursuit of an accord that would resolve the disputes over the Russian Empire’s oil and fishery concessions in Iran in addition to concluding a supplementary trade agreement. However, the Iranian government, cognizant of the severe famine spreading across Russia, adopted a tough-negotiator posture; including showing reluctance to ratify the Treaty of Friendships, as strategic negotiating tactic to maximize concessions from Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Rotshtein particularly concentrated on resolving the disputes over oil concessions in northern Iran. This was because at that time Soviet Russia saw the disputes as the national security issue rather than as a commercial one; formerly the Russian Empire had regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence, and Soviet Russia was concerned about Britain’s expansion in the region.Such was the importance that Rotshtein attached to deepening commercial relations with Tehran that he even helped Reza Khan suppress the revolutionary movement carried out under the auspices of Caucasian communists in northern Iran. This Rotshtein’s policy was severely criticized by David Gopner, a leftist in the Communist Party, but the criticism might have been politically inconvenient for the Soviet central government at that time because it had been prioritizing strengthening commercial relations with neighboring states over revolutionary ideology. In this context, it had profound implications for Soviet foreign policy that Boris Shumiatskii was assigned to Tehran as a successor to Rotshtein. He was an expert on Siberia, and unfamiliar with Iranian affairs. This posting was arguably a demotion for Shumiatskii, having clashed with Stalin over an ethnic issue in Buryatia, but the case was not that simple. The enthusiastic revolutionary’s transfer to Iran was a disguise to make Soviet policy look revolutionary again when, in fact, Soviet Russia had abandoned its strict revolutionary policy. Shumiatskii, however, had difficulty imposing his revolutionary policy on a country where he found himself to be a total stranger, and it is not surprising that it took only a few years before he departed the post. Overall, this article argues that Soviet Russia’s active opposition to revolutionary policy in Iran shifted to a “mild” permissive revolutionary policy.

著者

李 優大

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.201, pp.49-65, 2020-09