著者
佐藤 悠子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_126-179_141, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)
参考文献数
92

There are two major political issues that have been repeatedly debated in China’s modern history; how China’s relationship with the West should be and how China should treat Western science and technology. During the Cultural Revolution (CR), criticism against “bourgeois academic authority” raged. Science and even the lives of Chinese scientists were in jeopardy. The world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein became one of the main targets of this campaign. It was triggered by an article titled “Xiangduilun pipan (Criticism on the theory of relativity)” written by a local middle school teacher. In Beijing, one of the vice presidents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Chen Boda took charge of the campaign. Most of the participants were young scientists whose knowledge was too limited to refute Einstein’s theory. Senior scientists such as Zhu Kezhen, another one of the vice presidents of the CAS, and Premier Zhou Enlai’s protégé Zhou Peiyuan, vice president of Beijing University and physicist who had worked with Einstein, took the side of Einstein. Chen brought the campaign to schoolchildren and even planned to organize a rally of ten thousand people. But he fell off the ladder of power when he joined the bandwagon trying to elevate his patron Lin Biao to the position of the President of the State at a conference in Lushan in August 1970. It made Mao suspect that Chen in fact intended to replace Mao with Lin who had demonstrated his ability to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army in October 1969. The anti-Einstein criticism ceased in Beijing after Chen disappeared, but in Shanghai Chen’s rivals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan continued it. Thereafter two major changes in domestic and international context strengthened the hands of Zhou Enlai, who had been protecting scientists, through the upheaval of the CR: the U.S.-China rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident. Henry Kissinger secretly arrived in Beijing in July 1971, which opened China’s door to the West. Zhou Enlai intentionally issued important directives on promoting basic theoretical study in science in front of the Chinese American scientists who were visiting China. Zhou also encouraged scientists to write him letters in order to make the issue publicly known. After the Sino-US rapprochement, a newly published Chinese academic journal “Wuli (Physics)” became the stronghold for physicists who supported Einstein and his theory. Soon after his allegedly aborted assassination of Mao Zedong in September 1971, Lin Biao died in Mongolia. It weakened the authority of Mao who chose Lin as his successor, and enabled Zhou Enlai to bring back the scientists to Beijing from local labor camps. Zhou also gave the green light to physicist Zhang Wenyu’s proposal to build a high energy accelerator at the cost of $ 2 billion, despite a contrary voice from Yang Zhenning, a Nobel laureate physicist and professor at the University of Chicago. High energy physics is based on Einstein’s theory of relativity. The physicists who had participated in building China’s first atomic bomb supported building a high energy accelerator. Zhang Wenyu led a delegation of Chinese scientists to the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States in 1972, and Zhou Enlai established the High Energy Physics Institute in the CAS in 1973. By 1972, the Cultural Revolution in the field of science had lost steam because the physicists were now allowed to applying Western physics despite its “bourgeois”, “academic authoritarian”, and “wasteful” nature that had been fiercely condemned during the Cultural Revolution.
著者
高橋 和宏
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_46-170_60, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)
参考文献数
62

During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan’s index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by “black ships.” Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan’s economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it. Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan’s governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan’s economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961. Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan’s infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled “Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries” intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade. Instead of trade regulations, Japan’s economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda’s initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations. This article concludes that Ikeda’s leadership was essential to Japan’s overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.
著者
池内 恵
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)
参考文献数
44

Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This “avoidance theorists” conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its “subservient” style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the “defensive” nature of Islam but expanded the concept of “defense” beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the “defense” to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as “defense” in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.
著者
柴山 太
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_46-154_61, 2008

This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947&ndash;1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.<br>Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.<br>Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'&eacute;tat, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.
著者
神谷 万丈
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_15-170_29, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)
参考文献数
89

Throughout the postwar period, realism has been the dominant school of thought in academic international relations (IR) communities in the United States and Europe. During the same period, in the IR community in Japan,there has been a group of scholars called genjitsushugi-sha, which literally translated means “realist(s)”. (Genjitsushugi literally means “realism,” and “sha” means “a person” or “people.”) Unlike realism in the Western IR communities, genjitushugi was not a dominant school of thought in Japan during the Cold War years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese IR community witnessed a harsh debate between genjitushugi-sha and risoushugi-sha (idealist[s]) over the role of military power in postwar international politics and the desirability of the “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system” (i.e., the U.S.-Japan alliance) for Japan. In the Japanese society at that time, where strong pacifist orientation was widely shared, it was idealists, who denied the utility of military power in the contemporary international relations and insisted on the policy of unarmed neutrality for the security of Japan, who represented the mainstream view. Although Japanese genjitsushugi-sha have significant resemblances to Western realists, such as the recognition of the struggle for power as a continuing nature of international politics and the acceptance of the utility of military power in the postwar world, substantial differences also exist between the two. The previous research done by the author shows that genjitsushugi-sha recognized the decreasing utility of military power in international politics as early as the early 1960s. They also noticed variations in the utility of power resources depending on issue areas by the early 1970s. In these senses, the genjitsushugi-sha’s view on power shows considerably liberal tendencies. This article argues that their view on nationalism also has liberal, rather than realist, inclinations. While realism is a particularistic theory, liberalism is universalistic. Realist and liberal views on nationalism should reflect such natures of respective theories. The analysis in this article shows that Japanese genjitsushugi-sha’s view on nationalism shows strongly universalistic tendencies. In the face of the revival of nationalism among the Japanese citizens since the mid-sixties, genjitsushugi-sha argued: 1) that Japanese diplomacy should reduce the dependence on the U.S.; 2) but that Japan, as a trading country with a limited military power, could maintain its security and prosperity only with close cooperation with other countries,particularly the U.S., and increasingly so under the deepening interdependence in the postwar world; 3) that Japan, therefore, should not define its national interests in a narrow, egoistic sense, 4) and that the Japanese people should pursue nationalism that is internationalist in nature. Despite the conventional view that regards Japanese genjitsushugi-sha as (a subspecies of) realists in Western IR terms, this article argues that they were rather “realistic liberal” scholars.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)
参考文献数
40

For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950’s Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960’s was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan. Chapter I examines Nagai’s works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai’s behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao’s work, The World of Politics, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell’s works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950’s, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon’s work, the Vocabulary of Politics, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau’s criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai’s ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960’s. Chapter II investigates Nagai’s works on international politics in 1960’s focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950’s. and 1960’s His first article on international politics, “American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong” founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as “situation”, “institution” and “organization”. His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950’s. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai’s ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960’s upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article “Why dose socialism exist in America?”, Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with “utopian socialists” in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.
著者
土山 實男
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_114-172_128, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)
参考文献数
32

What is Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st Century and where is Japan’s diplomacy heading now? These are the questions we are often asked by international affairs specialists both inside and outside of Japan. To answer these questions, I am suggesting that the strategic and diplomatic debates conducted in the 1960s, when Japan was looking for appropriate policies, be re-examined. Japanese were looking for the answers to the following diplomatic questions: Should Japan go nuclear in the light of the fact that China succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons? Should Japan request the government of the United States to withdraw the nuclear weapons the United States was deploying in Okinawa after the Okinawa reversion? Should Japan remain in the U.S.-Japan alliance, or should Japan take more independent course of diplomacy? What kind of diplomatic relations does Japan hope to build with a growing China? To review the diplomatic decisions the Japanese government made as well as the diplomatic arguments conducted at that time, this article focuses on the international studies and strategic arguments made by three leading international affairs specialists who had a strong influence on Japanese international studies and on Japan’s diplomacy. These specialists are Yonosuke Nagai, Masataka Kosaka, and Kei Wakaizumi; the latter was also known as an emissary between Tokyo and Washington who served under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from 1967–1971. Although each of these specialists had different approaches to international affairs, I call them realists because they were all searching for a policy “solvent”—a word Walter Lippmann used in his U.S. Foreign Policy (1943)—for Japan, rather than looking for diplomatic goals designed by ideas or philosophy. They also share the understanding that reading the situation governments are facing and predicting the next move of their opponents are most difficult. These specialists had basically the same answers to the questions mentioned above, even though they had some differences regarding how to realize policy goals. They said, for example, that Japan should not go nuclear; the U.S.-Japan alliance is a fundamental base for Japanese diplomacy and security; and Okinawa should be returned to Japan without the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Compared to the diplomatic problems Japan is facing today, the diplomatic and security problems of the 1960s were more complexly related to each other. By re-examining the theoretical analyses and practical applications made by the three specialists mentioned above, this article suggests that we may be able to learn lessons from their analyses of Japanese diplomacy.
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_140-176_151, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)
参考文献数
17
著者
大嶋 えり子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_103-184_116, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)
参考文献数
66

Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.In the 1990’s, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called “memory laws (lois mémorielles)”, is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the “Algerian war law”, replaces the term “the operations in North Africa” with “the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco” in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the “repatriate law”, pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the “positive role of the French presence abroad”.This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France’s responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims’memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.
著者
今井 真士
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_44-172_57, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)
参考文献数
28

It is often assumed that, even if opposition parties can participate in electoral politics, they are fragmented, insufficient and insignificant under authoritarian regimes in which the ruling elites have maintained their political power for the long term. Recently, however, there have been not a few pre-electoral coalitions in various countries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Post-Communist World and the Middle East that opposition parties have formed with each other during the parliamentary elections. Under what conditions do opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty authoritarian regimes? There are still a few studies on pre-electoral coalitions under authoritarian regimes, though even such arguments have not consider a possibility that opposition parties could form them not only in competitive context but also in hegemonic one: In other words, these studies have treated a degree of party competitiveness as a given condition and dismissed a question of how it affects coalition formation among opposition parties. Therefore, this article focuses on party competition and electoral institutions, and attempts to testify their effects on the pre-electoral coalitions formed by the leading opposition parties by using an original data of the parliamentary elections from 1961 to 2008 in multiparty authoritarian regimes in which ruling elites have maintained their political power for more than a decade. The first section outlines it as a background of pre-electoral coalition formation of opposition parties that the number of authoritarian regimes which adopted a multiparty system has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Although compelling to adopt a multiparty system as a part of political liberalization, ruling parties have still tended to maintain their economic, social and political dominance and the opposition parties have tended to be in a disadvantageous position: It is authoritarian single-party dominance. The second section provides four hypotheses of pre-electoral coalitions focused on the party competition and the electoral institutions on the basis of two contrasting logics derived from the analyses of authoritarian regimes:One is that multiparty elections can facilitate their political liberalization, and another is that they can foster their political stability. The third section testifies several models with a large-N logistic regression with a sample of 248 parliamentary elections in 54 countries in the period 1961-2008. These models show that the leading opposition party is more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties when (1) the opposition parties as a whole have more seat share and when (2) the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (ENOP) increase, but that it is less likely to do it when (3) the numbers of the interaction term of seat share and ENOP increase and when (4) the plurality voting system is adopted. Finally, this article concludes by emphasizing that political institutions matter in authoritarian regimes.
著者
国分 良成
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.145, pp.1-16,L5, 2006

In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War, China essentially changed the nature of its policy of reform and opening. This was an individual decision taken by a single leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it was taken to secure China's stability by means of active participation in the international community as opposed to shying away from it. China conspicuously embarked on a path to economic growth, aiming to achieve a shift to a market economy through the bold introduction of foreign capital, and its subsequent readiness to join the WTO in 2001, implying submission to the international system, indicates the compromises that the establishment was willing to make in order to survive. In this respect, the impact of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War can be seen as having determined China's consequent course.<br>However, the plan to promote economic growth, through marketizing the economy amidst expansive globalization, is bound to give rise to grave difficulties in the near future. Disparity between regions, between urban and rural areas and between income groups, social unrest, energy shortages, environmental damage, corruption in government and rampant materialism are only some of the countless contradictions that have been recently exposed, and which may undermine the government. China needs to change in more substantial ways than mere privatization and political reform if it intends to overcome these predicaments.<br>In terms of foreign relations, the US-China relationship has been a stepping-stone for China's flourishing omnidirectional and multilateral diplomacy, coinciding with a fanfare of Chinese government pronouncements about &ldquo;peaceful development&rdquo; and the country's &ldquo;peaceful rise.&rdquo; Nevertheless, it remains a closed political system, and the lack of transparency in its political decision-making and military affairs is a constant source for concern. Furthermore, Chinese policies abroad are firmly linked with the balance of political power within the top leadership circle at home. Feuding over the transition of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao had palpable effects even in foreign affairs.<br>The issues shaping China's domestic policies and foreign relations are increasingly ramified and complicated. What shook the regime during Tiananmen may have been caused by a fraction of the elite and an international &ldquo;third wave&rdquo;, but today the elite is beginning to erode at its very own core. When reading Chinese intentions, it is imperative to bear in mind the following facts: that the Chinese Communist Party's ultimate aim is to sustain its political authority; that economic growth is necessary for it to achieve this; and that it finds itself compelled to pursue cooperative relations in today's interdependent, globalized world. This political, economic and diplomatic reciprocity constitutes the terms by which the future of China should be assessed; that is, failure in any one of these areas will compromise China's hold on its structural stability.
著者
政所 大輔
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_131-187_146, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)
参考文献数
68

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an emerging norm regarding the national and international protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. After the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed the principle of R2P in 2001, the idea was unanimously adopted by member states of the United Nations (UN) at the General Assembly in 2005 and 2009, and also used by the Security Council as a rationale for international action in Libya in 2011. The fact of this normative development is a puzzle, because the R2P potentially represents a challenge to state sovereignty for both developing and developed countries, and also because existing literature argues that norms are less likely to be created in the issue area of sovereignty and security. Nevertheless, it is important to ask why the R2P norm has been increasingly accepted by UN member states.Researchers who have attempted to answer this question tend to describe its chronological and historical process, but do not clarify or identify actors, factors and mechanisms which have promoted the norm diffusion of R2P. In addition, constructivist scholars who have been engaged in explaining norm diffusion processes pay attention to the role of norm entrepreneurs who persuade actors to accept their newly advocated norms by changing actors’ preferences. However, based on such explanations, it is difficult to understand the case of R2P norm diffusion, since the agreement of R2P in 2005 was achieved while there was a group of member states who were suspicious of or strongly opposed to the norm, including the United States. The purpose of this article is thus to elucidate the political process in which the R2P norm has diffused by analyzing why and how UN member states unanimously agreed upon R2P in 2005 and 2009.The article concludes that mechanisms of persuasion and negotiation among UN member states functioned successfully in gaining a consensus and promoting norm diffusion of R2P. In the early stage of norm diffusion, agreement is likely to be achieved through negotiation in order to accommodate various preferences of member states and seek mutual concessions. The agreement on R2P in 2005 through such negotiation was then a reference point by which norm entrepreneurs successfully persuaded member states to accept the R2P norm. Through persuasion by such entrepreneurs as the UN Secretary-General, his special adviser and NGOs, many states which were skeptical of R2P in 2005 changed their discourse in its favor. As a result, member states by consensus adopted the General Assembly resolution on R2P in 2009. This shows that norm entrepreneurs succeeded in stimulating the norm diffusion by persuading member states to change their preferences on R2P.
著者
池上 萬奈
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_142-177_155, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)
参考文献数
67

The First Oil Crisis started as a result of the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC announcing a raise in the posted price of crude oil on October 16, 1973 and OAPEC deciding to reduce oil production by 5% per month on the following day, touched off by the breakout of the Yom Kippur War. Japan was faced with an unprecedented dilemma between the Arab countries, who strongly demanded Japan to condemn Israel, and the United States who pressed Japan to align with their Middle East policy based on diplomatic relations with Israel. When the Arabs announced a 25% cut of oil supply on November 4, the European countries, similarly to Japan, who were scarce on resources, immediately criticized Israel, and declared support for the Arabs. However, the Japanese government was hesitant to criticize Israel. And the Arab countries pressed to intensify oil supply reduction unless Japan announced to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in the case Israel would not obey the UN Security Council Resolution 242. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restrained Japan by stating that condemning Israel would hinder Middle East peace talks with the United States and that cooperative relations with the U.S. would be profitable for Japan from a long-term view. On November 18, the Arab countries announced that they would release the European countries, excluding Holland, from the weighted oil supply reduction measure of 5% from the benchmark set on December, because the European countries had criticized Israel. As a result, the criticism of the weakness of the Japanese diplomacy in attaining resources made the headlines of the Japanese newspapers. How was the Japanese government to escape such dilemma? The Japanese government finally criticized Israel by name and made its pro-Arab positioning clear in the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido on November 22. Further on December 10, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki, as special envoy, left for eight Middle Eastern countries to offer economic and technical aid. At first glance, the Japanese government took a pro-Arab policy without accepting the warning of the Unites States. This document, however, will empirically clarify that the U.S.-Japan friction related to Japanese Middle East policy was resolved before November 22 in the midst of the development of multilateral diplomacy for the “Kissinger Plan”, a unified framework among Japan, the U.S. and the European countries, and that the Japanese diplomacy during the First Oil Crisis achieved to broaden the permissible scope of the United States.
著者
千々和 泰明
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008

The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the &ldquo;Concept of Basic Defense Capability&rdquo; (<i>kibanteki boeiryoku koso</i>), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (<i>boei taiko</i>), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.<br>The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.<br>In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (<i>shoyo boeiryoku koso</i>) or modifying the schedule form (<i>beppyo</i>) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.<br>In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.
著者
山本 章子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_111-182_124, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)
参考文献数
56

This article aims at reconsidering the decision making process of the Eisenhower administration on the revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 as part of the policy for the U.S. oversea bases. The previous studies have argued the treaty revisions as part of American policy toward Japan with a motive to prevent her from neutralization. But so-called “New Look”, the cold war strategy of the Eisenhower’s administration which depended on nuclear weapon capability, built in the presence of oversea bases all over the world. Therefore, the U.S. government addressed lessening the complaint of the host nations to maintain the oversea bases. This article discusses the treaty revisions from the point of its relations with the Nash Report, the survey and recommendation on the situation and issues surrounding U.S. oversea bases, to point out how the treaty revisions have a close link with the comprehensive U.S. oversea-bases policy. Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the attitude of the U.S. military including the Pentagon. The previous studies have ignored the role of the U.S. military in terms of the treaty revisions, but they are a key actor as well as the Department of State and the American embassy in Japan because the U.S. military has a veto of security policies.During the period of the Eisenhower’s administration, the USSR’s success in hydrogen-bomb test and appeal for change for peace after death of Stalin escalated fear of entrapment and demand of reducing U.S.-Soviet tension among the U.S. allies. In addition, the success of the USSR in development of ICBM missiles and Sputnik I launching in 1957, persuaded the host nations to limit their alliance commitment to the United States. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces for a long time and criminal jurisdiction procedures involving U.S. military personnel unfair to the host nations also led to public protest against the security policy of their government. As for Japan in 1950s, the presence of U.S. military bases was considered as an ongoing symbol of the “U.S. occupation”. What is more, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment everywhere in Japan strengthened the public’s fear of entrapment. The neutralists in Japan succeeded in propagating the idea that the U.S. military presence would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted nuclear wars after so-called “Sputnik shock”.Reflecting such a situation, the Nash Report recommended that the U.S. should examine alternatives to their base system in Far East. This recommendation became discussed seriously by the Operation Coordinating Board in spite of the opposition by the U.S. military. These altered the negative attitude of the U.S. military toward the treaty revisions.
著者
松浦 正伸
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_80-187_96, 2017

<p>How do we apply history in politics? The purpose of this paper is to analyze how recognition in civil society, such as perception of history, plays a role in public opinion and parliamentary government. To clarify this research question, incorporating a political concept into the analysis, this paper focused on roles of the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) and the North Korean Lobby and looked into the backgrounds in the repatriation massively expanded between 1959 and 1961.</p><p>Before repatriation movements started, changes of organization structures were observed in the Chongryon and they began to speak in favor of North Korea. Simultaneously, the nature of the Niccho-Kyokai (日朝協会), which had been taking a politically neutral position, also began to change. They began to be a lobbying group in order to support the North Korean foreign diplomacy against Japan.</p><p>Applying a concept of "Pseudo Environment" defined by Walter Lippmann as a subjective, biased, and abridged mental image of the world, this section reflected on influences of the two key players over North Korean residents in Japan and Japanese public opinion. The analysis found a social trend with regards to repatriation issues being manipulated by a correlation of three components in the Pseudo Environment: (1) unified perception of history, (2) motherland-oriented nationalism, and (3) economic rationality.</p><p>Based on a data-mining method, the influences of the Pseudo Environment in the Diet were analyzed. The penetration of such an environment into civil society assisted the Diet members with the repatriation project being recognized ethically and humanitarianly. Therefore, intentions of the North Korean strategies against South Korea were insufficiently discussed.</p><p>The Pseudo Environment lost its effect as (1) demand of mobilization was weakened, (2) activities were diversified among the North Korean Lobby, and (3) information about North Korea was brought by returnees, and gaps were gradually closed between the Pseudo Environment and reality.</p><p>As a result of the Pseudo Environment effectively created by the two players among the North Korean residents in Japan and in the Japanese public opinion, one-sided recognition of North Korean strategies influenced civil society and parliamentary government to bring the mass repatriation out. This analysis also concludes that a nation is capable of controlling a social trend in other countries via intermediaries from outside of its country taking advantage of certain recognition. When we see international relations in East Asia, perception of history is an ongoing issue and has been more complex. This indicates that more case studies will be expected on how history has been utilized in politics.</p>
著者
宮田 律
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.92, pp.158-170,L16, 1989

The coup backed by the CIA which toppled the Mussadiq's government in 1953 and the failure of the popular uprising led by Khumeini initiated and developed the anti-US feeling in Iran. This fact can be proved because Khumeini's &ldquo;struggle&rdquo; against &ldquo;American imperialism&rdquo; led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the successive US hostage incident in Iran (November 1979-January 1981).<br>After the uprising in 1963, the U. S. government gradually got on closer terms with the Shah's regime. Such U. S. support for the corrupt and repressive government of the Shah had close connections with important American industries, such as munitions production, electric power generation and communication industry. In addition, the clash of interests and competition of these industries in Iran were carried out by bribes and a huge commission system. Furthermore, in 1977, about 70% of the national budget was spent on military affairs, so it was evident to many Iranians that the Iranian policies were determined by the interest of these American enterprises.<br>After the 1963 uprising was quelled, Khumeini formed strong attachments with the purpose of overthrowing the Shah's regime. He believed that the Shah was selling the spirit of Iran to the U. S. and propagating corruption, immorality and repression. In addition, Khumeini blamed the U. S. for making the Shah carry out the &ldquo;White Revolution&rdquo;, so it was responsible for the tragedy that occurred in that uprising. Khumeini also declared that the U. S. government compelled the &ldquo;Puppet Shah&rdquo; to give Americans extraterritorial rights. Up until the revolution in 1979, he had condemned the Shah and admired the people who were engaged in the anti-establishment movement, and he denounced the U. S. government for supporting the corrupt and repressive Shah's government. Thus, Khumeini and his followers became the background of anti-US ideology of the Iran-Islam government which has endured till the present.<br>This paper traces the formation and development of anti-American feeling in Iran. This anti-US feeling has formed the basis of diplomatic policies of the Iranian government since the revolution. Needless to say, Iranians have various feelings about the U. S. In fact, while freedom and democracy have been questioned in Iran since the revolution, some Iranians have discovered the merits of American democracy. This influence of democracy had penetrated the public as well as the private sector, because it is known that some Iranian government officials secretly negotiated with the U. S. government in the Iran-Contra incident. Furthermore, Rafsanjani's more realistic government might change its policies against the U. S.; however, it is certain that the Iranian government will follow Khumeini's line for the present. Needless to say, the U. S. learned a great lesson about its relations with the Third World from Iran-a lesson that should be remembered when dealing with these countries in the future.