著者

板橋 拓己

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_67-200_83, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

70

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With respect to the international negotiations on the German unification in 1989/1990, not only the massive publication of memoirs by contemporaries, but also the release of historical materials by governments concerned has advanced the elucidation of the event. Existing studies, however, tended to characterize the German unification on October 3, 1990 as “goal” and to assess who contributed to it. On the other hand, more recent studies have shifted the research interest from the “happy end narrative”. In other words, they came to regard German unification not as “goal” or “end” but as “start” or “formative phase” of the post-Cold War European international order.While sharing the view that the German unification process is a period of the formation of the post-Cold War European international order with the latest research, this paper focuses on the issue of NATO (non-)enlargement. Using newly available diplomatic sources, the author tries to reevaluate the role of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister of the FRG. What is clear from this approach is the differences of visions within the West German government concerning how to end the Cold War and what kind of new international order should be created, and the impact of these differences on actual international politics.As shown in this paper, it can be said that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Genscher had consistently envisaged “the ending the Cold War by emphasizing reconciliation with the Soviet Union.” The Bush administration, on the other hand, placed top priority on the survival of NATO. After the Camp David talks in late February, the Bush administration and Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the FRG, began to seek “the ending the Cold War based on the preeminence of the United States or NATO.”Kohl, who strived for the swift reunification of Germany, put priority on cooperation with the United States on security issues. Nevertheless, Genscher continued to stick to his vision. Due to Kohl’s rebuke and the Bush administration’s pressure, he no longer spoke of the NATO’s non-expansion to the east after April 4, 1990, but repeated arguments for strengthening the CSCE and changing the nature of NATO. Ironically, it was Genscher’s idea that was subsequently effective in convincing the Soviet Union of a unified Germany’s full membership in NATO. Genscher contributed to the end of the Cold War in terms of the “victory of the West” by advocating his vision of the end of the Cold War as a “reconciliation with the East” even after it lost its reality.

著者

松浦 正伸

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_80-187_96, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

91

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How do we apply history in politics? The purpose of this paper is to analyze how recognition in civil society, such as perception of history, plays a role in public opinion and parliamentary government. To clarify this research question, incorporating a political concept into the analysis, this paper focused on roles of the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) and the North Korean Lobby and looked into the backgrounds in the repatriation massively expanded between 1959 and 1961.Before repatriation movements started, changes of organization structures were observed in the Chongryon and they began to speak in favor of North Korea. Simultaneously, the nature of the Niccho-Kyokai (日朝協会), which had been taking a politically neutral position, also began to change. They began to be a lobbying group in order to support the North Korean foreign diplomacy against Japan.Applying a concept of “Pseudo Environment” defined by Walter Lippmann as a subjective, biased, and abridged mental image of the world, this section reflected on influences of the two key players over North Korean residents in Japan and Japanese public opinion. The analysis found a social trend with regards to repatriation issues being manipulated by a correlation of three components in the Pseudo Environment: (1) unified perception of history, (2) motherland-oriented nationalism, and (3) economic rationality.Based on a data-mining method, the influences of the Pseudo Environment in the Diet were analyzed. The penetration of such an environment into civil society assisted the Diet members with the repatriation project being recognized ethically and humanitarianly. Therefore, intentions of the North Korean strategies against South Korea were insufficiently discussed.The Pseudo Environment lost its effect as (1) demand of mobilization was weakened, (2) activities were diversified among the North Korean Lobby, and (3) information about North Korea was brought by returnees, and gaps were gradually closed between the Pseudo Environment and reality.As a result of the Pseudo Environment effectively created by the two players among the North Korean residents in Japan and in the Japanese public opinion, one-sided recognition of North Korean strategies influenced civil society and parliamentary government to bring the mass repatriation out. This analysis also concludes that a nation is capable of controlling a social trend in other countries via intermediaries from outside of its country taking advantage of certain recognition. When we see international relations in East Asia, perception of history is an ongoing issue and has been more complex. This indicates that more case studies will be expected on how history has been utilized in politics.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_59-195_74, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

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Termination of war is a “bridge” between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact “restoration” of interstate relationship presupposes “collapse” of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of “the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict” and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.

著者

佐藤 悠子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_126-179_141, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)

参考文献数

92

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There are two major political issues that have been repeatedly debated in China’s modern history; how China’s relationship with the West should be and how China should treat Western science and technology. During the Cultural Revolution (CR), criticism against “bourgeois academic authority” raged. Science and even the lives of Chinese scientists were in jeopardy. The world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein became one of the main targets of this campaign. It was triggered by an article titled “Xiangduilun pipan (Criticism on the theory of relativity)” written by a local middle school teacher. In Beijing, one of the vice presidents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Chen Boda took charge of the campaign. Most of the participants were young scientists whose knowledge was too limited to refute Einstein’s theory. Senior scientists such as Zhu Kezhen, another one of the vice presidents of the CAS, and Premier Zhou Enlai’s protégé Zhou Peiyuan, vice president of Beijing University and physicist who had worked with Einstein, took the side of Einstein. Chen brought the campaign to schoolchildren and even planned to organize a rally of ten thousand people. But he fell off the ladder of power when he joined the bandwagon trying to elevate his patron Lin Biao to the position of the President of the State at a conference in Lushan in August 1970. It made Mao suspect that Chen in fact intended to replace Mao with Lin who had demonstrated his ability to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army in October 1969. The anti-Einstein criticism ceased in Beijing after Chen disappeared, but in Shanghai Chen’s rivals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan continued it. Thereafter two major changes in domestic and international context strengthened the hands of Zhou Enlai, who had been protecting scientists, through the upheaval of the CR: the U.S.-China rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident. Henry Kissinger secretly arrived in Beijing in July 1971, which opened China’s door to the West. Zhou Enlai intentionally issued important directives on promoting basic theoretical study in science in front of the Chinese American scientists who were visiting China. Zhou also encouraged scientists to write him letters in order to make the issue publicly known. After the Sino-US rapprochement, a newly published Chinese academic journal “Wuli (Physics)” became the stronghold for physicists who supported Einstein and his theory. Soon after his allegedly aborted assassination of Mao Zedong in September 1971, Lin Biao died in Mongolia. It weakened the authority of Mao who chose Lin as his successor, and enabled Zhou Enlai to bring back the scientists to Beijing from local labor camps. Zhou also gave the green light to physicist Zhang Wenyu’s proposal to build a high energy accelerator at the cost of $ 2 billion, despite a contrary voice from Yang Zhenning, a Nobel laureate physicist and professor at the University of Chicago. High energy physics is based on Einstein’s theory of relativity. The physicists who had participated in building China’s first atomic bomb supported building a high energy accelerator. Zhang Wenyu led a delegation of Chinese scientists to the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States in 1972, and Zhou Enlai established the High Energy Physics Institute in the CAS in 1973. By 1972, the Cultural Revolution in the field of science had lost steam because the physicists were now allowed to applying Western physics despite its “bourgeois”, “academic authoritarian”, and “wasteful” nature that had been fiercely condemned during the Cultural Revolution.

著者

細谷 正宏

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.115, pp.216-219, 1997

著者

池内 恵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

44

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This “avoidance theorists” conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its “subservient” style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the “defensive” nature of Islam but expanded the concept of “defense” beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the “defense” to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as “defense” in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

著者

高橋 和宏

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_46-170_60, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)

参考文献数

62

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During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan’s index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by “black ships.” Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan’s economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it. Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan’s governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan’s economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961. Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan’s infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled “Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries” intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade. Instead of trade regulations, Japan’s economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda’s initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations. This article concludes that Ikeda’s leadership was essential to Japan’s overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.

著者

柴山 太

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_46-154_61, 2008

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This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947&ndash;1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.<br>Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.<br>Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'&eacute;tat, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.

著者

泉川 泰博

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_97-199_109, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

19

著者

酒井 啓子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_17-189_32, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

71

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In order to analyse contemporary global crises, it is necessary for scholars of International Relations and Area Studies to overcome two limitations: Area Studies’ tendency to focus only on the substance of certain states or areas and the state-centric understanding of International Relations. Contemporary conflicts and faultlines that intermingle and interlock from the local level to the global level cannot be explained simply by unilineal causal relations among the existing actors but rather are complicated by their reciprocal interaction. In order to grasp the widespread networks of co-relationship among various actors, a new analytical framework should be introduced which frames current affairs as the product of a web of interconnections, and as a result of the transformation of those relationships, rather than on the actors’ essential qualities.As a case study of the above new framework, this paper analyses sectarian “faultlines” in post-war Iraq. Since 2003, violent clashes have occurred in Iraq, which Western media and policy-makers considered to be “sectarian conflicts.” As most of the Western policy-makers assume an essentialist understanding of sectarian relations in Iraq, they consider the sectarian factor as an explanatory and independent valuable. However, in order to propose an alternative approach to the perception of sectarian groups as cohesive actors, this paper avoids substantial “sectarian factors” for explanations of conflict in post-2003 Iraq, and focuses instead on the transformation of the various kinds of relationships that led to political and social strife. It sees how sectarian factors emerge as a result of mobilisation of rhetoric and legitimisation of fighting parties.This paper analyses media narratives in Iraq and surrounding states. It discloses that pro-government Iraqi media and Iranian media consider IS as inhuman terrorists while Arab and Turkish media as a reflection of anti-government ideology and sentiments in Iraqi society. In the regional power struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, each media, domestic or regional, focuses on the victimhood of their side, and a sectarian narrative further legitimatises the appeal of the victims for their rights. For each side it is not “us” but “others” that discriminate us and exclude us from the Iraqi nation or from the religion of Islam; each side uses sectarian terms to demonise the others, with each insisting that it is “us” who pursue the unity of the community. This paper concludes that the conflicts in post-war Iraq are caused by the competition among the fighting actors over the right to claim the injustice of marginalisation, which often relies on sectarian legitimisation.

著者

重政 公一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_81-190_96, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

76

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This article postulates that Myanmar’s long-discarded ethnic minority group, the Rohingya people in Rakhine State, has a multifaceted characteristic—refugees, internally displaced persons, and stateless people. They have one common theme—the most persecuted minority in the world. This paper investigates their plight from its origins in the nineteenth century up to now and argues that ASEAN needs to consider on the applicability of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm to eradicate their plight. Interference, however, would be an unorthodox diplomatic move that violates ASEAN’s long-guarded non-interference principle.The justifications for interference are three-fold: the Rohingyas are “stateless” people with no governmental protection for their right to life; they fall victim to the inter-communal violence that was invoked by nationalistic Buddhist movements; and their evacuation from the deteriorating human rights conditions on the ground puts their life into jeopardy at sea, and they are subject to human trafficking at a later stage.The United Nations World Summit Outcome Document stipulated the R2P norm in 2005. ASEAN member states verbally accepted this norm’s emergence in the first instance, but are at odds with its introduction into regional politics. To examine the theoretical and policy application of it, we do not take this norm’s localization in Southeast Asia for granted.This piece categorizes three types of arguments over the R2P and its localization within the ASEAN area when we examine the Rohingya issues in Myanmar and beyond. First, there are “accommodationsit” that say that the state sovereignty can be reconciled with humanitarian needs and imperative situations faced with the Rohingya’s plight. “Incrementalist” contend that ASEAN has endeavored to create a caring society for its people by establishing new institutions to promote and protect human rights and fundamental values. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, as an overarching institution of the kind, is a case in point. Despite some institutional deficiencies, it has at least a “tongue”—promoting and protecting ASEAN people’s fundamental rights as encapsulated in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration(2012). Incrementalist can view these existing legal frameworks, humanitarian and human rights instruments, to which the ASEAN member states have acceded, as the window of opportunity for a possible localization of R2P in the region. Finally, “Scepticist” regard the R2P’s localization as premature, since the ardent advocacy for the norm comes from external regional non-state actors. This makes the scepticist doubt that decision-makers in ASEAN really take the norm seriously.In light of the events surrounding the Rohingyas from 2012 onwards, these three claims have been examined. The incrementalist view on R2P, supported by various ASEAN documents, seems to have gained ground. The ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat meeting on December 2016 paved the way for ASEAN’s pragmatic application of R2P principle, without embarrassing Myanmar by directly alluding to the R2P. This article concludes that the gap between the non-interference principle and the humanitarian norm appears to be narrowing in the case of Myanmar’s Rohingya issues.

著者

中野 聡

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.101, pp.143-146, 1992

著者

川嶋 周一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_85-98, 2009

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The purpose of this paper is to examine European Union projects in the early 1970s and to examine how the End of Cold War was considered in this project. In this period, the European Community (EC) would enlarge its member states for the first time, try to deepen internal policies and also Conference for pan-European security (that is formed afterwards as CSCE) began. The author tries to reexamine the relations between Cold War and European integration, having an attention to the European Union project concerns both European political integration and European international order.<br>In December 1969, EC countries agreed the political cooperation concerning foreign policies (known as later EPC) at Hague summit. EPC mechanism developed as the arena in which EC countries discussed about the CSCE and whether EC would/should participate in the CSCE negotiation. But in EC Commission, Commissioner Borschette and Spinelli discussed how Political Union could realize from the development of EPC. This Political Union concept conceived as &lsquo;finalit&eacute;&rsquo; (final aims or final form) of European Integration, considering the evolution of economic integration like agriculture and especially the start of monetary integration.<br>In 1971, French President Pompidou launched his plan for the reactivation of European Integration entitled &lsquo;European Confederation&rsquo;. In this plan, member states would select &lsquo;European State Secretary&rsquo; and these Ministers would hold regular meetings and finally this organization would develop &lsquo;European Government&rsquo;, transferring gradually government's competences to this Ministers institution. On the other hand, EC Commission discussed the acquirement of the role of EC in the field of world politics. Pompidou's concept and that of Commission was opposing each other, but both agreed that EC would be changed after the enlargement of member states and development of EPC. This plan manifested as &lsquo;European Union&rsquo; in the communiqu&eacute; of Paris Summit in the 1972.<br>Realizing of D&eacute;tente within the framework of CSCE, development of EPC, and acquirement of the role of EC in the world politics connected each other. That is, EC tried to improvement of the relations with Eastern Bloc within the framework of CSCE, and looked for the political integration by deepening EPC mechanism, which would develop at the CSCE negotiation. When these two aims would realize EC would be &lsquo;independent Europe&rsquo; as an actor of world politics, so EC sought the redefinition of the relationship with the USA. Especially Spinelli argued that when the entity of Europe restored by establishing new European order which would cover Pan-Europe by CSCE and which would be supported by &lsquo;Political Union&rsquo; at the its western side, Europe would step into the &ldquo;New Yalta&rdquo; era.<br>Political Union Project, which appeared as &lsquo;European Union&rsquo; in the Paris Summit communiqu&eacute;, was not the project of merely internal community institution, but the project which designated the structural transformation of cold war as prerequisite.

著者

今井 宏平

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_46-194_61, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

52

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This article examines how non-state actors struggle to rule the areas void of sovereignty. The areas void of sovereignty is not a new issue in international politics. There have been many such areas within weak states. Traditionally, the existence of such areas has been a domestic, not an international, matter. However, the recent trend of globalization and its effects have changed the situation. For example, the Islamic State (IS), which emerged along the Iraqi-Syria border, recruited international fighters from all over the world using the internet and social media. As a result, the existence of ungoverned territories became known all over the world. Hence, the struggle to establish control over these areas void of sovereignty is deeply related to the stability of international order. In Iraq and Syria, IS, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) all sought to control the ungoverned territory. On the one hand, IS attempted to establish a sovereign state based on jihadist ideology. On the other hand, the global community supported the KRG and the PYD to combat IS. The legitimacy of the KRG and PYD in international politics increased during the war on IS. In 1991, at the end of the Gulf War, the KRG established a de facto autonomy in northern Iraq; its formal autonomy was recognized by the Iraqi central government in 2004. For the KRG leadership, the war against IS was looked upon as a rare opportunity to achieve independence. Hence the KRG quickly held the independence referendum on September 25, 2017. However, the neighboring countries (Turkey and Iran), the patron state (the United States), and the parent state (Iraq) all opposed this referendum and the KRG’s independence. After the independence referendum failed, KRG lost the disputed territory in Iraq and its relationships with neighboring countries deteriorated. The PYD is an organization that operates under the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the umbrella group for managing the mobilization of Kurds across the Middle East. PYD became the leading Kurdish group in Syria because its military unit, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), gained the support of the United States and its allies in the war against IS. However, Turkey views the PYD as part of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), an illegal, armed group in Turkey. Hence, Turkey continues to battle the PYD in northern Syria.As a result, no actor can fully control the areas void of sovereignty in Iraq and Syria. However, exploring the cases of the KRG and PYD shows how maintaining good relations with neighboring states is a condition for the survival of non-state actors.

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

40

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For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950’s Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960’s was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan. Chapter I examines Nagai’s works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai’s behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao’s work, The World of Politics, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell’s works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950’s, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon’s work, the Vocabulary of Politics, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau’s criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai’s ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960’s. Chapter II investigates Nagai’s works on international politics in 1960’s focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950’s. and 1960’s His first article on international politics, “American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong” founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as “situation”, “institution” and “organization”. His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950’s. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai’s ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960’s upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article “Why dose socialism exist in America?”, Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with “utopian socialists” in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.

著者

栗原 健

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.6, pp.52-65, 1958

著者

神谷 万丈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_15-170_29, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)

参考文献数

89

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Throughout the postwar period, realism has been the dominant school of thought in academic international relations (IR) communities in the United States and Europe. During the same period, in the IR community in Japan,there has been a group of scholars called genjitsushugi-sha, which literally translated means “realist(s)”. (Genjitsushugi literally means “realism,” and “sha” means “a person” or “people.”) Unlike realism in the Western IR communities, genjitushugi was not a dominant school of thought in Japan during the Cold War years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese IR community witnessed a harsh debate between genjitushugi-sha and risoushugi-sha (idealist[s]) over the role of military power in postwar international politics and the desirability of the “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system” (i.e., the U.S.-Japan alliance) for Japan. In the Japanese society at that time, where strong pacifist orientation was widely shared, it was idealists, who denied the utility of military power in the contemporary international relations and insisted on the policy of unarmed neutrality for the security of Japan, who represented the mainstream view. Although Japanese genjitsushugi-sha have significant resemblances to Western realists, such as the recognition of the struggle for power as a continuing nature of international politics and the acceptance of the utility of military power in the postwar world, substantial differences also exist between the two. The previous research done by the author shows that genjitsushugi-sha recognized the decreasing utility of military power in international politics as early as the early 1960s. They also noticed variations in the utility of power resources depending on issue areas by the early 1970s. In these senses, the genjitsushugi-sha’s view on power shows considerably liberal tendencies. This article argues that their view on nationalism also has liberal, rather than realist, inclinations. While realism is a particularistic theory, liberalism is universalistic. Realist and liberal views on nationalism should reflect such natures of respective theories. The analysis in this article shows that Japanese genjitsushugi-sha’s view on nationalism shows strongly universalistic tendencies. In the face of the revival of nationalism among the Japanese citizens since the mid-sixties, genjitsushugi-sha argued: 1) that Japanese diplomacy should reduce the dependence on the U.S.; 2) but that Japan, as a trading country with a limited military power, could maintain its security and prosperity only with close cooperation with other countries,particularly the U.S., and increasingly so under the deepening interdependence in the postwar world; 3) that Japan, therefore, should not define its national interests in a narrow, egoistic sense, 4) and that the Japanese people should pursue nationalism that is internationalist in nature. Despite the conventional view that regards Japanese genjitsushugi-sha as (a subspecies of) realists in Western IR terms, this article argues that they were rather “realistic liberal” scholars.

著者

五十嵐 元道

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_140-193_156, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

81

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In contemporary international relations, it is almost impossible to acknowledge the actual situation of armed conflicts without the reports of human rights NGOs. These reports often record detailed data, including the number of civilian casualties, and therefore contribute to the construction of the representation of armed conflicts. While constructivism analyzes the normative power of human rights and NGOs, it misses the struggle over the representation of armed conflicts between human rights NGOs and sovereign states. Applying P. Bourdieu’s theory of fields, this article demonstrates how human rights NGOs have fought against sovereign states and acquired a decisive influence over the representation of armed conflicts. Sovereign states and NGOs have constituted global and local fields in which actors wrangle over legitimacy by making the representation of the armed conflicts.This article argues that the struggles over the representation of armed conflicts between states and NGOs began in the late 1960s because of several post-colonial conflicts such as the Nigerian Civil War (the Biafran War) and the Northern Yemen Civil War. In these conflicts, traditional neutrality rarely afforded protection from military attack to NGOs; on the contrary, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s policy of avoiding testimony faced severe criticism as this policy seemed to help genocide continue. Until the 1960s, NGOs such as the ICRC had tended to avoid publicly criticizing sovereign states in armed conflicts even when NGOs confronted genocides.In the 1970s, human rights networks, including local and international NGOs, have been created because of serious human rights violations in Latin American countries. Various NGOs recorded human rights violations and publicly criticized authoritarian states. In the 1980s, when the Salvadoran Civil War occurred, local NGOs tracked civilian casualties and human rights violations by armed forces. With the help of these local NGOs, the newly established Americas Watch published many reports on the Salvadoran Civil War. Thereby, the Americas Watch tried to change the foreign policy of the Reagan administration that strongly supported the Salvadoran government. The data on civilian casualties was the focal point of the struggle between NGOs and the Reagan administration. This struggle contributed to the constitution of the global regime for humanitarian crises and led to the development of the methodology of fact-finding in armed conflicts. In the late 1980s and 1990s this global regime for humanitarian crises expanded as the number of human rights NGOs increased and the UN was involved in fact-finding missions.

著者

藤原 修

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_84-175_99, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

29

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A liberal political regime is an important precondition for peace movements to flourish as in Britain of the 19th century. Japan, as a latecomer in the modern world, adopted an aggressive militarist policy under the authoritarian regime in the late 19th century. Thus, the earliest peace movements in Japan, which appeared around the turn of the century, took it upon the daring struggle against the towering militarism, and advocated absolute pacifism and a remarkably cosmopolitan outlook; but their social impact was negligible till the end of the Second World War. The collapse of a militarist Japan in 1945 and the following enactment of the liberal peace constitution brought forth favorable conditions for peace movements. In fact, Ban-the-A-and-H-Bomb Campaign in the mid 1950’s rallied unprecedentedly wide and strong popular support and exerted a significant influence on Japan’s security policy. However, such seemingly advantageous conditions to peace movements had their own hazards. The strong antiwar sentiment in postwar Japan largely came from the devastating national war experience. Therefore, peace groups very often shied away from immediate security issues in East Asia; and national stories of wartime hard suffering turned a blind eye to even harder indignation of neighboring nations against Japan’s militarist records. In addition, national peace organizations were torn apart in line with the cold war ideological split, and thus lacked the ability to mobilize the grassroots antiwar sentiment effectively. From around the end of the cold war, some new trends turned up in Japanese peace movements. First, local groups virtually took over longstanding national groups in peace activities. It is largely because locality became the front line between the security of people’s daily life and the growing frequency of US military activities in and around Japan. The most important case was the concentration of US military bases in Okinawa. This problem came to attract national attention by virtue of an unbending Okinawan minority of antiwar landowners. Second, the problem of Japan’s war responsibility was at last widely acknowledged among the Japanese public. Reconciliation with neighboring nations was set as a distinct goal of peace activities. Third, peace activists began to propose an alternative security policy. They stress the importance of establishing the rule of law in the unstable security environment of East Asia. In short, Japanese peace movements began to address the long-overdue problem of international solidarity in East Asia and to assume the role of a policy initiator.

著者

土山 實男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_114-172_128, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

32

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What is Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st Century and where is Japan’s diplomacy heading now? These are the questions we are often asked by international affairs specialists both inside and outside of Japan. To answer these questions, I am suggesting that the strategic and diplomatic debates conducted in the 1960s, when Japan was looking for appropriate policies, be re-examined. Japanese were looking for the answers to the following diplomatic questions: Should Japan go nuclear in the light of the fact that China succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons? Should Japan request the government of the United States to withdraw the nuclear weapons the United States was deploying in Okinawa after the Okinawa reversion? Should Japan remain in the U.S.-Japan alliance, or should Japan take more independent course of diplomacy? What kind of diplomatic relations does Japan hope to build with a growing China? To review the diplomatic decisions the Japanese government made as well as the diplomatic arguments conducted at that time, this article focuses on the international studies and strategic arguments made by three leading international affairs specialists who had a strong influence on Japanese international studies and on Japan’s diplomacy. These specialists are Yonosuke Nagai, Masataka Kosaka, and Kei Wakaizumi; the latter was also known as an emissary between Tokyo and Washington who served under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from 1967–1971. Although each of these specialists had different approaches to international affairs, I call them realists because they were all searching for a policy “solvent”—a word Walter Lippmann used in his U.S. Foreign Policy (1943)—for Japan, rather than looking for diplomatic goals designed by ideas or philosophy. They also share the understanding that reading the situation governments are facing and predicting the next move of their opponents are most difficult. These specialists had basically the same answers to the questions mentioned above, even though they had some differences regarding how to realize policy goals. They said, for example, that Japan should not go nuclear; the U.S.-Japan alliance is a fundamental base for Japanese diplomacy and security; and Okinawa should be returned to Japan without the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Compared to the diplomatic problems Japan is facing today, the diplomatic and security problems of the 1960s were more complexly related to each other. By re-examining the theoretical analyses and practical applications made by the three specialists mentioned above, this article suggests that we may be able to learn lessons from their analyses of Japanese diplomacy.