著者
佐藤 悠子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_126-179_141, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)
参考文献数
92

There are two major political issues that have been repeatedly debated in China’s modern history; how China’s relationship with the West should be and how China should treat Western science and technology. During the Cultural Revolution (CR), criticism against “bourgeois academic authority” raged. Science and even the lives of Chinese scientists were in jeopardy. The world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein became one of the main targets of this campaign. It was triggered by an article titled “Xiangduilun pipan (Criticism on the theory of relativity)” written by a local middle school teacher. In Beijing, one of the vice presidents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Chen Boda took charge of the campaign. Most of the participants were young scientists whose knowledge was too limited to refute Einstein’s theory. Senior scientists such as Zhu Kezhen, another one of the vice presidents of the CAS, and Premier Zhou Enlai’s protégé Zhou Peiyuan, vice president of Beijing University and physicist who had worked with Einstein, took the side of Einstein. Chen brought the campaign to schoolchildren and even planned to organize a rally of ten thousand people. But he fell off the ladder of power when he joined the bandwagon trying to elevate his patron Lin Biao to the position of the President of the State at a conference in Lushan in August 1970. It made Mao suspect that Chen in fact intended to replace Mao with Lin who had demonstrated his ability to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army in October 1969. The anti-Einstein criticism ceased in Beijing after Chen disappeared, but in Shanghai Chen’s rivals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan continued it. Thereafter two major changes in domestic and international context strengthened the hands of Zhou Enlai, who had been protecting scientists, through the upheaval of the CR: the U.S.-China rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident. Henry Kissinger secretly arrived in Beijing in July 1971, which opened China’s door to the West. Zhou Enlai intentionally issued important directives on promoting basic theoretical study in science in front of the Chinese American scientists who were visiting China. Zhou also encouraged scientists to write him letters in order to make the issue publicly known. After the Sino-US rapprochement, a newly published Chinese academic journal “Wuli (Physics)” became the stronghold for physicists who supported Einstein and his theory. Soon after his allegedly aborted assassination of Mao Zedong in September 1971, Lin Biao died in Mongolia. It weakened the authority of Mao who chose Lin as his successor, and enabled Zhou Enlai to bring back the scientists to Beijing from local labor camps. Zhou also gave the green light to physicist Zhang Wenyu’s proposal to build a high energy accelerator at the cost of $ 2 billion, despite a contrary voice from Yang Zhenning, a Nobel laureate physicist and professor at the University of Chicago. High energy physics is based on Einstein’s theory of relativity. The physicists who had participated in building China’s first atomic bomb supported building a high energy accelerator. Zhang Wenyu led a delegation of Chinese scientists to the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States in 1972, and Zhou Enlai established the High Energy Physics Institute in the CAS in 1973. By 1972, the Cultural Revolution in the field of science had lost steam because the physicists were now allowed to applying Western physics despite its “bourgeois”, “academic authoritarian”, and “wasteful” nature that had been fiercely condemned during the Cultural Revolution.
著者
松本 繁一
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1978, no.60, pp.111-131,L6, 1978-10-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
47

In terms of Japan's foreign policy, economic assistance to the developing countries has been very important recently. This indicates that the stability and development of the world economy, and North-South problem are becoming the major issues to urgently be solved in the world politics.The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the politico-economic implications of Japan's foreign aid in the post-war internal politics, (2) the relevance of Japan's economic aid to the increasing relations with neighboring country, (3) social changes in Southeast Asia and impacts of foreign assistance on the local community, and finally to suggest (4) a new direction of the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan.Japan's Conservative Government in post-war era has made use of the economic power as a diplomatic weapon and has practiced a realistic “Cold-War Diplomacy” following the United States' global policy until Nixon's visit to China in early 1972.However, such a diplomatic style as taken by the Conservatives was compelled to change because of U. S. -China summit and the ceasefire of Vietnam war. In particular, non-socialist Southeast Asian nations are strengthening stance to the big powers. Japan's development assistance has variously influenced on the indigenous economy and community in Southeast Asia. Some effects of Japanese aid to Southeast Asia are recognized in terms of the national development, but the sphere of contribution has been extremely limited.Because foreign capital and technology tended to flow into the power elites rather than grass-roots. The Western aid has failed to lessen the disparity between the rural and urban areas, and to improve the unequal income distribution between the landlord and the peasant. Gaps between the upper-class and the lower-class are claimed to widen more than before.The author concludes that Japanese assistance in the future should prefer (1) grant to loan, (2) rural development to industrial development, and should try to raise (3) the standard of living of the poorest people and their welfare as well as small farmers'. It depends on both training of uar younger generation for overseas activities and administrative reform for external economic cooperation whether Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia could be successful or not.
著者
井上 正也
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.151, pp.36-53,L7, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
77

On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter infiltration” against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter infiltration” plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations it Mainland China.This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRC. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRC started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRC interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to use Japanese agents. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U. S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U. S. to set up a “high command” on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.
著者
高橋 和宏
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_46-170_60, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)
参考文献数
62

During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan’s index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by “black ships.” Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan’s economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it. Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan’s governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan’s economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961. Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan’s infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled “Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries” intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade. Instead of trade regulations, Japan’s economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda’s initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations. This article concludes that Ikeda’s leadership was essential to Japan’s overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.
著者
大木 毅
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.91, pp.101-119,L11, 1989-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
83

In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from
著者
池内 恵
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)
参考文献数
44

Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This “avoidance theorists” conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its “subservient” style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the “defensive” nature of Islam but expanded the concept of “defense” beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the “defense” to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as “defense” in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.
著者
渡邊 啓貴
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_1-13, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
24

This special issue focuses on research in the field of security and strategic culture in international relations.The first point in creating this issue is the concepts stated in the title and the need to address it. The approach of elucidating the nature of foreign policy decision-making process from the perspective of security and strategic culture hasn't yet been established in Japan. In particular there is a paucity of conceptual debate. Hence, the primary objective of compiling this special issue is to mark the beginning of research in this field in Japan.The second point is the historical timeline of security and strategic culture studies. Is it possible to explain the relationship between cultural studies and actual strategic diplomatic choices and behavior? It is evident from the existing research that this question is difficult to verify. However this does not mean that cultural studies in this field are not required. The importance of cultural approaches involving values and ideals has steadily increased in the Post Cold War era. While the cultural approach is not a necessary and sufficient condition for strategic diplomatic choices and behavior, its significance as necessary condition is undeniable. Despite that, there is hardly any full-fledged research in Japan in this field.Given the above context, this special issue is an attempt to shed light on the trends in research and interests in the field of security and strategic culture in Japan. A majority of the arguments in this issue are aimed at revealing diplomatic behavior that stems from history, culture and values. This can be thought of as a result of progress in the field of area studies. This issue contains examples from the United States, China, Eastern Europe and England. The next argument is a case study of strategic culture which looks into the influence strategic culture has on leaders. You find papers on Iran and England, mainly the Tony Blair dministration. The third argument focuses on the changes in values and world view among the citizens brought about by the changes in the global environment in the Post Cold War era. You find is some discussions of changes in Germany and France from a cultural and value perspective. Lastly this issue also features a paper characterized by a comparative study in attitudes towards intelligence in England and the United States and discussing the position of Japan within the above framework.
著者
柴山 太
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_46-154_61, 2008

This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947&ndash;1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.<br>Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.<br>Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'&eacute;tat, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.
著者
神谷 万丈
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_15-170_29, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)
参考文献数
89

Throughout the postwar period, realism has been the dominant school of thought in academic international relations (IR) communities in the United States and Europe. During the same period, in the IR community in Japan,there has been a group of scholars called genjitsushugi-sha, which literally translated means “realist(s)”. (Genjitsushugi literally means “realism,” and “sha” means “a person” or “people.”) Unlike realism in the Western IR communities, genjitushugi was not a dominant school of thought in Japan during the Cold War years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese IR community witnessed a harsh debate between genjitushugi-sha and risoushugi-sha (idealist[s]) over the role of military power in postwar international politics and the desirability of the “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system” (i.e., the U.S.-Japan alliance) for Japan. In the Japanese society at that time, where strong pacifist orientation was widely shared, it was idealists, who denied the utility of military power in the contemporary international relations and insisted on the policy of unarmed neutrality for the security of Japan, who represented the mainstream view. Although Japanese genjitsushugi-sha have significant resemblances to Western realists, such as the recognition of the struggle for power as a continuing nature of international politics and the acceptance of the utility of military power in the postwar world, substantial differences also exist between the two. The previous research done by the author shows that genjitsushugi-sha recognized the decreasing utility of military power in international politics as early as the early 1960s. They also noticed variations in the utility of power resources depending on issue areas by the early 1970s. In these senses, the genjitsushugi-sha’s view on power shows considerably liberal tendencies. This article argues that their view on nationalism also has liberal, rather than realist, inclinations. While realism is a particularistic theory, liberalism is universalistic. Realist and liberal views on nationalism should reflect such natures of respective theories. The analysis in this article shows that Japanese genjitsushugi-sha’s view on nationalism shows strongly universalistic tendencies. In the face of the revival of nationalism among the Japanese citizens since the mid-sixties, genjitsushugi-sha argued: 1) that Japanese diplomacy should reduce the dependence on the U.S.; 2) but that Japan, as a trading country with a limited military power, could maintain its security and prosperity only with close cooperation with other countries,particularly the U.S., and increasingly so under the deepening interdependence in the postwar world; 3) that Japan, therefore, should not define its national interests in a narrow, egoistic sense, 4) and that the Japanese people should pursue nationalism that is internationalist in nature. Despite the conventional view that regards Japanese genjitsushugi-sha as (a subspecies of) realists in Western IR terms, this article argues that they were rather “realistic liberal” scholars.
著者
石井 修
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1992, no.100, pp.35-53,L8, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
56

The major thesis of this article is that the year 1955 marked a watershed in the history of the Cold War, in a sense that by then a fundamental, qualitative change had taken place, and that it set the tone for the future Cold War.By 1955, not only the “easing of tension” but also several changes in the nature of the East-West contest had become discernible. These changes were: (1) relative stability in Europe—the major battleground in the Cold War and also, to a much lesser extent, though, in Asia; (2) a growing awareness on the part of the leaders in Washington, London, and Moscow of the massive destructiveness of a nuclear conflagration, which had made them extremely cautious in their behavior, especially in Europe; and therefore, (3) the super-power rivalry shifting from the major battleground in Europe to the risk-free “Third World”, hence the globalization of the Cold War. Accordingly, the Cold War hereafter took on more of the characteristic of economic and psychological warfare and covert operations.The above-mentioned changes resulted from: (1) the congealment of the two “security spheres” in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, on a global scale; (2) the emergence of thermonuclear weapons, making actual war unbearably costly and difficult.This article basically supports the bipolar stability theory, and yet it contends that bipolarity alone would not guarantee stability, and stresses the “soft, ” human, and psychological aspect of the leadership on both sides.
著者
村井 友秀
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.108, pp.55-68,L9, 1995-03-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
77

In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.
著者
波多野 澄雄
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
57

Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.