著者

李 太喜

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.19-40, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

21

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The argument against incompatibilism is that freedom and alternative possibilities are incompatible. This argument presupposes a dogma on freedom debate, which says that freedom always improves our rationality and control. Since the dogma is not valid, because it is not adequate for the descriptive aspect of our concept of freedom, incompatibilism need not worry about the incompatibility between freedom and alternative possibilities. We must reconsider the relationship between the two aspects of our concept of freedom; alternative possibilities and agency. Then alternative possibilities should be regarded to weaken our agency.