著者
笠木 雅史
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.3-27, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)
参考文献数
75

It is commonplace to characterize analytic philosophy in terms of the so-called “linguistic turn.” Recent historical studies, however, tell or remind us that analytic philosophy is not unified with regard to its methods or subject matters. The purpose of this paper is to contribute toward the accurate picture of the history of analytic philosophy, with a focus on the group of philosophers that was called “Cambridge Analysis” or the “Cambridge School of Analysis” in the 1930s. Firstly, the paper exposes the methods and conceptions of metaphysics championed by members of the Cambridge School of Analysis, such as G. E. Moore, B. Russell, L. S.Stebbing, and J. Wisdom. Secondly, the paper argues that when the Cambridge School of Analysis was succeeded by Cambridge Ordinary Language School in the late 1930s, metaphysics started being conceptualized linguistically.
著者
小山 虎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.29-45, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)
参考文献数
41

What is the exact relationship between analytic philosophy and philosophy of science? In this paper, I will address this question from the perspective of research traditions, with the help of recent historical studies on analytic philosophy. The two groups are particularly focused: the Polish philosophers and the logical empiricists in Berlin. Neither of them is unknown to us. However, by taking seriously their connection to the development of analytic philosophy and philosophy of science as research traditions, I believe, the understanding of our own tradition may be improved.
著者
青山 拓央
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_81-2_94, 2010 (Released:2011-04-01)
参考文献数
6

Achilles need not catch the tortoise, although Achilles is faster than the tortoise. Zeno's premise does not determine whether Achilles can catch up. In this paper, I clarify this fact through a critical examination of Noya (2005), which criticizes Aoyama (2002) and Uemura (2002). Noya's solution smuggles the unnecessary premise of equal ratio to make Achilles catch up. However, his solution gives a new idea about what speed is. In the last part of this paper, I develop this idea and explain the reason why Achilles usually catches up in the actual world.
著者
井頭 昌彦
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.2_59-2_73, 2009 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
21

Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question “What there is?” In this paper, I begin with Quine's “indispensability argument,” and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.
著者
伊勢田 哲治
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_1-2_17, 2010 (Released:2011-04-01)
参考文献数
20

In this paper I discuss the epistemological implications of the rise of so-called “Mode 2” science. Mode 2 science is a kind of knowledge production in the context of application where knowledge production is conducted in a heterogeneous manner. Because of these features, bilateral science communications, where lay expertise has the same authority as scientific expertise, play significant roles in Mode 2 science. Features of Mode 2 (especially heterogeneity and use of lay expertise) pose epistemological questions: is Mode 2 knowledge as reliable as Mode 1?; what is the methodology used (or at least available) in Mode 2 to assure the reliability?; is Mode 2 worth the name of “science”?; if yes, what is the definition of 'science' used there? I maintain that we can enrich the philosophy of science by taking these questions seriously, and I conduct some preliminary considerations on the final question, namely the question of demarcation taking into account of Mode 2.
著者
高橋 泰城
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.2, pp.17-30, 2013-12-20 (Released:2014-06-28)
参考文献数
14

One of the recent promising theoretical approaches to accounts of the violation of rationality (or generalize the concept of rationality) in human decision making is quantum decision theory. In this expository review article, I introduce 1) problems of rationality in quantum decision theory and 2) relationships between psychophysics, theoretical neuroscience including neuroeconomics, and quantum decision theory.

9 0 0 0 OA 書評

出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.2, pp.2_101-2_134, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)
参考文献数
7
著者
坂上 雅道 山本 愛実
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.2_29-2_40, 2009 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
20

To survive in changeable circumstances, we have to make appropriate decisions on our behavior. Recent studies have suggested that we have two brain processes to calculate reward values of objects. One is the process coding a specific reward value of a stimulus or event dependent on direct experience. The other enables us to predict reward based on the internal model of given circumstances, including societies, which doesn't necessarily require direct experience. The nigro-striatal network works for the model-free decision and the prefrontal network contributes to the model-based decision. These two networks are cooperative in one occasion and are competitive in another.
著者
鴻 浩介
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.27-47, 2016-12-20 (Released:2017-09-29)
参考文献数
20

A normative reason is a consideration that counts in favor of doing something. According to Internalism about reasons, a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to do something only if that consideration is capable of motivating the agent to do that action. Externalism about reasons denies this claim. After surveying the debate between Internalism and Externalism, I defend the oldest version of Internalism, that is, Bernard Williamsʼ deliberative Internalism. My argument is twofold: first I argue that there is a specific motivation for adopting deliberative Internalism, and then try to address the most serious objection against Internalism, i.e., the undergeneration problem.
著者
森田 邦久
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_1-1_14, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
21
被引用文献数
1 1

In this essay, I would like to show a demarcation between science and pseudo-science, from two approaches: theoretical and experimental/observational. Theoretical approach pays attention to revision pattern in theoretical explanation. Especially, when the elucidator introduces new unknown elements for explanation, pseudo-scientific explanation fails to satisfy some conditions. On the other hand, experimental/observational criterion says, pseudo-science claims doubtful phenomenological laws.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015

In <i>Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge</i> (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Ueharas distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.
著者
島村 修平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012

It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.
著者
小川 芳範
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.1, pp.1-13, 2002

In this paper, I consider a philosophical interpretation of Hilbert's program put forward by Paul Bernays. The paper consists, roughly, of two parts. In the first part, I briefly describe Bernays's polemic against "immanence philosophy" over the question concerning the epistemological status of theoretical sciences and its relation to the foundational controversy in mathematics in the 1920s. In the second part, I briefly discuss the theory of cognition contained in the transcendental philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries and his twentieth century evangelist, Leonard<BR>Nelson, and consider Bernays's view against the background of this intellectual tradition. I conclude the paper by arguing for the importance of attending to Friesian influence in order to achieve a deeper understanding of Bernays's (and Hilbert's) philosophy of mathematics.
著者
小草 泰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_29-1_49, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
16

Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014

According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of "modes of presentation" of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.
著者
水本 正晴
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_59-1_78, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
40

The "entailment thesis", or the principle that knowledge entails belief, is accepted by most epistemologists today. However, not everyone agrees. Some philosophers have presented at least prima facie convincing counterexamples. It seems, however, their challenges have been not so much answered as simply neglected. After examining two types of attractive, but not completely satisfying answers to such purported counterexamples, I will propose an alternative answer, which seems to be congenial to the spirit of epistemological naturalism.
著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.1-17, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
1

The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.
著者
Ikuro Suzuki
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
Kagaku tetsugaku (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
21

The paradox of coincidence, a paradox about the relation between a material object and its stuff, has been paid a great attention to in recent metaphysics. In this paper, I compare two influential approaches to this paradox; sortalism and fourdimensional worm theory, and defend sortalism. I give the following two arguments. (1) Worm theory, like sortalism, must introduce sortal concepts to resolve the paradox. So both approaches owe the (almost) same theoretical burden to explain how sortal concepts work. (2) Worm theory, unlike sortalism, introduces sortal concepts in a very problematic way.