著者

森 美矢子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.28, pp.145-154, 1999 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

31

著者

森 美矢子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.217-248, 2000

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This paper looks at the attempts made between 1987 and 1988 to reform and revive Komsomol under the pressure of political and social change, and their consequences that paradoxically led to the collapse of Komsomol. When we explore the process of Perestroika and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, we tend to perceive Perestroika simply as the prologue to the collapse of the Union and interpret all factors and phenomena during Perestroika from the perspective of how they contributed to the demise of the Soviet system. While it is true that Perestroika ultimately brought about the collapse of the old regime, ten years have elapsed since the beginning of Perestroika. I believe that a more critical and historical examination of the complicated and contradicted process of Perestroika is necessary. Upon reconsidering the historical meaning of Perestroika, it is puzzling to realize how the measures were first initiated to make the system work better, and then transformed intentionally or unintentionally under given circumstances, thus deviating from their original aims and reaching completely different results. Komsomol, as I will examine later, is a good example of this process. Komsomol was one of the major 'social organizations' with enormous membership and a very high saturation rate among the Soviet young. It had been an indispensable part of the Soviet political system, functioning as a mobilization and indoctrination machine since the early years of nation construction. Therefore, even though it had little actual importance and autonomy in political decision making, it did have the potential to exercise great influence on the potential of Perestroika as a driving force of political and social change. As a matter of fact, Komsomol played an important role in determining the direction of Perestroika. It came to be an avant-garde of economic change and secure a position as a leading actor in the emerging market economy and consumerism. In the chapters of this paper, I will investigate the transformation process of Komsomol, which resulted in its eventual fragmentation and collapse, in close connection with the destination of Perestroika. This paper is composed as follows. First of all, I will survey the critical situation of Komsomol just prior to Perestroika and the measures of the Party to make Komsomol more effective as a doctrination machine. Several months after the introduction of Perestroika, the glasnost' uncovered the pathological reality of Komsomol, triggering harsh attacks on it from the society. Holding serious concerns for the future of Komsomol, the Party and Komsomol officials at last proclaimed to start genuene reform. In the second chapter, I will examine the consequence of his reform and discuss the problems, especially the draft of the new "ustav" which was presented at the 20th Komsomol Congress. This marked the actual starting point for making the new Komsomol. In the following section, the two principal directions of Komsomol reform will be elucidated separately in detail. The first is the giving of greater autonomy to the local organizations. The second is the representation of youth interests as an interest association. Komsomol's post-reform direction will then be discussed in the conclusion. Up to the end of 1986, Komsomol seemed to be very reluctant to do anything special even amidst the criticism that was being leveled against it. It rather belatedly declared to hold the 20th Congress in April 1987 to revise the "ustav" (rules) of the organization. Complains and opinions about Komsomol were concentrated on the widening gap between Komsomol and ordinary young people. In the course of active discussions in preparation for the Congress, a general consent was formed that Komsomol should be more responsive to young people's interests through the establishment of local organizations, especially primary organizations. It was believed that Komsomol should grant these organizations rights to decide policies, and allocate budgets for staffing and activities such as local recruitment. The aim was to reform Komsomol from a youth mobiliser to a youth representative. At the 20th Congress, the directions referred to above were officially confirmed and the "ustav" revised accordingly. Therefore it was in the 20th Congress that Komsomol took the first step to remake itself to survive under the unique circumstances brought about by Perestroika, showing not only the members but also the other organizations which Komsomol was working with Komsomol's two new directions of giving local organizations more autonomy and becoming an initiator of the youth interests not a mobiliser of the youth force. Despite this, real change inside Komsomol had not begun yet. An exploration of the practical changes that emerged after the Congress and their effects on the future of Komsomol is necessary. The ideal image of the new Komsomol formulated by the 20th Congress was one that would be activated by the initiatives from the below. Empowerment of local organizations, especially the primary organizations, thus was essential for real change. The authorization of primary organizations to make final decisions on recruitment and the abolishment of membership targets was welcomed by the local organizations that had in the past been prevented from other substantial activities. The effectiveness of local organization largely depended, however, on the quantity of funds and the quality of staff. Thus from 1987 to 1988, local organizations were only gradually given autonomy form the central committee not only on the jurisdiction of the activities, but also on the budget and the personnel administration. The measures mentioned above gave the local organizations the incentive to earn funds because they had to survive on their own at the time the membership began to decline. This meant that through local organizations getting autonomy more and more, Komsomol was becoming more and more centrifugal instead of a united active political force supported from below. This contradicted development can also be seen in the another direction Komsomol took to transform itself under Perestroika. For a long time, Komsomol had been functioning as the main mobilization machine to provide human resources for economic purposes. It had been in charge of students construction brigates (SSOs) and Komsomol storming units (KUOs), sending labor fources to destinated sites or factories that had high economic priority. But this had largely been against their will and interests according to rank and file members. So when it confronted the difficult situation around 1987, in order to restore authority among the members, it was natural that Komsomol turned to the very members who were accusing it of being indifferent to the welfare of the nation's youth through a failure to resist hindrance by governmental or economic organizations. The members appealed to its status as the only representative of the youth, arguing that it should be a reliable promoter of their interests through acquiring the right to determine how much labor forces to supply, where to send brigades and so on. Moreover, through 1987 and 1988, local organizations began to mobilize labor to create profit-making enterprises under Komsomol auspices. The professed aim of the measure was to increase the income of the participants of SSOs or KSUs by giving them the chance to make profits at their own discretion. It should not be overlooked that Komsomol's interest in the measure was to utilize these enterprises to make money because it had to maintain the organization and support the staff in spite of the declining membership and income from membership fees. SSOs, KSUs and other forms like youth housing complexes (MZhKs) which were originally made to provide young workers opportunities to acquire dwelling through social competition got to be the foundation for Komsomol to develop profit-making enterprises which would be leading to genuine Komsomol businesses in the near future. In other words, the Komsomol transformation into be the representative of youth interests entailed the shift from political activities to profit making ones. As a consequence, we can consider Komsomol to have been one of the leading pioneers in making of the market economy in the Soviet Union. As was already mentioned, Komsomol's underlying rationale for reform was to survive the radical political and social change around 1987. Thus it took fundamental actions to be responsive to the demands of youth and to the circumstances under Perestroika. Its breakdown was not due to the obstinate resistance of the stubborn conservative careerists in Komsomol. It was also not the result of any students' revolts or social uprisings. At the present stage, it is necessary to further illuminate the process by which Komsomol reformed itself and should refrain from assertive conclusions. However, it can be assumed that the collapse of Komsomol was an unexpected outcome inadvertently brought about by actions aimed at creating a new Komsomol, but that these actions deviated gradually from their original purpose and drove Komsomol into fragmentation and finally collapse. This paper attempts to analyse this process and serves as a preliminary step to further investigation.

著者

森 美矢子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.143-175, 2003

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This paper focuses on the relationship between Komsomol and informal organizations under Perestroika. Perestroika brought immense social change to Soviet society. Komsomol had to face, for the first time in its long history, rival informal youth organizations not subordinate to, but independent of its power. An investigation of this new situation and analysis of the transformation of formal organizations like Komsomol sheds light on the transition and social change experienced during the final days of the Soviet system. First, this paper will examine the appearance of various informal youth organizations under Perestroika, ranging from amateur hobby clubs to political groups. Simultaneously it will explore the tactics used by Komsomol to compete with them for support among young people and to survive in the new situation. This discussion will include an examination of the roles played by Komsomol and the informal youth organizations during Perestroika. This paper focuses on the period from the 20th Komsomol Congress held in April, 1987 until June, 1988, when there were heated demands for democratization at the 19th Party Conference. It was in this period that the informal organizations not only played the most important role in promoting social change, but Komsomol also devised strategies to revive its role as a youth organization. As background, we will trace the history of the relations between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations. At first, Komsomol had to take young people from traditional youth organizations in order to become the only formal youth organization in the Soviet system. Although Komsomol acquired this status in the late 1920s, there was an ongoing struggle to retain this monopoly in the face of continual attempts to create informal youth organizations. In the 1970s, informal organizations of youth, mostly hobby clubs like rock music clubs became an essential part of life for ordinary young people. They enjoyed their leisure time in a subculture beyond the influence of Komsomol. These organizations were not directly anti-Soviet nor even politically oriented. Nevertheless, they were threatening to the authorities as potential enemies because they were making Soviet ideology less influential among the youth, the future-builders of Soviet society. The renewed Cold War that broke out at the beginning of the 1980s made Komsomol confront a hard situation: how to protect Soviet youth from the evil subculture of the West. Under these circumstances, Komsomol adopted a new policy for informal organizations. That is, instead of suppressing all of them, Komsomol began to select "better" organizations both to promote and to keep under control the leisure activities of Soviet youth. Second, this paper will examine this new Komsomol policy toward informal youth organizations. After Perestroika began, as society became more and more active, ideological restrictions rapidly weakened. Komsomol decided to "register" the informal youth hobby clubs and permit them to operate freely under its supervision. This new approach greatly increased the possibility both for cooperation and friction between Komsomol and the informal organizations. In addition, new organizations appeared such as those protecting cultural assets or others promoting ecological awareness. Further, youth groups involved in political discussions gradually emerged. These new organizations were considered the pioneers of Perestroika and were starting to rival Komsomol. The 20th Komsomol Congress was the first opportunity to discuss the relationship between Komsomol and the emerging informal youth organizations. At this Congress, Komsomol declared that they could not become an alternative to Komsomol. It also tried to transform itself into a political organization to represent youth interests. Third, this paper analyzes the politicization of the informal youth organizations in the spring just before the 19th Party Conference. At last, Komsomol recognized that it could not avoid talking on equal terms with the informal political organizations concerning the future of all youth organizations, including Komsomol itself. The informal organizations and Komsomol delegates met several times to discuss political problems in general and to make a joint appeal to the 19th Conference. The 19th Conference was a very important venue for Komsomol to insure its role and status in the emerging system. After the discussions with the informal organizations, Komsomol devised a new strategy: It would become one of many youth organizations and it would cooperate with the others to advance Perestroika. Komsomol abandoned its earlier strategy of maintaining a monopoly over youth organizations. It realized that it could survive only if it became reconciled with the informal organizations that were more popular and more influential among the youth. To improve its image and survive, Komsomol would have to work in partnership with the other groups. After the 20th Congress, a partnership was gradually established between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations in the area of leisure and cultural activities because such cooperation would serve to make Komsomol more popular. Ironically however, Komsomol was losing its organizational unity and identity as a youth organization due to its success in constructing a cooperative relationship with the informal organizations. In addition, after the 19th Conference, the search for a political partnership between Komsomol and the informal organizations became more difficult. Under Perestroika, Komsomol had to transform itself in order to compete with the informal organizations. This transformation process and the evolving relationship between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations are ongoing. They are a topic for future research on the role of Komsomol under Perestroika.