81 0 0 0 OA ソ連の鉄道輸送

著者
加藤 幸廣
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.18, pp.58-68, 1989 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
34
著者
中井 遼
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.38, pp.89-103, 2009 (Released:2011-10-14)

This article presents quantitative aspects of the party system in Lithuania and argues that Lithuania’s electoral institutions (mixed-member majoritarian system) define the quantitative features of its party system. There has been an ambivalent view of Lithuanian party politics in the literature. Some scholars argue that it is a highly fragile and volatile system, while others assert that it is stable. Several scholars have argued that its complexity could be explained as a result of intertemporal change. Adding to this debate, I argue that the differing evaluations of the Lithuanian party system is the result of analyses based on different measurement scores. The view that the system is unstable is supported by the multitude of political parties that seats in the parliament and the view that it is volatile is evidenced by the fact that newcomer parties easily win seats. On the other hand, effective party number index (known as the Laakso-Taagepera index) and the bipolar cabinet forming support the view that the system is stable. This article organizes and clears up various quantitative features of the party system of Lithuania and argues that its two main aspects—its instability (multitude of political parties) and its volatility (newcomer parties)—are prominent features of the political systems in other Central and East European countries. In order to explore the origins of these two prominent aspects of the Lithuanian party system, this article focuses on Lithuania’s electoral institutions. Socioeconomic and historical factors cannot account for the quantitative aspects of Lithuanian party politics. Lithuania has adopted the mixed-member majoritarian system as their electoral system, an institution that is very exceptional in the context of the Central and East European democracies. Referring to theoretical research in electoral studies, I argue that Lithuania’s adaptation of the mixed-member system is an explanatory variable in the determination of the quantitative aspects of Lithuania’s party system. This is because Lithuania’s adaptation of the mixed-member system, including single member district, do not promotes two party systems, rather fragmentizes the party system and foments personal voting. These effects are bolstered by contamination effects which occur in the mixed-member majoritarian system, seats distribution rule and the transitional fledgling Lithuanian party system. Observation clearly shows that single-member districts are responsible for the multitude of political parties, which are seated in the Lithuanian parliament. Representatives from about four to six parties are elected in proportional representation districts, but representatives from ten parties are elected in single member districts in Lithuania. Moreover, profiles of political elites who organize new political parties show that those who have been elected in single member districts are significantly involved in splitting from existing parties and forming new political parties. In addition, in single member districts it is easier for a member of the local elite possessing a political or economic power base to win an election than in another type of district. Lithuania’s party politics exhibit aspects of both stability and instability. However, the quantitative character and prominent features of the party system have been considerably defined by its mixed-member majoritarian electoral system.
著者
淺村 卓生
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.36, pp.48-60, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

The Uzbek standard language of today is exceptional among the Turkic languages in lacking vowel harmony. This paper focuses on changes in an ideological position of vowel harmony rules in Uzbek for those who engaged in language politics or educational works in the early Soviet era. The paper deals mainly with the period between 1924, when the National Delimitation in Central Asia took place, and 1934 when vowel harmony rules were abolished from the Uzbek standard written language at the Scientific Conference on Uzbek Orthography.In the 1920's vowel harmony rules were regarded by local intellectuals as a symbol of Uzbek language ties with other Turkic languages and as a legacy of Chagatai literature. At a 1929 Conference the inclusion of vowel harmony rules into the grammar of standard Uzbek, which the chair of the conference proposed, was approved as an “iron law”. However, after the alteration of Moscow's policy on national problems, the vowel harmony rules were attacked as a “dying law” that blocks further development of the Uzbek language, because they were considered to be unsuitable for transcribing international (read “Russian”) words. Vowel harmony rules were abolished not only from transcribed Russian or international words but also from Uzbek orthography in the 1934 Conference, where the number of vowels in Uzbek alphabet was reduced from nine to six, it was decided that the Uzbek standard language should be based on urban dialects in which vowel harmony was weak.It is worth mentioning that it was only after the basic shape of the “Uzbek national language” was determined, that the need for a history of the new national language started to be strongly felt. Many linguists tried to seek its origin and trace back the descent of Uzbek language. In the 1920's scholars were longing for a shape of the “Uzbek national language” in the Turkic languages with Chagatai as the successor, considering that vowel harmony rules remained in the “Uzbek national language” from the past. However, showing a remarkable contrast with studies in the 1920's, studies after 1934 tried to establish a theory that these Turkic languages also lacked vowel harmony rules in the similar way that standardized “Uzbek national language” does. The latter group of studies obscured the historical side of the Uzbek language and substantialized “Uzbek national language” that was being constructed as a part of the cultural essentialism in Uzbekistan. This suggests that, from the viewpoint of the socio-cultural history of Uzbekistan, the abandonment of a written language with vowel harmony rules and the standardization of Uzbek language in 1934 were also some of the extremely important events in the process of the construction of the national representation of Uzbekistan.
著者
村井 淳
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.32, pp.145-161, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
17

Crimes are mirrors of society. This article analyzes the contents of the Russian criminal statistics that began to be released to the public from the end of the Soviet era and examines the changes of the Russian society behind the crimes.There are three particular periods when crimes in Russia rapidly increased from 1982 to 2002. The first period is 1983, one year after the general secretary Brezhnev died. In 1983, the number of thefts remarkably increased, but the increase rate is not as prominent as the other two periods. The second period is 1989-1992, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the number of crimes increased because morality and social order collapsed due to the following: introduction and expansion of the market economy, the social maladaptation of the returned soldiers from Afghanistan, and the confusion brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1992, atrocious crimes such as murders, rapes and robberies especially increased. The third period is 1998-1999. The financial crisis in 1998 deprived millions of people of their savings and wages. From 1998 to 1999, the number of robberies, thefts and drug-related crimes increased. After Putin was officially elected as president of Russia in 2000, however, the crime rate increase slowed and, crimes started to reduce in number in 2002.Today the most serious crimes are crimes related to drugs, psychotropic medicines and deadly poisons. Drugs such as heroin and poppy seeds come to Russia mainly from Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Turkmenistan, and the part of them flows out to Ukraine and Western Europe. Drugs are expanding to smaller cities in Russia, not to mention the large cities. A large number of crimes, including drug-related crimes, are rapidly increasing in Khabarovsk, Tyumen', Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, and so on. Of late, the number of crimes in Moscow is more than that in Sankt-Peterburk. Behind that, there exist movements of Russian Mafias.The unemployment rate rose after the collapse of the Soviet Union and became the highest in 1998 (13.2%) . The number of crimes, criminals and prisoners increased in proportion to the unemployment rate. Moreover, the number of crimes caused by the unemployed especially increased. This phenomenon, of course, was related to the economic conditions behind it. Among the young, those who don't go to school and have no job, increased in number and they tend to commit crimes such as robberies and thefts. In 2002, the number of crimes in Russia reduced a little, but the number of murders and drug-related crimes were larger, and the number of thefts were smaller compared to America, Japan, Britain, France and Germany. It seems that a large amount of illegal drugs flows underground in Russia.Now not only does the Russian government have to reinforce anticrime and anti-Mafia measures, but also have to reinforce the redistribution of wealth for the week, to promote national welfare, to regulate corruption of government officials and to promote tax collection in order to reduce the number of crimes. To do so, first of all, the government must further develop the economy and accumulate wealth.
著者
齋藤 宏文
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.36, pp.72-83, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
53

This research focuses on the process by which scientific information on Soviet genetics—particularly the Lysenko Doctrine—was accepted by Japanese academic groups in the field of biological science. Nakamura (1967) studied the Lysenko Controversy in Japan and illustrated the process whereby this debate resulted in the inevitable political conflict among Japanese biologists after the conference of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in August 1948. In order to examine the possibility of the purely scientific debate on Soviet genetics, it is necessary to investigate the various types of literatures available in the few years immediately following Japan's defeat in World War II. In addition, there are three approaches that complement Nakamura's research. First, it is necessary to measure the ideological control given to Soviet science by the Soviet Government's scientific policies, because this control directly affected the quality of information on Soviet genetics. In particular, the discussion prepared by the editorial board of the Pod znamenem marksizma in 1939 will be highlighted as the turning point of this control. Second, Western scientific literatures were the most important channel of information transfer for Japanese biologists; in this case, it is necessary to consider the acceptance of this literature and the extent to which it influenced Japanese biologists. Third, Japanese academic groups lagged behind the West in accepting information, at least in the two years after the Japanese defeat in World War II; therefore, it is interesting to compare the acceptance times between the West and Japan. In 1946, the ideological control granted to Soviet science was at its weakest, and it was at this time that western biologists accepted the most detailed literatures and wrote numerous scientific criticisms on the Lysenko Doctrine. On the other hand, at this time, Japanese biologists were still concerned with the lack of availability of scientific literatures.
著者
細川 隆雄
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1992, no.21, pp.58-65, 1992 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
12
被引用文献数
1
著者
光吉 淑江
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.133-145, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

This article examines how Soviet maternalist policies were implemented in Western Ukraine, a newly acquired Soviet territory in the wake of the Second World War. While the 1944 Soviet Family Code, especially the campaign for “Mothers with Many Children, ” has often been seen as the culmination of the Stalinist pronatalist policies-virtually encouraging extramarital affairs in order to produce children-, its meaning, perception, and methods of implementation were not uniform even in the authoritarian Soviet society. A close examination of the archival documents on the newly created women's departments in the Western Ukrainian party committees reveals that the “Mothers with Many Children” campaign and other state maternal supports served to justify otherwise extremely unpopular Soviet policies in the region. The essentialized gender role of “mother” was a rare measure of Sovietization that did not require special skills, training, or political education, and therefore would not have caused much resistance, bloodshed, or even hesitation. The Western Ukrainian women often quickly learnt how to exercise their new rights in defence of their lives in order to survive the difficult postwar material situation, thus becoming important, if not active, agents in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region.
著者
伊東 孝之
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.5-28, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

When World War 1 broke out, most of the nations in Eastern Europe identified themselves with the existing Empires. Poles were mobilized into the three Empires that divided them. They ran the risk of fighting against each other. Germans in the Russian Empire fought in the Russian army against Germany. As the war progressed, however, they became aware of their ethnic identity. They were discriminated against by the authorities or the populace of the ruling nationality. Or they were manipulated by the belligerent nations against the enemy. A lot of new states came into being in Eastern Europe after the war in the name of national self-determination. Most of them, however, were not “ethnic states” in the proper sense of the word. They included many citizens of different ethnicity. On the other hand, as a result of the Russian Revolution a state based on the completely new principle came into being: the Soviet Union. It adopted ethnicity as the constituting principle of the state and formed a federation of ethnic republics. Ethnic republics were, however, just on paper. There were no institutional arrangements that would promote citizens’ allegiance to the given republic. The all-mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the institution that should secure citizens’ allegiance to the federal center. So long as the ideological mobilization worked, they managed to succeed in resurrecting citizens’ civic loyalty to the state as a whole. As the international tension mounted in the course of the 1930s, the Soviet leadership started to look with mistrust on national minorities on the periphery which resulted in the mass murder in Eastern Europe. The famine in 1932–33 in Ukraine was the first case. It was no natural, but man-made disaster to which 3.3 million people fell victim. It was caused by the excessive requisition of grain that the authorities forced through for the ambitious industrialization program. Ukraine had to pay a particularly heavy toll for it. Those who tried to resist were blamed for “Ukrainian nationalism” and “actions to serve the interests of the enemy”. Most of the victims of the so-called “Great Purge” in 1937–38 were citizens of national minorities in Eastern Europe. They were suspected to be spies for Japan in the case of the “Kulak operation” and for Poland in the case of the “Polish operation”. 625,000 people were incriminated and shot to death. During World War 2 Germans and Soviets did ethnic cleansing in a huge scale in Eastern Europe. Germans considered Eastern Europe as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials, foods and labor forces, and were not interested in integrating peoples there. They starved to death about one million inhabitants of Leningrad and 3.1 million soldiers of the Red Army most of whom were conscripted from Eastern Europe. 5.4 million East European Jews fell victim to the German extermination policy after July 1941. Soviets, on the contrary, were interested in integrating peoples they captured. However, they shot to death most of the elite who cooperated with the previous regime and exiled “enemy nationalities” en masse to Central Asia or Siberia. Beneath the German-Soviet war another ethnic cleansing unfolded: Ukrainian nationalists killed about one hundred thousand Poles and Jews in Volynia. (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)
著者
亀山 郁夫
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.30, pp.40-54, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
29

This paper aims to trace the descent of ‘enthusiasm’ in the twentieth century Russian cultural history as well as understand the Totalitarianism under the Stalinist authority and its consequences in the late twentieth century. In doing so, we started by categorizing the concept of ‘enthusiasm’ into the ‘earth-grounded type’ and the ‘authority-oriented type’.The mainstream symbolist movement in the early twentieth century Russian culture obtained an eschatological tendency under the influence of Sorov'yov's school. Later, Ivanov opened up a way to the Primitivist movement by recognizing the role of ‘symbol’ within the Dionysian integration. Such is an example of the ‘grounded’ type of enthusiasm.Nourishing on such enthusiasm, the Russian avant-garde art movement blossomed. After the Russian revolution, the Russian avant-garde art, through artist such as Mayakovsky and Meierhold, realised the enthusiasm in both directions. On the other hand, there were artists such as Eisenstein who attempted to integrate to the Stalinist authority by deploying an anthoropological imagination, even though tending towards the ‘earth-grounded’ enthusiasm.The era of the ‘Thaw’ was also the era in which the spirit of integration (sobornost') originated in the Russian Orthodox tradition flourished. But since Stalin's death the centripetal force of enthusiasm was lost. The process of anti-Stalinism failed to realise the regression towards world history, and caused the new era of closure called ‘the post-Utopean era’. The characteristic of ‘informal culture’ which existed between the ‘Thaw’ and the Breshnev era is understood as the movement attempting to overcome the Stalinist influence through intense sophistication of the concept of ‘distance’.Even though the Soviet socialist declined through the influence of high-tech revolution in the Western Europe, the recent Postmodernists devise Russian history with the concept of ‘emptiness (pustota) ’, identifying Russia as the state of simulation without reference. Such Postmodernists attempt to harmonize with the Totalitarianism, but at the same time seek for a way to overcome Stalinism as they skillfully attempt to secretly innovate the rigid dichotomous framework.
著者
鳥飼 将雅
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.98-116, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
20

Although the political processes in specific regions of Russia have attracted much scholarly attention since the collapse of the USSR, the number of case studies involving the North-Caucasian ethnic republics has been quite limited. Consequently, a rather shallow and stereotypical understanding emphasizing only limited aspects of the politics in these republics has been represented in the academic discussion. Building on information from local news-sources and interviews in Dagestan, this study highlights three overlooked but important aspects: (1) the consociational nature and instability between the regional and municipal governments in Dagestan politics, (2) the uniqueness of electoral mobilization in Dagestan, and (3) the struggle to consolidate the power vertical following Ramazan Abdulatipov’s appointment as the governor.The consociational nature of Dagestan politics, particularly in the 1990s, has been discussed by several specialists. While this uniqueness was guaranteed by the legal and constitutional framework of Dagestan, the Kremlin’s initiative to force regional governments to revise regional laws to comply with federal laws removed these constraints. However, by scrutinizing the composition of the regional assembly, this study shows that the balance of power among ethnic groups has been maintained informally in contemporary Dagestan. Moreover, an analysis of municipal level elites reveals the independence of diverse actors in Dagestan’s politics, which has resulted in an unstable regime.This study also highlights the difficulty of aligning our understanding of electoral mobilization in Dagestan with the general conception of political machines in the non-Russian ethnic republics. Although, as the literature on Russian electoral politics points out, turnout and support for incumbent candidates and parties in federal-level elections are extremely high in Dagestan, mayoral elections have proved highly competitive, implying that electoral mobilization in Dagestan is not controlled by the regional government but rather by clan groups whose activities are rampant at the municipal level. This finding demonstrates the need to modify the prevailing concept of Russian political machines, which has been based mainly on case studies of ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, to explain Dagastanʼs uniqueness.Finally, governors recently sent from the center have begun to establish the power vertical in Dagestan in order to enforce stable rule by the federal government. The fourth governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, was the first outsider governor in Dagestan since WWII. His close relationship with the Kremlin enabled him to neutralize several local clans that were firmly rooted in specific municipalities, although this attempt was left incomplete. His successor, Vladimir Vas’liev, had had no ties whatsoever to Dagestan prior to his inauguration as governor. Given his efforts to thoroughly transform Dagestan’s politics, there is an urgent need to observe whether this transformation, with support from the Kremlin, will succeed.Whereas the main focus is on the contemporary political process in Dagestan, the implications of this case study offer a deeper understanding of Russian federalism during Putin’s presidency. Study findings also show the importance of case studies focused on specific regions, even in centralized Russia, in order to expand our understanding of federalism and electoral politics in Russia.