- 著者
-
松里 公孝
- 出版者
- ロシア・東欧学会
- 雑誌
- ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2000, no.29, pp.49-71, 2000 (Released:2010-10-27)
- 参考文献数
- 30
- 被引用文献数
-
1
1
Kuchma's “cassette tape scandal” in 2000-2001 exemplified the patrimonial phenomena that has become prevalent in post-communist Ukrainian politics. However, this patrimonial tendency has not been combined with classic authoritarianism but machine politics (or ‘caciquismo’), in which election votes play a decisive role in intra-elite struggles for power. As a rule, caciquismo is based on independent meso-elites which function as mobilizers of votes and also as political brokers between localities and the center. Ukraine is not an exception, although in this country the meso-elites independence is masked by a constitutional unitarism and an appointment system of regional and ‘raion’ chief executives. Therefore, we need to pay attention to patrimony building at the regional level, which provides a social basis for strong regional electoral machines. I sampled four regions which contributed to Kuchma's victory in the 1999 presidential elections : Odesa, Transcarpathia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. Remarkably, despite previously sympathizing with the opposition, the electorate in these regions changed their political inclinations in the few years leading up to the 1999 elections. Along with the common tendency of electoral machines being based on the regional patrimony, a contrast was found with the extent to which this machine/patrimony had been legalized. This is the problem of regional party building. The development of a regional party system is determined by two factors :(1) intra-elite competition and,(2) interactions between party system levels. Regarding the latter, if infra-regional issues are converted into national political issues in a region, we can say that the interactions between party system levels have been activated. In 1994-98, Odesa Region experienced harsh infra-elite competition between its governor and Odesa mayor, but even in 1998 this conflict remained infra-regional (Kyiv only intervened sporadically). Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk politics were forcibly nationalized in 1996 and after 1997 respectively, since the top leaders of these regions became rivals for Kyiv politicians (Donetsk governor Shcherban versus the then prime minister Lazarenko ; and the Dnipropetrovsk Soviet chair Lazarenko versus President Kuchma). Nevertheless, Kyiv could not divide these regions' elites. In Transcarpathia conflicts between the governor and the mayor of the regional capital Uzhhorod became nationalized in 1997-98 because the governor allied with the Medvedchuk faction of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), a typical legalized clan organization from Kyiv. In other words, only in Transcarpathia were the two conditions fully met and thus a formal party system was able to develop.