著者

江﨑 智絵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_108-195_122, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

71

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The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has gained much support from its sponsor states including Iran and Syria, which has been a cause of deep concern for Israel. The biggest problem for Israel is that Hamas has been launching missiles from the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since June 2007. Some of these missiles are said to have been supplied by Iran. In response, Israel imposed a land and air blockade on Gaza and attacked Hamas military base in Gaza three times between December 2008 and August 2014. However, in October 2011, Hamas and Israel held a prisoner exchange deal, mediated by Egypt. Why did Hamas climb down to a prisoner exchange deal with hostile Israel? What was Hamas’s logic behind managing its foreign relations in this manner?Previous studies on Hamas’s foreign relations indicate that the organization behaves according to political expediency rather than ideology and religious solidarity. This means that Hamas acts flexibly in response to the context it finds itself situated in. These foreign strategies need to be verified further, with a focus on a case that changed the relations between Hamas and the involved countries. Therefore, this paper examines the background of prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel in the context of deteriorating relations between Hamas and its sponsor states.The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, Hamas agreed to a prisoner exchange with Israel to minimize the damage resulting from Iran’s suspension of financial support. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Hamas did not accept Iran’s request to support the Syrian regime and thus weakened its relations with Iran. Harking back to Hamas’s historical background would bear out that they were inclined to support the Syrian people’s aspiration. Thus, Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip who were most effected by the waning financial assistance from Iran needed Egypt to ease the blockade imposed on the area. For them, an indirect negotiation with Israel on a prisoner exchange presented a good opportunity to reach out to Egypt, which played a mediator role in the negotiation.Second, Hamas’s rational for entering a prisoner exchange deal with Israel indicates that Hamas exercises flexibility in fostering relations with foreign countries. It is inevitable for a non-state actor such as Hamas to need the support of other countries as much as possible. Factors such as ideology and religious solidarity would not go well with this aim because they limit the number of countries to which Hamas can appeal for support.

著者

江﨑 智絵

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.3, pp.15-28, 2015-12-31 (Released:2022-04-01)

著者

江﨑 智絵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_196-207_199, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)