- 著者
-
浜野 研三
- 出版者
- 日本科学哲学会
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.35, no.2, pp.29-40, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
- 参考文献数
- 14
This paper deals with the question of why intentional vocabulary is distinctive. The question arises from the comparison of the status of normative discourse in the philosophies of W. Sellars and of W. V. Quine. While Sellars gives a significant role to normative discourse, Quine does not. I call into play Bjφrn Ramberg's attempt to combine insights of R. Rorty and of D. Davidson to herald the emergence of what he calls a post-ontological philosophy of mind. Ramberg makes it clear that Rortian pragmatism has every reason to accept openhandedly Davidson's claim of the distinctiveness of intentional vocabulary. On the basis of Ramberg's achievement, I conclude that Sellars's position is more productive than Quine's.