著者

渡曾 知子

出版者

社会学研究会

雑誌

ソシオロジ (ISSN:05841380)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.21-37,189, 2004-05-31 (Released:2016-05-25)

参考文献数

25

被引用文献数

1

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Regarded as the beginning of the constructionist controversies, "the Ontological Gerrymandering Critique" addressed both constructionist forms of description and their methodological presuppositions. In the course of the debates, while a variety of improvements were suggested for the former, no clear-cut prescription emerged for the latter. This paper employs radical constructivism's arguments to the epistemological premises which underlie constructionist's works. The aim is to elaborate a methodological foundation that can permit an approach to plural realities, which cannot be considered within the framework of social constructionism. After surveying the constructionist controversies, I focus on two pressing tasks.The first is a methodological inconsistency. Constructionist research is selective in its construction of reality, yet its epistemic standpoint itself is placed out side its own methodological principles. The other is that the more strictly constructionists elaborate their methodology, the more they exclude important factors which also contribute to the organization of social problems. Radical constructivism's perspective draws attention to self-referential concepts and arguments related to mutual interdependence between the observer and the observed. From this point of view, we can comprehend only after we construct cognition on the basis of individual standards, which Luhmann called "distinction". Although "distinction" is an essential element of observation, observers cannot distinguish their own distinctions during observations. They would require yet another distinction to do that. Therefore, radical constructivism says, distinction is a "blind spot" for observers themselves. Nevertheless, it's still possible to observe others' latent distinctions or latent social relationships by means of one's own blind spot. Employing the framework of radical constructivism, we can accommodate multiple realities which cannot be reduced to a single definition, and we can comprehend a wide range of social constellations. By adopting these explanations, I handle the constructionist problems noted above. In conclusion, I present a method of constructivistic observation, which can complement to social constructionism in a consistent way, and indicate some pragmatic problems involved in the constructionistic view.