著者

渡辺 幹雄

出版者

山口大学

雑誌

山口經濟學雜誌 (ISSN:05131758)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.6, pp.737-763, 2006-03-31

著者

渡辺 幹雄

出版者

山口大学経済学会

雑誌

山口経済学雑誌 (ISSN:05131758)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.2, pp.249-260, 2009-07

著者

渡辺 幹雄

出版者

経済理論学会

雑誌

季刊経済理論 (ISSN:18825184)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.41-66, 2008

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In this paper, I'll show that Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) includes a hidden purpose, which is, the purpose to set out the framework of some kind of liberal communism. First, I make clear the failure of his 'moral geometry' and its ideological character. Second, I situate his concept of justice in the history of it. According to this, it turns out that his theory of justice can not be the universal and neutral moral science, but presupposes certain ideology from the beginning. Rawlsian justice does include some communistic aspects ex ante. In section 3, I discuss the distinctiveness of his theory in view of what is called 'a fixed point of our moral judgments.' It is a fundamentalistic foundation of his theory of justice, from which his principles of justice, especially the difference principle, are derived indeed. The original position and veil of ignorance are all the device to disguise that fact. Next, I argue that Rawls intentionally neglects a controversial theme, id est, 'Work-Ownership Thesis.' Despite the fact that Work-Ownership Thesis is a widely accepted belief, he has never discussed it. It's because that thesis sharply conflicts with the fixed point he exposes, and so, its acceptance would make it impossible for him to derive the difference principle. Furthermore, a simple neglect of the thesis means that the difference principle is a highly communistic principle. For it is only in the highly achieved communistic society that the thesis can be perfectly neglected. In section 5, I prove that the difference principle thus derived is both irrational and unreasonable. This is explained as the result of making one fixed point of our moral judgments absolute, and so losing the balance with some other fixed points that Rawls doesn't take up. Upon preceding arguments, in the last section 6, I conclude that it is very dangerous for one to make his favorite moral judgments absolute without thinking much of other ones. His judgments as such are just his own personal judgments, or indeed prejudices, that he expects his readers to accept, and the lack of balance will lead to a political disaster.

著者

渡辺 幹雄

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, pp.141-147, 2001-10-30 (Released:2008-11-17)

参考文献数

12

著者

渡辺 幹雄

出版者

山口大学経済学会

雑誌

山口経済学雑誌 = Yamaguchi journal of economics, business administrations & laws (ISSN:05131758)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3, pp.119-142, 2019-11