著者

石川 誠人

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.148, pp.118-132,L15, 2007-03-08 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it examines Nationalist's attempts to implement the 1962 “Returning to the Mainland” plan. Secondly, it considers the Kennedy administration's response to this plan.After having retreated to Taiwan, Nationalist China placed the highest priority of the national policy on “Returning to the Mainland”. But the United States, the major benefactor of the Nationalists, tried to avoid an armed clash developed between Taipei and Beijing, and consistently restrained the Nationalists from invading mainland China. Following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U. S. and the Nationalist China exchanged notes in which Taipei, under Washington's pressure, agreed to withhold military action without holding prior consultation. Furthermore, at the time of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his “Returning to the Mainland” ambition. As a result, in an October 1958 joint communiqué' Chiang promised that the “principal means” of regaining the mainland would “not (be) the use of force”. Yet, the Nationalists still continued to pursue the policy of reconquering the mainland.The Nationalists envisioned themselves accomplishing its mission through provoking a “revolution” in the mainland before initiating the invasion. In 1961, Chiang, judging that the post-“Great Leap Forward”-chaos in China, along with the Sino-Soviet dispute, had generated widespread anti-communist sentiments, ordered the military to prepare for an offensive campaign. In the following year, he requested Kennedy's blessing for this plan.While the Kennedy administration had no intention of consenting to Chiang's demands, it could not afford to let their already strained relations deteriorate further. Therefore, rather than offering a clear reply, the administration partially satisfied Taipei's desire by allowing the Taipei government to carry out small scale “probing operations”. At the same time, Washington monitored Taipei's preparation for an invasion through taking an active part in the operation planning; it also pressed Taipei to reduce its military budget. Taipei yielded to the U. S. position because the two nations had agreed in 1960 to set a ceiling on the Nationalists' military spending. These measures kept the Nationalists from starting an offensive operation without impairing the relationship with the U. S.. Only after their enthusiasm for “Returning to the Mainland” faded, did the Kennedy administration inform Taipei of its opposition to conducting an invasion under the current circumstances.Still the Kennedy administration's attitude toward the Nationalist's aspirations for “Returning to the Mainland” remained ambiguous. Kennedy never announced that such an operation would not be accepted in the future. It was not until Lyndon B. Johnson took office that a clear statement denying U. S. support for regaining the mainland was finally issued.