著者

松本 繁一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.60, pp.111-131,L6, 1978-10-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

47

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In terms of Japan's foreign policy, economic assistance to the developing countries has been very important recently. This indicates that the stability and development of the world economy, and North-South problem are becoming the major issues to urgently be solved in the world politics.The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the politico-economic implications of Japan's foreign aid in the post-war internal politics, (2) the relevance of Japan's economic aid to the increasing relations with neighboring country, (3) social changes in Southeast Asia and impacts of foreign assistance on the local community, and finally to suggest (4) a new direction of the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan.Japan's Conservative Government in post-war era has made use of the economic power as a diplomatic weapon and has practiced a realistic “Cold-War Diplomacy” following the United States' global policy until Nixon's visit to China in early 1972.However, such a diplomatic style as taken by the Conservatives was compelled to change because of U. S. -China summit and the ceasefire of Vietnam war. In particular, non-socialist Southeast Asian nations are strengthening stance to the big powers. Japan's development assistance has variously influenced on the indigenous economy and community in Southeast Asia. Some effects of Japanese aid to Southeast Asia are recognized in terms of the national development, but the sphere of contribution has been extremely limited.Because foreign capital and technology tended to flow into the power elites rather than grass-roots. The Western aid has failed to lessen the disparity between the rural and urban areas, and to improve the unequal income distribution between the landlord and the peasant. Gaps between the upper-class and the lower-class are claimed to widen more than before.The author concludes that Japanese assistance in the future should prefer (1) grant to loan, (2) rural development to industrial development, and should try to raise (3) the standard of living of the poorest people and their welfare as well as small farmers'. It depends on both training of uar younger generation for overseas activities and administrative reform for external economic cooperation whether Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia could be successful or not.

著者

石井 修

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.100, pp.35-53,L8, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The major thesis of this article is that the year 1955 marked a watershed in the history of the Cold War, in a sense that by then a fundamental, qualitative change had taken place, and that it set the tone for the future Cold War.By 1955, not only the “easing of tension” but also several changes in the nature of the East-West contest had become discernible. These changes were: (1) relative stability in Europe—the major battleground in the Cold War and also, to a much lesser extent, though, in Asia; (2) a growing awareness on the part of the leaders in Washington, London, and Moscow of the massive destructiveness of a nuclear conflagration, which had made them extremely cautious in their behavior, especially in Europe; and therefore, (3) the super-power rivalry shifting from the major battleground in Europe to the risk-free “Third World”, hence the globalization of the Cold War. Accordingly, the Cold War hereafter took on more of the characteristic of economic and psychological warfare and covert operations.The above-mentioned changes resulted from: (1) the congealment of the two “security spheres” in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, on a global scale; (2) the emergence of thermonuclear weapons, making actual war unbearably costly and difficult.This article basically supports the bipolar stability theory, and yet it contends that bipolarity alone would not guarantee stability, and stresses the “soft, ” human, and psychological aspect of the leadership on both sides.

著者

渡邊 啓貴

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_1-13, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

24

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This special issue focuses on research in the field of security and strategic culture in international relations.The first point in creating this issue is the concepts stated in the title and the need to address it. The approach of elucidating the nature of foreign policy decision-making process from the perspective of security and strategic culture hasn't yet been established in Japan. In particular there is a paucity of conceptual debate. Hence, the primary objective of compiling this special issue is to mark the beginning of research in this field in Japan.The second point is the historical timeline of security and strategic culture studies. Is it possible to explain the relationship between cultural studies and actual strategic diplomatic choices and behavior? It is evident from the existing research that this question is difficult to verify. However this does not mean that cultural studies in this field are not required. The importance of cultural approaches involving values and ideals has steadily increased in the Post Cold War era. While the cultural approach is not a necessary and sufficient condition for strategic diplomatic choices and behavior, its significance as necessary condition is undeniable. Despite that, there is hardly any full-fledged research in Japan in this field.Given the above context, this special issue is an attempt to shed light on the trends in research and interests in the field of security and strategic culture in Japan. A majority of the arguments in this issue are aimed at revealing diplomatic behavior that stems from history, culture and values. This can be thought of as a result of progress in the field of area studies. This issue contains examples from the United States, China, Eastern Europe and England. The next argument is a case study of strategic culture which looks into the influence strategic culture has on leaders. You find papers on Iran and England, mainly the Tony Blair dministration. The third argument focuses on the changes in values and world view among the citizens brought about by the changes in the global environment in the Post Cold War era. You find is some discussions of changes in Germany and France from a cultural and value perspective. Lastly this issue also features a paper characterized by a comparative study in attitudes towards intelligence in England and the United States and discussing the position of Japan within the above framework.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

著者

信夫 清三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1974, no.50, pp.147-153, 1974-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

村井 友秀

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.108, pp.55-68,L9, 1995-03-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.

著者

久保田 貫一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.29, pp.107-149, 1965-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

浅野 亮

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_27-41, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

8

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Main propose of this paper is to analyze the strategic culture of China. Advocates of thesis of strategic culture, both in China and Western countries, persistently claim that China has uniquely non-belligerent strategic culture which has been formulated in its long history, and that China firmly maintains its pacifistic character no matter how China's security environment becomes deteriorated.They persistently contend that military thought of Sunzi, a prominent strategic thinker in ancient China, is a humanitarian pacifist, ant that modern China as well as ancient China is essentially a peace-loving country because modern China also employs Sunzi's traditional non-aggressive military thought.However, this argument is fundamentally misleading because tremendous number of sentences and expressions of Sunzi cited in China's classical and modern documents and speeches on military strategy does not necessarily reflect reconciliatory tendency of China's actual strategic behavior. Almost no academic study on China's strategic culture could prove that China has consistently employed a pacifistic strategic behavior in its history. Most of researchers on this field have failed to show a significant positive causal relationship between China's peace-loving rhetoric and its actual behavior.Likewise, even though ancient Sunzi also stresses the imperative importance of coherent and comprehensive grand strategy which not only comprises military but also extensively covers political, diplomatic, psychological and economic factors, it does not automatically mean that China has almost always maintained a farsighted and coherent grand strategy.Academic studies on major warfare and diplomatic negotiations among the major countries during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period usually show that the main reason why Sunzi emphasized the need of minimal exertion of military force and coherent grand strategy was mainly because he intended to reduce the huge cost of actual battle thus avoiding an unexpected protract of armed conflicts; otherwise his country would be suffered by an unfavorable risk of diplomatic and military intervention by other hostile countries.Idealizing of Sunzi in Western countries has been endorsed when some leading military analysts and politicians such as Hart and Weinberger criticized the existing Western military strategy and thinking, with stressing a sharp contrast between the reality of political and military institutions and idea of Sunzi, in order to emphasize the necessity of promoting a radical reform of existing political and military institutions.In China of the 21st century, China's major strategic thinkers utilize Sunzi to convince the mainstream of China's public opinion to accept their blueprint of increasing China's international role in a prudent, patient and tightly self-restrained manner without carelessly activating a devastating confrontation/crisis with the existing powerful hegemonic countries, while some belligerent Chinese claim emotionally to accelerate the pace of increasing China's international influence and to employ a more coercive approach to challenge the “iniquitous order of international ancien regime dominated by the United States.”

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_17-33, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

89

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The aim of this article is to examine the role of Japanese diplomacy in bringing cooperative relationship among oil-consumers, and how it led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 after the First Oil Crisis (FOC). The foundation of the IEA has an epoch-making significance in itself, as this institution provided a platform in which long-term policy cooperation among oil consumers could be designed and implemented. The IEA obligates signatory states to stockpile a designated certain amount of oil reserves, and it also specifies the Oil Emergency Sharing System in the agreement. This represents an effort for advanced countries seeking cooperation while the postwar international economic order was undergoing to serious changes.Most works on Japanese diplomacy dealing with the FOC period have tended to focus on Japan's stance toward the Middle East. They generally emphasize highlight the anxiety within the government to secure a stable supply of oil as the principal reason for Japan eventually swinging toward pro-Arab policy. However, such narratives do not provide us with a whole picture, since the FOC was not only brought by Arab oil embargo. If we were to fully grasp the underlying cause of Japan's policy behavior in the FOC, we must first take into account a structural change in the international oil market since the late 1960s resulting from the strengthening of oil-producers. In the same vein, it is equally crucial to analyze how the oil consumers in general responded to the oil producers united under the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).After the FOC, cooperation among oil consumer states intensified with Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, and Japan was an active participant during the process. In fact, the Japanese government was the first to announce its intention to participate in the conference. It also actively took part in Energy Coordination Group (ECG) following the Washington Energy Conference, and facilitated ECG in playing a moderating role between Great Britain and West Germany.Japan actively participated in these institutional frameworks since the policymakers shared two perceptions. The first is the recognition that the oil consumers, in order to decrease their vulnerability in oil supply, must unite. The second perception is that it is important for Japan to support the maintenance of a liberal international economic order which would ensure the stable flow of oil supplies. Seen from this context, the Japanese participation in the establishment of the IEA from the first stage is a drastic deviation from past diplomatic practice of passively joining already-existing international organizations. Although Japan's role in G7 for facilitating international cooperation among advanced countries is better known, it is significant to notice that Japan's early participation in establishing cooperative framework in the aftermath of the FOC is the true turning point.

著者

奥田 泰広

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_130-143, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

71

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This paper examines the ‘strategic culture’ of Britain, which gives importance to external intelligence activities prior to the formulation of the foreign policy. ‘Intelligence’ is sometimes narrowly defined as the activity of collecting information covertly. However, in this paper, the word ‘intelligence’ has a broader definition; it is defined as the state's activity to investigate the international environment. In history, some countries formed their foreign policies without considering the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ and subsequently encountered defeat in wars. Britain has managed to avoid serious defeats in wars owing to its intelligence-oriented strategic culture.Such a feature can be seen in the case of Britain's intelligence activity prior to the First Word War. From the late nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War, Britain conducted some important activities to investigate the international environment. While adversary relationships were hardening within Europe, the Admiralty and War Offices tried to comprehend the entire picture of the international crisis and began to clarify the ‘emergency powers’ of the government. In addition, in the process of doing so, both offices decided to reinforce their own intelligence services. Furthermore, concerns regarding both offices were shared by the higher stratum of the strategic decision-making authority—the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) —. Further, the establishment of a new intelligence service—Secret Service Bureau—was determined by the CID in 1909; this service later became MI5 and SIS as we know them today.Subsequently, in 1911, the ‘War Book’ was compiled with the cooperation of many departments such as the Foreign, Admiralty, and War Offices. Although the War Book did not describe detailed plans for the war, Britain could avoid internal confusions at the onset of the war owing to the War Book. The important point here is that the officials of the Naval and Military intelligence departments attended the meeting for the compilation of the War Book held among the officials from the other offices of the government. The War Book can be regarded as representative of the intelligenceoriented strategic culture of Britain.From a common perspective, the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ should be highly valued before making any decision. However, in reality, many countries have not conducted such policy-related activities. This paper considers the activities of the British intelligence prior to the First World War as a salient example of an ‘intelligence-oriented strategic culture’ and discusses this case in depth.

著者

藤村 道生

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.58, pp.130-136, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

田中 明彦

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.82, pp.94-115,L10, 1986-05-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

80

被引用文献数

1

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Recent theoretical efforts in international relations focus increasingly on building grand and dynamic theories with major emphasis on cycles in addition to trends. This essay is to critically review an important part of these recent efforts: long cycles both in economic sphere as well as in political-military sphere and their linkages. First, recent researches in the Kondratieff waves are briefly summarized as those emphasizing on (a) technological innovations, (b) capital accumulation, and (c) resource abundance and scarcity. Second, George Modelski's “long cycles” theory is examined with particular emphasis on how it treats economic-political linkages. Third, a brief summary of the Wallersteinian “world-system” approach is given. How it relates long cycles in economics (the Kondratieffs) with the rises and declines of hegemony is the case in point. I summarize Bousquet's attempts to critically examine Wallerstein and others' early effort and to reconstruct it focusing on technological innovations. I suggest that current efforts in long cycles both in economic and political spheres have strong similarities with such early works by Toynbee and Akamatsu in the 1930s and 1940s. Recent efforts have clear advantages in research environment both in terms of increase of increase of empirical data and availability of computers, however. I argue, however, that more conceptual clarity and sophistication is necessary if the current efforts are to go beyond a simple revival of the research a half century ago.

著者

小林 良樹

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_57-71, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

54

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The objective of this article is to examine the influence of cultural factors on systems of democratic control over the intelligence communities of different countries and the light this can shed on the road ahead as Japan develops its own oversight mechanisms.The intelligence communities of different countries are configured in different forms. In the US, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the IC, while in the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee which is a part of the Cabinet Office is responsible for directing the IC. This variation reflects not only the different presidential and parliamentary political systems but also the different organizational cultures of intelligence agencies in Britain and the US. For instance, the prevailing characteristics of organizational culture in the British IC are collegiality and collaboration. In the US, divisionism and bureaucracy are predominant. These cultural differences are rooted in the different political, historical and social environments unique to each country.Systems for democratic control of the ICs also vary in different countries. In the US, congressional committees specialized in intelligence matters in both chambers of Congress exercise oversight and have strong authority over the IC. Although in the UK the Intelligence and Security Committee which directly reports to the Prime Minister is responsible for oversight of the IC, it exercises comparatively moderate control over the IC. Such differences are a reflection of the cultural differences between each country. The US system of oversight by powerful congressional committees reflects the high levels of public distrust in the IC, the result of a litany of intelligence-related scandals. This system also reflects the history of serious power struggles between Congress and the executive. In the UK, however, public trust in the IC, and collaboration between the executive branch and Parliament, has historically been greater than in the US.Currently, Japan has no organization dedicated to democratic oversight of its intelligence organs. If Japan expands the scope of its intelligence activities, it will be necessary to develop new and enhance existing mechanisms for democratic control. In doing so it will be vital to ensure that they take account of the cultural factors at play in Japanese society rather than to transplant the systems of control in place in foreign countries which reflect their different cultural milieu.The Japanese cultural factors that systems of control in other countries do not take account of are, firstly, a strong public distrust of intelligence activities, and secondly strong public desire to maintain the political neutrality of intelligence organizations. These cultural characteristics can be attributed to Japan's historical experiences during the Second World War, and are very different from circumstances in other countries. The existing Independent Regulatory Commission system could be a possible foundation on which to build a uniquely Japanese system for democratic oversight of the nation's intelligence activities.

著者

北川 誠一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.138, pp.142-156,L13, 2004-09-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

65

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Between 1999 and 2004, the issue about Chechen and foreign fighters in and around the Pankisi Valley in one of the districts of the Eastern Georgia was a focus of political negotiations in the Georgia-Russia, Gerogia-USA, then Russia-USA relations.The majority of the residents of the valley are the Chechens and the Ingushes, who are called as the Kists there. Using historical and ethnographic literatures by Margoshivili, Shavkhelishvili and others which describe the immigration process of the Chechens and the Ingushes to the Pankisi Valley in the 19th century, this paper underlines the importance of traditional and national homogeneity between the Chechens and the Kists, which keeps their mutual relation and fellow feeling in the both sides of the Great Caucasus. As the Kists had no right as ethnic minority in the Soviet era, they could have merged into the Georgian masses, if they had no relation with the Chechno-Ingush Republic and the people living there. This is how the valley still remains as a semi-independent enclave of Chechnia within Georgia.The majority of the inhabitants of the valley are Sunni Muslims. Then the Pankisi Valley has a strategic value, as one of the Sunnite outputs from the Chechen and Daghestan into the South Caucasus. It is also witnessed there the re-islamization during and after the Perestroika era, the coming of the foreign missionaries and the rising in the popularity of the so called the Wahhabits among the local people.Even after the violent death of a Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and the end of the War against the Terrorism in Georgia, the Kists remain as the Chechens and their majority are the Muslims. Excepting the Kists, there are the Georgian Pshavs, the Tushes and the Ossets in the valley. Any ethnic or confessional clash would be reflected in a wilder arena. With potential cause of discontents to the Georgian government, the strategic importance of the valley in the process of integrity of Georgia's ethnics and regions into one single civil society is still existing, as well as in the regional security of the South Caucasus as a whole.

著者

三浦 聡

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.145, pp.162-165, 2006-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

三宅 正樹

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.47, pp.33-74, 1972-12-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

81

著者

関 誠

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_12-154_28, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

104

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In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.

著者

伊豆見 元 平岩 俊司

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.106, pp.149-161,L15, 1994-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

29

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the withdrawal of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) which was completed in 1958 and the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base. When compared with the U. S. forces still stationed in South Korea, the CPVA withdrawal progressed smoothly upon Chinese-North Korean agreement. The CPVA withdrawal was implemented in two stage, in 1954-1955 and 1958, and suspended in 1956-1957. Why suspended in 1956-1957? According to the Chinese explanation, it was suspended upon Chinese-North Korean agreement with the shakeup within the socialist camp after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the background. However, 1956 and 1957 was a period in which Kim Il Sung established his own power base by purgeing the Chinese and Soviet factions within North Korea. In 1956, China suspended the withdrawal of CPVA to pressure Kim Il Sung who trying to eliminate the Chinese faction within North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has almost completed purging the main members of the Chinese faction by the end of 1957. In 1958, China who judged that the revival of the Chinese faction was difficult, completely withdrew the CPVA to maintain good relations with North Korea. Afterwards, Kim Il Sung continued his all-out purge of the Chinese faction and established his power base. Therefore, the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base and the timing of the CPVA withdrawal was closely connected. Afterwards, North Korea and China maintained good relations, but it was a delicate relationship between Kim Il Sung and China in the beginning.

著者

臼井 勝美 安岡 昭男 池井 優 波多野 澄雄 増田 弘 宇野 重昭 横山 宏章 中見 立夫 植田 隆子 佐々木 雄太 油井 大三郎 福田 茂夫 草間 秀三郎 佐藤 信一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1979, no.61-62, pp.2-107,L4, 1979-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

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The Japan Association of International Relations, which was established in 1956, considers one of its main objectives to contribute to the progress of the study of the history of international relations, in paticular to research into the history of Japanese diplomacy. Japan's Road to the Pacific War is a representative example of what can be done by the joint endeavour of this association.We would like to point out, as a specific characteristics of recent research on the history of international relations, firstly, a tendency to remove the limitations which are encountered by a study of so called “diplomatic history” in isolation from everything else.We would like to examine the change from the move traditional approaches, which have emphasized only bilateral or multilateral relations between states, to the more modern, original approaches. The interest of researchers will be to cover a wide area of historical phenomena, such as the political decision-making process, public opinion, economic pressure groups and the process of communication amongst other things.The second characteristic has been the flowering of collaborative reserch between Japanese and foreign scholars, and we are now receiving the excellent results of their labours. For instance, the conference at Lake Kawaguchi in 1969, the result of which was, “The history of Japanese-American Relations, 1931-41” is a representative example of this trend. However, it is regrettable that the participants in these collaborative research projects have been mainly limited to Japanese and American scholars. It is to be hoped that, in future, there will be further opportunities for collaborative research and conferences not only with American scholars, but also with scholars from China, England, Korea, the Soviet Union and South East Asia.We hope the future tendency of research will be for the themes of the role and limitation of the individual in international affairs, as well as the problem of individual responsibility, to become the common interest of scholars.We hope that, in future, the increasing variety of scholarship will not become merely scattered and diffused.

著者

末内 啓子

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.101, pp.90-105,L10, 1992-10-24 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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Studies of International Relations have been undergoing debates for some time. Contrasting views of international relations have resulted in debates, such as those between idealists and realists over norms and objectivity, and between traditionalists and behavioralists over history via-a-vis science. Recently, the influence of “critical theory, ” which examines relations between a theory and its norms, challenges the mainstream of International Relations, which has pretended to separate itself from values. For instance, recent studies by Robert Cox, R. B. J. Walker, Richard K. Ashley, and Mark Hoffman assert that any theory in the field of International Relations is bound to values and history. These studies try to examine the assumptions and the nature of theories in International Relations.Under the influence of the recent development of studying the relations between norms and theory in International Relations, this paper analyzes state-centric models in the tradition of realism (i. e. H. J. Morgenthau) and neorealism (i. e. Robert O. Keohane, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Robert Gilpin). This analysis encompasses questions such as: what are the theorists' views of international relations? What are the normative values underlining their views? How are these explanations and values related to each other in each theory?The state has been seen as the most significant actor in the mainstream of International Relations, including realism which sees international relations as a competition among states, and neorealism which recognizes the increasing importance of international economic issues and international regimes during the era of declining U. S. hegemony. The state continues to be described as a rational actor, and at the same time as an indispensable actor in international relations. Both realism and neorealism are based on their assumptions of the separation between theory and norm and are engaged in their pursuits of science. As natural scientists pursue the control of nature, realists and neorealists consider that their science of international relations will provide practical tools to create order and stability out of international relations, which are seen as originally anarchic.This examination argues that despite their pretension to value-neutrality, objectivity, scientific outlook, and rationality, the mainstream studies in International Relations are heavily grounded in values. The separation of values and methods create a norm of analytical supremacy and scientific rationality which give the illusion of control over international relations. Realism and neorealism also eliminate challenges to themselves by asserting their “scientific” legitimacy. Accordingly, the dominance of state-centric models in realism and neorealism resulted in their peculiar structure of logic and justification, leaving the field undeveloped in terms of critical challenges to these approaches.Therefore, this analysis concludes that it is essential to examine the nature of relations between theory and norms within theories. This attempt encourages the examination of these models by challenging their premises. This approach would not immediately invent an “alternative” theory; yet, it is a significant beginning to the reassessment of the state of the field and the consideration of theoretical alternatives. Accordingly, it is essential to create an analytical dialogue with these theories and to examine the textures of theories which weave together norms, values, and ideas within a historical context.