著者
松本 繁一
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1978, no.60, pp.111-131,L6, 1978-10-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
47

In terms of Japan's foreign policy, economic assistance to the developing countries has been very important recently. This indicates that the stability and development of the world economy, and North-South problem are becoming the major issues to urgently be solved in the world politics.The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the politico-economic implications of Japan's foreign aid in the post-war internal politics, (2) the relevance of Japan's economic aid to the increasing relations with neighboring country, (3) social changes in Southeast Asia and impacts of foreign assistance on the local community, and finally to suggest (4) a new direction of the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan.Japan's Conservative Government in post-war era has made use of the economic power as a diplomatic weapon and has practiced a realistic “Cold-War Diplomacy” following the United States' global policy until Nixon's visit to China in early 1972.However, such a diplomatic style as taken by the Conservatives was compelled to change because of U. S. -China summit and the ceasefire of Vietnam war. In particular, non-socialist Southeast Asian nations are strengthening stance to the big powers. Japan's development assistance has variously influenced on the indigenous economy and community in Southeast Asia. Some effects of Japanese aid to Southeast Asia are recognized in terms of the national development, but the sphere of contribution has been extremely limited.Because foreign capital and technology tended to flow into the power elites rather than grass-roots. The Western aid has failed to lessen the disparity between the rural and urban areas, and to improve the unequal income distribution between the landlord and the peasant. Gaps between the upper-class and the lower-class are claimed to widen more than before.The author concludes that Japanese assistance in the future should prefer (1) grant to loan, (2) rural development to industrial development, and should try to raise (3) the standard of living of the poorest people and their welfare as well as small farmers'. It depends on both training of uar younger generation for overseas activities and administrative reform for external economic cooperation whether Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia could be successful or not.
著者
井上 正也
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.151, pp.36-53,L7, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
77

On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter infiltration” against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter infiltration” plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations it Mainland China.This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRC. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRC started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRC interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to use Japanese agents. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U. S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U. S. to set up a “high command” on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.
著者
大木 毅
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.91, pp.101-119,L11, 1989-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
83

In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from
著者
渡邊 啓貴
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_1-13, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
24

This special issue focuses on research in the field of security and strategic culture in international relations.The first point in creating this issue is the concepts stated in the title and the need to address it. The approach of elucidating the nature of foreign policy decision-making process from the perspective of security and strategic culture hasn't yet been established in Japan. In particular there is a paucity of conceptual debate. Hence, the primary objective of compiling this special issue is to mark the beginning of research in this field in Japan.The second point is the historical timeline of security and strategic culture studies. Is it possible to explain the relationship between cultural studies and actual strategic diplomatic choices and behavior? It is evident from the existing research that this question is difficult to verify. However this does not mean that cultural studies in this field are not required. The importance of cultural approaches involving values and ideals has steadily increased in the Post Cold War era. While the cultural approach is not a necessary and sufficient condition for strategic diplomatic choices and behavior, its significance as necessary condition is undeniable. Despite that, there is hardly any full-fledged research in Japan in this field.Given the above context, this special issue is an attempt to shed light on the trends in research and interests in the field of security and strategic culture in Japan. A majority of the arguments in this issue are aimed at revealing diplomatic behavior that stems from history, culture and values. This can be thought of as a result of progress in the field of area studies. This issue contains examples from the United States, China, Eastern Europe and England. The next argument is a case study of strategic culture which looks into the influence strategic culture has on leaders. You find papers on Iran and England, mainly the Tony Blair dministration. The third argument focuses on the changes in values and world view among the citizens brought about by the changes in the global environment in the Post Cold War era. You find is some discussions of changes in Germany and France from a cultural and value perspective. Lastly this issue also features a paper characterized by a comparative study in attitudes towards intelligence in England and the United States and discussing the position of Japan within the above framework.
著者
石井 修
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1992, no.100, pp.35-53,L8, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
56

The major thesis of this article is that the year 1955 marked a watershed in the history of the Cold War, in a sense that by then a fundamental, qualitative change had taken place, and that it set the tone for the future Cold War.By 1955, not only the “easing of tension” but also several changes in the nature of the East-West contest had become discernible. These changes were: (1) relative stability in Europe—the major battleground in the Cold War and also, to a much lesser extent, though, in Asia; (2) a growing awareness on the part of the leaders in Washington, London, and Moscow of the massive destructiveness of a nuclear conflagration, which had made them extremely cautious in their behavior, especially in Europe; and therefore, (3) the super-power rivalry shifting from the major battleground in Europe to the risk-free “Third World”, hence the globalization of the Cold War. Accordingly, the Cold War hereafter took on more of the characteristic of economic and psychological warfare and covert operations.The above-mentioned changes resulted from: (1) the congealment of the two “security spheres” in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, on a global scale; (2) the emergence of thermonuclear weapons, making actual war unbearably costly and difficult.This article basically supports the bipolar stability theory, and yet it contends that bipolarity alone would not guarantee stability, and stresses the “soft, ” human, and psychological aspect of the leadership on both sides.
著者
村井 友秀
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.108, pp.55-68,L9, 1995-03-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
77

In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.
著者
波多野 澄雄
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
57

Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.
著者
渡辺 昭夫
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1992, no.100, pp.1-15,L5, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
14

To commemorate the 100th issue of International Relations, the editorial board decided to compile a special volume on the Cold War and After: Japanese Perspectives.The 14 articles contained in this volume are for the sake of convenience divided into three groups: theory, history and prospects. The article by Yoshinobu Yamamoto gives an overview of the evolutions of international relations theories during the past four decades which, he argues, can be related to the historical developments of international relations in the real world. Since the latter were to an important degree shaped by the Cold War, a dominant paradigm altered from time to time, reflecting the sequence of events in the East-West relations. After tracing the paradigmatic development from the intitial stage of realist domination through the rise of various versions of liberalism during the 1970's to the resurgence of neo-realism in the more recent times, Yamamoto forsees the coming of an age of liberalist-led integration of international theories following the end of the Cold War.This basically sanguine prospect shown by Yamamoto is in line with one of the major theses dealt with by various writers who contributed to this volume. Influenced by John Gaddis' book The Long Peace, they are concerned with the reasons for the continuation of peace between the two superpowers during the Cold War era. Without necessarily denying the idea that such systemic and objective factors as bipolarity and nuclear deterrence were conducive to the long peace, some of the writers for this volume rather emphasized the learning capacity of the policy-makers of the both superpowers as an explanatory factor (Anami, Umemoto and Ishii). To some if not all, the long peace in the Cold War era was part of the longer trend in international relations, i. e. the trend towards no war among the major powers. The lessons of the two World Wars in the 20th century brought about attitudinal change regardiag the issue of war and peace, signs of which were discernible even in the behaviours of the Soviet and American leaders despite their Cold War rhetoric. Democracy is not necessarily regarded as a prerequisite for international peace. In fact, examining the thought of George Kennan on the problems of democracy, one of the contributors (Terachi) casts doubts on the thesis that democracy is by nature conducive to international peace.If one takes a narrow definition of the Cold War with a focus on Soviet-American relations or East-West relations in Europe, the long peace thesis seems largely acceptable, although his or her explanation may differ from the one offered in the above. A more fundamental objection will be raised, however, by those who adhere to the idea that the ‘hot wars’ outside Europe were the essential ingredient of the Cold War. In fact this was the central theme of The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, a volume edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye fifteen years ago. Wit-nessed two hot wars in Korea and Indochina during their life time, many contemporary Japanese (and probably other Asian) historians would choose this broader definition of the Cold War. This thesis is worth remebering, although, apart from a brief reference by Ishii, it was not fully discussed in the present volume. This is so particularly because the relative weight of the Cold War in the entire history of the post WW II era differs from one region to another. Hece the difference in the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the regional international affairs in the years to come, which is the topic of the the third section of the present volume.Koizumi (who deals with the present and future in the latter half of her article) and Ueta are concered with post-Cold War Europe, whereas all others are either with Asia/Pacific (Sakanaka, Kurata, Tamaki, Hara and Purrington) or with more broad themes (Oizumi and Takehiko Yamamoto).
著者
浅野 亮
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_27-41, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
8

Main propose of this paper is to analyze the strategic culture of China. Advocates of thesis of strategic culture, both in China and Western countries, persistently claim that China has uniquely non-belligerent strategic culture which has been formulated in its long history, and that China firmly maintains its pacifistic character no matter how China's security environment becomes deteriorated.They persistently contend that military thought of Sunzi, a prominent strategic thinker in ancient China, is a humanitarian pacifist, ant that modern China as well as ancient China is essentially a peace-loving country because modern China also employs Sunzi's traditional non-aggressive military thought.However, this argument is fundamentally misleading because tremendous number of sentences and expressions of Sunzi cited in China's classical and modern documents and speeches on military strategy does not necessarily reflect reconciliatory tendency of China's actual strategic behavior. Almost no academic study on China's strategic culture could prove that China has consistently employed a pacifistic strategic behavior in its history. Most of researchers on this field have failed to show a significant positive causal relationship between China's peace-loving rhetoric and its actual behavior.Likewise, even though ancient Sunzi also stresses the imperative importance of coherent and comprehensive grand strategy which not only comprises military but also extensively covers political, diplomatic, psychological and economic factors, it does not automatically mean that China has almost always maintained a farsighted and coherent grand strategy.Academic studies on major warfare and diplomatic negotiations among the major countries during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period usually show that the main reason why Sunzi emphasized the need of minimal exertion of military force and coherent grand strategy was mainly because he intended to reduce the huge cost of actual battle thus avoiding an unexpected protract of armed conflicts; otherwise his country would be suffered by an unfavorable risk of diplomatic and military intervention by other hostile countries.Idealizing of Sunzi in Western countries has been endorsed when some leading military analysts and politicians such as Hart and Weinberger criticized the existing Western military strategy and thinking, with stressing a sharp contrast between the reality of political and military institutions and idea of Sunzi, in order to emphasize the necessity of promoting a radical reform of existing political and military institutions.In China of the 21st century, China's major strategic thinkers utilize Sunzi to convince the mainstream of China's public opinion to accept their blueprint of increasing China's international role in a prudent, patient and tightly self-restrained manner without carelessly activating a devastating confrontation/crisis with the existing powerful hegemonic countries, while some belligerent Chinese claim emotionally to accelerate the pace of increasing China's international influence and to employ a more coercive approach to challenge the “iniquitous order of international ancien regime dominated by the United States.”
著者
白鳥 潤一郎
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_17-33, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)
参考文献数
89

The aim of this article is to examine the role of Japanese diplomacy in bringing cooperative relationship among oil-consumers, and how it led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 after the First Oil Crisis (FOC). The foundation of the IEA has an epoch-making significance in itself, as this institution provided a platform in which long-term policy cooperation among oil consumers could be designed and implemented. The IEA obligates signatory states to stockpile a designated certain amount of oil reserves, and it also specifies the Oil Emergency Sharing System in the agreement. This represents an effort for advanced countries seeking cooperation while the postwar international economic order was undergoing to serious changes.Most works on Japanese diplomacy dealing with the FOC period have tended to focus on Japan's stance toward the Middle East. They generally emphasize highlight the anxiety within the government to secure a stable supply of oil as the principal reason for Japan eventually swinging toward pro-Arab policy. However, such narratives do not provide us with a whole picture, since the FOC was not only brought by Arab oil embargo. If we were to fully grasp the underlying cause of Japan's policy behavior in the FOC, we must first take into account a structural change in the international oil market since the late 1960s resulting from the strengthening of oil-producers. In the same vein, it is equally crucial to analyze how the oil consumers in general responded to the oil producers united under the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).After the FOC, cooperation among oil consumer states intensified with Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, and Japan was an active participant during the process. In fact, the Japanese government was the first to announce its intention to participate in the conference. It also actively took part in Energy Coordination Group (ECG) following the Washington Energy Conference, and facilitated ECG in playing a moderating role between Great Britain and West Germany.Japan actively participated in these institutional frameworks since the policymakers shared two perceptions. The first is the recognition that the oil consumers, in order to decrease their vulnerability in oil supply, must unite. The second perception is that it is important for Japan to support the maintenance of a liberal international economic order which would ensure the stable flow of oil supplies. Seen from this context, the Japanese participation in the establishment of the IEA from the first stage is a drastic deviation from past diplomatic practice of passively joining already-existing international organizations. Although Japan's role in G7 for facilitating international cooperation among advanced countries is better known, it is significant to notice that Japan's early participation in establishing cooperative framework in the aftermath of the FOC is the true turning point.
著者
奥田 泰広
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_130-143, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
71

This paper examines the ‘strategic culture’ of Britain, which gives importance to external intelligence activities prior to the formulation of the foreign policy. ‘Intelligence’ is sometimes narrowly defined as the activity of collecting information covertly. However, in this paper, the word ‘intelligence’ has a broader definition; it is defined as the state's activity to investigate the international environment. In history, some countries formed their foreign policies without considering the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ and subsequently encountered defeat in wars. Britain has managed to avoid serious defeats in wars owing to its intelligence-oriented strategic culture.Such a feature can be seen in the case of Britain's intelligence activity prior to the First Word War. From the late nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War, Britain conducted some important activities to investigate the international environment. While adversary relationships were hardening within Europe, the Admiralty and War Offices tried to comprehend the entire picture of the international crisis and began to clarify the ‘emergency powers’ of the government. In addition, in the process of doing so, both offices decided to reinforce their own intelligence services. Furthermore, concerns regarding both offices were shared by the higher stratum of the strategic decision-making authority—the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) —. Further, the establishment of a new intelligence service—Secret Service Bureau—was determined by the CID in 1909; this service later became MI5 and SIS as we know them today.Subsequently, in 1911, the ‘War Book’ was compiled with the cooperation of many departments such as the Foreign, Admiralty, and War Offices. Although the War Book did not describe detailed plans for the war, Britain could avoid internal confusions at the onset of the war owing to the War Book. The important point here is that the officials of the Naval and Military intelligence departments attended the meeting for the compilation of the War Book held among the officials from the other offices of the government. The War Book can be regarded as representative of the intelligenceoriented strategic culture of Britain.From a common perspective, the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ should be highly valued before making any decision. However, in reality, many countries have not conducted such policy-related activities. This paper considers the activities of the British intelligence prior to the First World War as a salient example of an ‘intelligence-oriented strategic culture’ and discusses this case in depth.
著者
北川 誠一
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.138, pp.142-156,L13, 2004-09-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
65

Between 1999 and 2004, the issue about Chechen and foreign fighters in and around the Pankisi Valley in one of the districts of the Eastern Georgia was a focus of political negotiations in the Georgia-Russia, Gerogia-USA, then Russia-USA relations.The majority of the residents of the valley are the Chechens and the Ingushes, who are called as the Kists there. Using historical and ethnographic literatures by Margoshivili, Shavkhelishvili and others which describe the immigration process of the Chechens and the Ingushes to the Pankisi Valley in the 19th century, this paper underlines the importance of traditional and national homogeneity between the Chechens and the Kists, which keeps their mutual relation and fellow feeling in the both sides of the Great Caucasus. As the Kists had no right as ethnic minority in the Soviet era, they could have merged into the Georgian masses, if they had no relation with the Chechno-Ingush Republic and the people living there. This is how the valley still remains as a semi-independent enclave of Chechnia within Georgia.The majority of the inhabitants of the valley are Sunni Muslims. Then the Pankisi Valley has a strategic value, as one of the Sunnite outputs from the Chechen and Daghestan into the South Caucasus. It is also witnessed there the re-islamization during and after the Perestroika era, the coming of the foreign missionaries and the rising in the popularity of the so called the Wahhabits among the local people.Even after the violent death of a Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and the end of the War against the Terrorism in Georgia, the Kists remain as the Chechens and their majority are the Muslims. Excepting the Kists, there are the Georgian Pshavs, the Tushes and the Ossets in the valley. Any ethnic or confessional clash would be reflected in a wilder arena. With potential cause of discontents to the Georgian government, the strategic importance of the valley in the process of integrity of Georgia's ethnics and regions into one single civil society is still existing, as well as in the regional security of the South Caucasus as a whole.
著者
鈴木 陽一
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.144, pp.69-84,L12, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
57

In 1998, the Public Record Office released a top-secret file. The file contained Britain's 1945 war plans against Russia, her ally at the time. Just after the German surrender, Winston Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, instructed the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) to draw up war plans against Russia. This apparently contradicted the British policy towards the wartime grand alliance. Through reviewing these war plans and their background, this essay will re-examine Churchill's image as a wartime leader. In particular, it will consider the following questions: Why did Churchill enter the World War II? Why did he instruct war plans against Russia to be drawn up? Why did the planned war never eventuate? What was the implication of the failure of these plans?In May 1940, just after the German advance into the Low Countries, Churchill took the office of the Prime Minister. Despite this crisis, he decided to continue the war, calling for the New World to enter the war. It seemed, however, that Britain's dependence on America might trigger the dismemberment of her empire. Churchill, unlike conventional statesmen, envisioned a new world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. He believed that with common citizenship and the common use of military bases, Britain and America could work together. His vision was, however, obstructed by Russia's unexpected victory over Germany in 1941, which was considered to be a serious threat to the British Empire and Western civilization.To save his civilized world, Churchill instructed the JPS to make two war plans against Russia just after the German surrender. The first plan, “Operation Unthinkable, ” was an offensive war plan. The object of the plan was “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire.” The planned date for the opening of hostilities was 1 July 1945. The Allied powers were to count upon the use of German forces. However, the JPS concluded that UK-US numerical inferiority on land rendered even a limited and quick success doubtful, thus proving Churchill's surprise attack plan ultimately unthinkable.The second plan, retaining the codeword “Unthinkable, ” was a defensive one. Wearying after the pessimistic first report, Churchill asked the JPS to study how Britain could defend her islands against a possible Russian advance into France and the Low Countries. This time, they concluded that Russia, without rockets and other new weapons, would not develop into a serious threat to the security of Britain.Churchill was a statesman who fought for his ideal of a civilized world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. His war, however, spawned unexpected and disastrous results. Russia became an enemy of the Empire. The Cold War, an Anglo-American imperial war, became inevitable. Thorough inviting the Americans into her empire, and also decolonizing her empire, the British fought the war against communism. This became a basis for a new globalizing world order under America and her allies.
著者
添谷 芳秀
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.151, pp.1-17,L5, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
19

Postwar Japanese diplomacy has both benefited and suffered from the Yoshida Line of foreign policy, consisting of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty. This set of Yoshida's choices during the occupation period became the foundation of Japan's postwar economic recovery and eventually the rapid economic growth rendering Japan a world-class economic power. Deeply embedded in the Yoshida Line, however, was the structure of “dependence” on the United States for economic growth as well as security protection. This in turn has often invited, rather inevitably, challenges from nationalism attacking the lack of “autonomy” or “independence” of postwar Japan.This structural problem was also a source of criticism by external countries, especially the United States, for Japanese inaction or “free-riding, ” and the lack of a strategy. As Japan grew into an economic power and the negative views became prevalent concomitantly, some analysts rebuffed the criticism by arguing that the Yoshida's commitment to “light armament, economic growth, and the U. S. -Japan security ties” indeed constituted a strategy of postwar Japan. Simply put, the Yoshida Line was elevated to the Yoshida Doctrine.There were three types of discourse on the Yoshida Doctrine, which began to emerge since the end of the 1970s. One was to argue that the Yoshida Doctrine had been a viable strategy of postwar Japan, but that it would now need to be modified in a more proactive fashion. The second argument claimed that nationalistic challenges against the Yoshida Doctrine should be inevitable as Japan had recovered a sense of national pride, but that domestic political balance was still favorable to the supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Thirdly, it was contended that the Yoshida Doctrine was a strategic representation of Japan's political realism and should be retained as such particularly against the logic of military realism.The common denominator among the three was that the deep structure of “dependence” on the United States was taken for granted, or even assumed as the source of postwar Japan's successful strategy. This meant that the structural problem, susceptible to challenges by nationalism, was kept intact, which has now re-emerged as an old and new problem for Japan as it gropes for a new diplomacy, including possible revision of the peace constitution, in the 21st century.The articles in this volume traces the development of the Yoshida Line since the occupation period to the 1960s, when the deep structural problem was dodged, rather than rectified, in the evolutionary process of Japan's foreign policy making. There are three sets of propositions relevant for this period. Firstly, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had not successfully integrated his basic foreign policy with his Asian diplomacy, particularly toward China, demonstrating the lack of independent Asian policy on the part of postwar Japan. Secondly, close examinations of the origins of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty, as well as the origin of economycentered approach, reveals that the leaders, including Yoshida himself, did not expect that their choices should remain unchanged after the occupation period. Thirdly, this in turn calls for the scrutiny of Japanese diplomacy in the 1960s, when Japan grew into a global economic power precisely by putting a lid on the structural problem entrenched in the Yoshida Line.
著者
関 誠
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_12-154_28, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)
参考文献数
104

In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.