著者
篠塚 寛美
出版者
公益社団法人 日本心理学会
雑誌
心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.3, pp.163-172, 1997-08-28 (Released:2010-07-16)
参考文献数
35
被引用文献数
3

The experiment of this paper studied the role social orientation would play in double-dilemma situations. In a double-dilemma situation, social dilemmas exist both between and within groups; a cooperation choice at the within-groups level is considered a defection choice at the between-groups level, and vice versa. Using such a situation, whether “others” in other-orientedness are limited to those of the ingroup or include those of a competing group was examined. Each of 132 college students played both an ordinary social dilemma game and a doubledilemma game, with equivalent incentive structures. Subjects' social orientation was measured a few days after the experiment. Results indicated that other-oriented subjects thought only about ingroup members, and did not care much about the others. Furthermore, social orientation did not affect whether subjects acted similarly or differently for the two dilemma situations. Therefore, social orientation approach to intergroup conflicts apparently had its limitations.
著者
篠塚 寛美
出版者
公益社団法人 日本心理学会
雑誌
心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.63, no.6, pp.396-403, 1993-03-10 (Released:2010-07-16)
参考文献数
8
被引用文献数
3 3

Problems consisted of two categories of questions, of general knowledge and forecasting future events. Given each question, the subjects chose a more likely answer from the given two alternatives, rated their own confidence on the correctness of the choice, and then, assessed the hit-rate of the classmates. The major result is as follows. The difference between average confidence and average hit-rate was small, namely, calibration was good, for problems of both general knowledge and familiar future events. On the other hand, calibration was poor for problems of accidental future events. In other words, the more available knowledge, the better calibration is. In discussion we proposed “a model of retrieval and generation”, which could explain our results for the problems of general knowledge. Results for problems of future events suggest that the subjects possibly used a certain model to make their probability judgments. On the basis of our results and with our discussion, we found the phenomenon that people believe themselves to make mental judgments better than the average. We call the phenomenon “self-superiority phenomenon”.