著者

重永 哲也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.79-92, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

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In this critical notice, I point out that there are two problems for Ishiguro's interpretations of Leibniz. First, I argue that her response to Benson Mates in the defense of her interpretation of the principle of substitutivity sal va veritate as providing a criterion for the identity of concepts is not successful. Secondly, I explain why I cannot agree with her interpretation that Leibniz does not mean to eliminate relational properties in his reconstruals of relational propositions by showing that Leibniz's denial of the existence of extrinsic denominations, which he infers from the predicate-in-subject principle, is not consistent with the interpretation.

著者

重永 哲也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.133-148, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

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Michael Della Rocca, in his "Essentialism versus Essentialism", pointed out that Kripke's defense of his essentialism is made unstable by his limited use of the method of counterparts. But the defense, if trying to get out of this unstable position, would be circular, and therefore turns out to be unable to be justified. Kripke's version of essentialism, by introducing the method of counterparts into it, has a self-under-mining character, so argues Della Rocca. In this paper, I shall argue that these objections of Della Rocca to Kripke are wrong. After reviewing the objections, I shall argue that Della Rocca, when arguing for the circularity of Kripke's defense of his essentialism, is relying on a false premise and shall object to his objections. Then, I shall outline what more appropriate objections to Kripke's version of essentialism would be like.

著者

重永 哲也

出版者

駒澤大学

雑誌

駒沢大学文化 (ISSN:02896613)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.83-112, 1993-03