著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.122-132, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The birth of “A Just Russia” was a significant event in national and regional elections of 2007. It was taken as a milestone to bring a change to Russian political party system that predominance of “United Russia” continued on. Some researches discussed the possibility of the two-party system that the left faction confronted the right-center, and the other expressed deep concern over the danger that political party system in itself would be strictly operated by administrative power.In recent years, the camp that takes politico-sociological approaches appeared. For example, the group of Richard Rose does not overvalue a temporary change in support variation for Russian political regime. They never concentrate their interests on administration elite's behaviors only. Its analysis clarifies how Russians recognize the political regime. This perspective helps to deepen understandings what kind of role political party play to be expected. In Russia, preference of voters has been quite floating. The voters have been unlikely to ballot on cleavages and positive party support. Does the appearance of new left-center party cause a change for Russian political party system? Russian government began to build ruling party system in rapid political changes. The Presidential office took the leadership to organize“A Just Russia”. However, it is not definite if the interferences in the parties consolidate Russian political party system or not. Because the power of ruling parties deeply depends on the authority of the Federal President, and Russian voter's preference also is based on retrospective voting for President's achievement.In this article, I will analyze “A Just Russia” which attracted keen attention in the result of 2007 elections. This article primarily aims to examine why “A Just Russia” should have been formed, moreover, I presume that the question is likely to be a good scope finding a particularity of Russian political party system. “A Just Russia” is the successor of “Party of Life” under Sergei Mironov; the chairman of the Federal Council. The new party formation was not irrelevant to the support for “Rodina” declining and the reforms of Russian federalism. Although preference of Russian voters shifted into left position since the latter half of 2004, this change in voting behavior was the outcome of retrospective voting against social benefits reform beginning from June 2004.To clarify these, I mainly analyze on the process of the new left-center party formation and the result of regional parliamentary elections performed since the forth election of State Duma.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.53, pp.267-298, 2006

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After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.267-298, 2006

---

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.