著者

廣瀬 陽子 六鹿 茂夫 大西 富士夫 兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.43-68, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

著者

大矢 温

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.57-72, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

21

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The main object of this paper is to analyze the prevalence of xenophobia (and Neo-nazism as its political expression) in Russian society today and to examine its persuadable causes. Here the action and the ideology of the People's National Party (Narodnaya national'naya partiya) and of its leader Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy are analyzed as an example of the violent fascist party in Russia because the PNP is considered to have a strong relation with the Skinhead movement among the younger generation today.Today xenophobia and racial antipathy is prevalent throughout European society and racist or fascist movement is gaining ground in many European countries. The question is, does Russian fascism have any relationship with this global movement? If so, does it advocate nationalism owing to the effect of globalism? Does fascism equal to a nationalism of Russia? (We must remember that more than 20 million Soviet people were killed in the war against the fascist Germany.) Is the Neo-nazi in today's Russia is really a Nazism? How does it differ from the classical one?The leader of the People's National Party, Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy, came to be known as a politician only after he became a candidate of the Parliament in 1995. He became widely known by his book “My Faith is Rusism!” (Moya vera - rusizm!) in 1997. In this book, Ivanov names his ideology as “Russism”. Although his “Russism” is composed of many ideological fragmentary elements of popular fascism, it can be formulated as a slogan of “Russia for Russians”, which also can be summed up as an appeal for Russians to emancipate Russia from “non-aryans”, “communists”, and “Jews” and to fight against them.Obviously, Ivanov's “Russism” is not so prominent one among other fascism ideologies. But what is the main reason of its success? Why does it so attract young dissatisfied Russians? What is the background of its prosperity?In this author's opinion, the main cause of Ivanov's prosperity does not seem to be “a confusion” of post-Soviet society. Rather, it must be found in “a relative stability” of Russian society today. In a word, Russian society today is not so confused as the post-Soviet society, say, up to 1995. A fairy tale of a post-Soviet millionaire is not plausible today for those whom live in misery. Because, according to Ivanov, “Jews” have already established “Yid resume” in Russia.Then, what is to be done? The answer is quite simple -- “fight against them”.By arguing so, Ivanov published one document which is named “The ABC's of Russian skinheads” (Azbuki rocciiskikh skinheaov) . In this document, Ivanov encourages the dissatisfied young to eliminate alien elements from Russia and to shave their own heads. In this way, Ivanov connects “Russism” as a political movement with skinheads, which was regarded as a sub-culture of the violent young.

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.1-20, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

30

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This paper investigates the endeavors to solve the Donbas Conflict typologically. The first and most consistent policy was the Minsk Accord belonging to the category of federalization. As has been the case with other post-Soviet secession conflicts, federalization was a hopeless policy, which produced serious commitment problems, while contradicting the real interests of both the parent state (Ukraine) and the secession polities (the DPR and LPR). In the context of the Donbas War none proposed the second type of solution, that is, land-for-peace. Ineffective diplomatic endeavors induced both Ukraine, Russia, and the DPR/LPR to solve the situation in a military way. Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 disposed Ukraine for a coercive solution of the Donbas problem (the reconquest policy). The Russian political and military leadership split into two groups: one supporting the policy to make the secession polities (the DPR and LPR) Russia’s protectorates and another supporting the policy to destroy the parent state (Ukraine). The unsatisfactory results of Russia’s choice in 2008 of the protectorate policy vis-à-vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia and underestimation of Kyiv’s defense capacity made the Russian leaders opt for the destruction of Ukraine itself.

著者

古矢 旬 馬渕 睦夫 盛田 常夫 青木 睦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.42-71, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

著者

田畑 朋子

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.93-101, 2010 (Released:2012-06-20)

参考文献数

14

被引用文献数

1

著者

河野 健一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.91-106, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

15

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NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 is first ever “humanitarian intervention” launched without prior authorization of UN Security Council. Though the bombing led by US eventually forced Mirocevic to pull out of Kosovo, it incurred fierce debates over its legality and legitimacy, and over its failure in preventing escalation of abuse of human rights during the campaign. Military wisdom of having resorted solely to air bombing was also challenged.After September 11th 2001 we have been witnessing fundamental changes taking place in the way force is used in international relations. The wars in Afghanistan and then in Iraq compels us to ponder upon a grave question. Can and should force replace diplomacy in dealing with regimes considered to be undemocratic and hostile to established norms and regulations?Notwithstanding differences in political background NATO's armed intervention in Kosovo and the US-led war with Sadam's Iraq have one thing in common. In both cases military force was used in massive scale bypassing UN Security Council. Thus UN's role and authority as guardian of international peace and human rights has come to be seriously contested.In this paper the author tried, by re-examining the political and military aspects of NATO's bombing operation, to draw lessons for building a security architecture which is more widely acceptable and yet better workable in the changed international environment.The gist of lessons drawn is as follows;(1) The UN Charter must be revised to give legality to legitimate humanitarian intervention. An independent committee should work out principled guidelines for legitimate intervention.(2) Resort to force is to be considered only after other peaceful means have fully been exhausted. Use of force should be legitimatized solely by prior approval of UN.(3) The UN organs, in particular Security Council, need to be reformed to enable a fair, quick and effective crisis management.(4) Democratization and economic development are key to regional stability. EU's assistance to and future admittance of the whole of Balkan should be closely observed. It is a test case of proving that soft power rather than hard power plays vital a role in establishing a sustainable peace in regions traditionally vulnerable to chauvinistic nationalism and of war-ridden history.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.2-20, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

17

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In this study I will try to survey how Ukrainian oligarchs acted in the course of 2014 upheaval. Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions, whose rule collapsed as a result of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014, had been a party of interests, not of ideology. For the first couple of years (2010–2011) it was rather a coalition of several factions, with their interests more or less respected. The balance of power and interests of early years came to be disrupted by greedy expansion of the Yanukovich Family. It began to grow rapidly assumedly around the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012. The President’s son Oleksandr Yanukovich coordinated building of the Family empire, with help from intimate oligarchs like Serhiy Kurchenko and Yuliy Ivanyushchenko. Even some Ministers of national government contributed to money making schemes for the Family. Its spheres expanded sometimes even to the detriment of oligarchs who had been loyal to the regime. By the time mass demonstrations began at the end of 2013, the regime was no longer monolithic, losing full loyalty from Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitro Firtash, the 2 giant oligarchs of the Yanukovich era. Petro Poroshenko supported the Maidan movement most actively among famous oligarchs. Akhmetov, who used to be the biggest sponsor of the Yanukovich Regime, is also believed to have financed Maidan. Key persons of the Yanukovich Family and Andriy Klyuyev, on the other hand, insisted on ruthless suppression of Maidan. Vitaly Klichko, one of the most popular potential candidates of upcoming presidential elections, announced withdrawal from the race in March 2014. This even more ensured victory of Petro Poroshenko in elections on 25 May. Some experts believe that Firtash arranged Poroshenko=Klichko alliance, fearing that his rival Yuliya Tymoshenko might become president and get revenge on him. In Ukraine’s elections, most candidates traditionally appeal to anti-oligarch propaganda. Paradoxically it was Poroshenko, one of the most famous oligarchs in Ukraine, who won the 2014 presidential elections. There are no clear evidence that the oligarchs, who have business interests on the Crimean Peninsula, either supported actively Russia’s incorporation of Crimea or, oppositely, resisted it. It is well known, however, that Sergei Aksenov, who became Premier of Crimean AR and led its incorporation into Russian Federation, had been fostered by Firtash as a politician. Some experts hence believe that Firtash at least tacitly approved incorporation of Crimea. But in reality Firtash’s business on the Peninsula, for example titanium business, is threatened by changes of jurisdiction. In April–May 2014 some suspected that Rinat Akhmetov, a longtime lord of the region, stood behind pro-Russian separatist movements in Donbass. It is true that Akhmetov contacted separatists and attempted to use them. But he only needed a bargaining chip in relations with Kiev. It is very doubtful wheather Akhmetov really committed to separatism of Donbass. If Donbass will be independent from Ukraine or incorporated into Russian Federation, his ferrous metallurgy will inevitably collapse. At present Akhmetov is in distress because of warfare in Donbass and other unpleasant realities.

著者

〆木 裕子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.110-121, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

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In the Post-Soviet countries, the results of how the term “ridna mova” (Ukrainian for “mother tongue”) is categorized in the National Census are used for determining the language policies in each country. The 2001 All Ukrainian National Census also includes the question of “ridna mova”, and the results of the census show that 69% of Ukrainian citizens regard the Ukrainian language as their “ridna mova”. However, it is still unclear exactly what meaning is attached to the expression of “ridna mova”, and how each citizen of Ukraine interprets the notion of “ridna mova”.Arel explains the concept of “ridna mova” as being interpreted more as the language of one's nationality (referred to by Arel as “native language”) than as the first language spoken in early childhood or as the language which the person commands best (defined as “mother tongue” by Arel) . Using Arel's sub-classification this paper aims to demonstrate how Ukrainian respondents interpret “ridna mova”.The present thesis analyzes the results of surveys conducted in Kiev in 2006. In addition to the question of “ridna mova”, respondents were asked about their first language using the categories of “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best”. The results of these three questions differ from the results of the question about “ridna mova”. To examine the connection between these four categories, their coefficient connection (Cramer's V) was calculated. The results show that the connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” is very strong, but the connection between “ridna mova” and other categories is comparatively weak. This means that respondents have different interpretations of “ridna mova” and other categories. As Arel states, it seems that the respondents interpret“ridna mova”as the language of one's nationality. But strong connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” reveal the possibility that respondents additionally interpret ridna mova as a covert “mother tongue”, not only overt “native language”.In addition, an analysis of “contradictory answers” was conducted concerning the question of “ridna mova” as well as the question, “Which language (s) can you speak other than your “ridna mova”? ” Classifying the respondents who had “contradictory answers” by their“ridna mova”, the respondents who regarded the Russian language as their “ridna mova” tended to give a “contradictory answer”. And the respondents who answered Russian language to the question of first language exhibited the same tendency. The analysis of the “contradictory answers” shows that only respondents who regard Ukrainian as their “ridna mova” and answered only “Ukrainian language” to the question of first language can interpret “ridna mova” without contradiction, because their “native language” and “mother tongue” are same-the Ukrainian language.

著者

⿃飼 将雅

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.144-166, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

42

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As a result of a series of centralization reforms, initiated in 2000, a great number of studies have discussed that the center entrenched its control over regional subjects in Russia. Yet, several regional unrests observed in the recent years demonstrates an urgent need for an overhaul of the Russian center-periphery relationship, to which only limited attention has been paid yet. This study explains this instability by the increase of outsider governor deployments. Exploiting an original dataset of all governors from 1991 to 2019, patterns of outsider deployments and the effect of such deployments on the regional political processes are examined. Although President Boris Yel’tsin initially held the right to appoint and dismiss most governors in the first half of the 1990s, he did not try to dispatch outsider governors not firmly embedded in the regional societies. Whereas governors began to be elected through the popular gubernatorial elections in almost all of the regions since 1995, outsider candidates rarely won the posts of governors. In Vladimir Putin’s first and second terms (2000-2008), the power balance between the center and regions radically changed in favor of the center. In addition, scholars have argued that the center’s dominance over regional elites increased rapidly due to the de facto appointment system of governors was introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, even then, outsider governor deployments remained exceptional cases. Since the influence of United Russia as a dominant party was limited at that time, federal elites had to receive the endorsement of governors, as regional bosses, to secure the stability of the regime. However, after the triumph of United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary election and the advent of President Dmitrii Medvedev, the Presidential Administration embarked on active replacements of regional bosses with outsider governors loyal to the center. Consequently, while the center got capable of controlling regional political processes more tightly, these radical cadre reorganizations caused dissatisfaction and protests of regional elites, as a result of which electoral performances in the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections declined in the eyes of the center. As a compromise to massive protest movements brought about by the immense size of electoral frauds, popular gubernatorial elections were reinstated in 2012. However, the influence of the center over the recruitment of governors continues to be remarkable and the number of outsider governors is still growing. Yet, in the late 2010s, the decline of the regime’s popularity caused instability at the regional level, as demonstrated by the fact that several candidates backed by the federal government lost in gubernatorial elections. While outsider deployments have merits for the federal elites to control regional political processes through them as loyal agents of the federal government, their lack of embeddedness in local elite communities has detrimental effects on regional unrests. To test this argument, this study investigates the relationship between outsider deployments and regional electoral performances. The OLS estimate and Inverse Probability Weighted estimate demonstrate that outsider governors deliver fewer votes than local governors. Those findings imply that the center-periphery relationship in Russia is still in flux even though the rules of the game have changed since the 1990s.

著者

岩下 明裕

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.62-81, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

被引用文献数

1

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This essay sheds light on Soviet and Russian Foreign Policy through use of the “critical geopolitical” concept of the “geo-code.” A state’s “geo-code” refers to the construction of narratives regarding its own space and history over time. Borrowing from Klaus Dodd’s ideal-type categories, which he uses to explain geo-coded narratives of British policy (“little England,” “cosmopolitan,” “European” and “American”), this paper proposes to utilize combinations of four ideal-type categories, “Atlantic/European,” “ethnic Russian,” “Eurasian” and “super power,” in order to analyze and explain Soviet and Russian foreign policy.The first section applies the metaphor of a photograph to the memoirs of several foreign policy leaders: Andrei Gromyko and Eduard Shevardnadze in the Soviet-era; and Andrei Kozyrev, Evgenii Primakov and Serghei Ivanov in contemporary Russia. The paper shows how the composite image of Russia held by these individuals shaped the state’s foreign policy. It also stresses that different concepts of sovereignty have been sustained or reconstructed within Soviet/Russian international law theories in dialogue with changes in images held by the foreign policy leader.The latter half of the paper further develops this theory in order to apply it to Putin’s current Russian foreign policy perception of Northeast Asia, and particularly of China and Japan. From the late Soviet period under Gorbachev to the early Russian period of Yeltsin, Japan was considered as one of the “rising” powers able to aid Russia’s political and economic transition, and it was widely recognized that the relationship would be facilitated by a peace treaty resolving the territorial issue between the two countries. However, following reconciliation between Russia and China, China became the more important partner for Russia, not only in Northeast Asia but also throughout Eurasia.Following its disengagement with the West after the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia’s image of itself as close to “Europe” slipped, while that of the state as “ethnic Russian” and “Eurasian” that must become a “great power” to oppose the US was emphasized. This has meant that Japan is no longer an essential partner from the viewpoint of Russia’s dominant foreign policy images. In turn, the significance of China has increased and developed for Russia beyond the two countries historical “love-hate” relationship. Not only policy makers but also ordinary people look to China as Russia’s “No.1” partner, while the United States is its indefatigable “enemy.” There is no room for Japan in this picture while Japan remains so dependent on the US for security matters.In the conclusion, the paper debunks the myths associated with “classical geopolitics,” which associate foreign policy solely with perceptions of state power and geography. It shows that a “geo-politics” which links the positivist and constructive approaches, and which seeks to account for various analytical scales—from micro to macro, below/beyond the state—can analyze foreign policy change more effectively.

著者

鈴木 肇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.118-120, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

淺村 卓生

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.48-60, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The Uzbek standard language of today is exceptional among the Turkic languages in lacking vowel harmony. This paper focuses on changes in an ideological position of vowel harmony rules in Uzbek for those who engaged in language politics or educational works in the early Soviet era. The paper deals mainly with the period between 1924, when the National Delimitation in Central Asia took place, and 1934 when vowel harmony rules were abolished from the Uzbek standard written language at the Scientific Conference on Uzbek Orthography.In the 1920's vowel harmony rules were regarded by local intellectuals as a symbol of Uzbek language ties with other Turkic languages and as a legacy of Chagatai literature. At a 1929 Conference the inclusion of vowel harmony rules into the grammar of standard Uzbek, which the chair of the conference proposed, was approved as an “iron law”. However, after the alteration of Moscow's policy on national problems, the vowel harmony rules were attacked as a “dying law” that blocks further development of the Uzbek language, because they were considered to be unsuitable for transcribing international (read “Russian”) words. Vowel harmony rules were abolished not only from transcribed Russian or international words but also from Uzbek orthography in the 1934 Conference, where the number of vowels in Uzbek alphabet was reduced from nine to six, it was decided that the Uzbek standard language should be based on urban dialects in which vowel harmony was weak.It is worth mentioning that it was only after the basic shape of the “Uzbek national language” was determined, that the need for a history of the new national language started to be strongly felt. Many linguists tried to seek its origin and trace back the descent of Uzbek language. In the 1920's scholars were longing for a shape of the “Uzbek national language” in the Turkic languages with Chagatai as the successor, considering that vowel harmony rules remained in the “Uzbek national language” from the past. However, showing a remarkable contrast with studies in the 1920's, studies after 1934 tried to establish a theory that these Turkic languages also lacked vowel harmony rules in the similar way that standardized “Uzbek national language” does. The latter group of studies obscured the historical side of the Uzbek language and substantialized “Uzbek national language” that was being constructed as a part of the cultural essentialism in Uzbekistan. This suggests that, from the viewpoint of the socio-cultural history of Uzbekistan, the abandonment of a written language with vowel harmony rules and the standardization of Uzbek language in 1934 were also some of the extremely important events in the process of the construction of the national representation of Uzbekistan.

著者

西山 美久

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.82-92, 2010 (Released:2012-06-20)

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This paper traces the changing course of the patriotic policies of Putin’s government, and shows that the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyz had a great impact on the Russian political process. Post-communist Russia has suffered from serious political and economic disturbances, comparable with smuta in tsarist Russia. In the first period of the New Russia, while Yeltsin’s government adopted a series of western-oriented policies, the opposition put forward an alternative line based on Russian nationalism. As Russian citizens displayed anti-western sentiments, however, president Yeltsin also changed course and modified policies to take national feelings into consideration. As a result, almost all political forces in Russia became proponents of Russian patriotism. Therefore, we need to examine the real contents of the patriotism held by political forces, particularly in each administration. President Putin, who followed president Yeltsin in 2000, stressed the importance of patriotism in his policies. Valerie Sperling, who analyzed patriotic policies in post-Soviet Russia, argues that Putin practiced various policies based on ‘militarized patriotism’ toward Russian youth, because his government needed to foster their loyalty to the state and their interest in joining the Russian army. Although I agree with her claim that Putin pursued patriotic policies, Sperling appears not to have grasped a turning point in policy transformation under Putin, in particular the real meaning of the ‘color revolutions’ that took place in the former Soviet Republics in 2003–2005. This paper analyzes the two programs for promoting patriotism among Russians, each of which was adopted under Putin’s government in 2001 and 2005. The difference between both programs is that the first was directed at all social and age groups, while the second mainly targeted the younger generation. Why did the latter program focus on youths? This paper examines the political impact on Putin’s administration of the ‘color revolutions’ in the CIS countries in which the younger generation played a significant role, and clarifies Putin’s efforts to prevent these revolutions from spilling over into Russia, through organizing a new youth organization named ‘Nashi,’ publishing a new edition of the guidebook for teaching Russian history, and other efforts.

著者

松嵜 英也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.117-130, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

33

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The amendments in the Ukrainian constitution in the aftermath of the Orange revolution brought about sweeping changes in the semi-presidential system. It formally strengthened the parliamentary role in the political process, particularly in cabinet appointments and dismissal. Although the transition to democracy in Ukraine had been anticipated, the semi-presidential system that was introduced after the Orange Revolution proved to be a failure.Scholars have paid attention to the institutional design and patronalism, which is defined as a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments, besides the electoral system that emerged after the Orange Revolution. In particular, they have argued that the president had an initiative to form the cabinet in a multi-party system. However, this led to an intensification of the intra-executive competition between the president and the prime-minister after the formation of the cabinet. How did the semi-presidential system, introduced after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, fail? Although presidential commitment is an important component to consider when trying to understand the reason for institutional dysfunction, the interaction between the president and the prime minister is not clear.Focusing on the intra-executive competition, this article attempts to outline the process of failure of the semi-presidential system following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. First, this article analyzes the wording of the constitutional amendments, comparing it with that of the 1996 Ukrainian constitution. While the constitutional amendments strengthened the role of the Verkhovna Rada, which is also referred to as the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in the political process, the president retained other legislative powers, including the power to veto bills and dissolve the assembly. These amendments authorized the president to intervene in the legislative process.Second, utilizing a case study of the second Yanukovych government (2006-2007), and the second Timoshenko government (2007-2010), the author analyzes the process of intra-executive competition. When Yanukovych and Timoshenko became prime minister in 2006 and 2007, respectively, president Yushchenko was committed to maintaining decisive power over the Verkhovna Rada while appointing a prime minister. The case studies demonstrate that the coalitional cabinet would not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention because of the multi-party system. After the formation of the coalitional government, the president continued to intervene decisively in the legislative process, using both formal and informal power. However, under the 2004 constitutional system, the cabinet alone was responsible for running the parliament. Because the president’s party was a minority party in the parliament, he could not control the activities of the coalitional cabinet. The presidential interventions intensified the conflict with the prime minister over several issues, including NATO membership, the Russia-Georgia war, and so on. The conflict between the two also made parliamentary law-making much less efficient.Thus, the presidential commitment to the parliament produced different results during different periods. While the coalitional cabinet could not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention, the presidential commitment after the formation of coalitional cabinet led to a confrontation with the prime minister, and divided the members of the coalitional cabinet. The intensification of the intra-executive conflicts led to the failure of the semi-presidential system adopted after the Orange Revolution.

著者

中井 遼

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.38, pp.89-103, 2009 (Released:2011-10-14)

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This article presents quantitative aspects of the party system in Lithuania and argues that Lithuania’s electoral institutions (mixed-member majoritarian system) define the quantitative features of its party system. There has been an ambivalent view of Lithuanian party politics in the literature. Some scholars argue that it is a highly fragile and volatile system, while others assert that it is stable. Several scholars have argued that its complexity could be explained as a result of intertemporal change. Adding to this debate, I argue that the differing evaluations of the Lithuanian party system is the result of analyses based on different measurement scores. The view that the system is unstable is supported by the multitude of political parties that seats in the parliament and the view that it is volatile is evidenced by the fact that newcomer parties easily win seats. On the other hand, effective party number index (known as the Laakso-Taagepera index) and the bipolar cabinet forming support the view that the system is stable. This article organizes and clears up various quantitative features of the party system of Lithuania and argues that its two main aspects—its instability (multitude of political parties) and its volatility (newcomer parties)—are prominent features of the political systems in other Central and East European countries. In order to explore the origins of these two prominent aspects of the Lithuanian party system, this article focuses on Lithuania’s electoral institutions. Socioeconomic and historical factors cannot account for the quantitative aspects of Lithuanian party politics. Lithuania has adopted the mixed-member majoritarian system as their electoral system, an institution that is very exceptional in the context of the Central and East European democracies. Referring to theoretical research in electoral studies, I argue that Lithuania’s adaptation of the mixed-member system is an explanatory variable in the determination of the quantitative aspects of Lithuania’s party system. This is because Lithuania’s adaptation of the mixed-member system, including single member district, do not promotes two party systems, rather fragmentizes the party system and foments personal voting. These effects are bolstered by contamination effects which occur in the mixed-member majoritarian system, seats distribution rule and the transitional fledgling Lithuanian party system. Observation clearly shows that single-member districts are responsible for the multitude of political parties, which are seated in the Lithuanian parliament. Representatives from about four to six parties are elected in proportional representation districts, but representatives from ten parties are elected in single member districts in Lithuania. Moreover, profiles of political elites who organize new political parties show that those who have been elected in single member districts are significantly involved in splitting from existing parties and forming new political parties. In addition, in single member districts it is easier for a member of the local elite possessing a political or economic power base to win an election than in another type of district. Lithuania’s party politics exhibit aspects of both stability and instability. However, the quantitative character and prominent features of the party system have been considerably defined by its mixed-member majoritarian electoral system.

著者

堀江 新二

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.131-164, 2001-03

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"Гамлет", поставленный К. С. Станиславским и английским режиссером Г. Крэгом в 1911 году был эпохальным событием в истории мирового драматического театра. Однако коментатор первого собрания сочинений К. С. Станиславского, иэданного в 1954, написал, что приглашение Крэга в Россию окаэалось случайным эпизодом в истории МХТ и совместный спектакль "Гамлет" имел удачу вопреки режиссуре Крэга, трактовавшего трагедию Шекспира как мистическую пьесу. Автор данной статьи отвечает на вопрос, почему Станиславский при-гласил Крэга в МХТ и попросил совместно поставить "Гамлета", хотя у этих двух режиссеров на первый вэгляд совсем противоположные театральные стремления: один к "натурализму" и другой к "идеальному мистицизму." Автор, исследуя переписку Станиславского с Крэгом и их диалоги во время репетиции в Москве, утверждает, что Крэг стоял на стороне режиссера, а Станиславский на стороне актера. Тем не менее когда Крэг смотрел спектакли МХТ, он восхищался мастерством актеров, особенно самого Станислваского. Крэг пишет, "наибольшее удовольствие доставало мне представление ≪Дядя Ваня≫-эта труппа в состоянии превосходно справиться с какой угодно пьесой". А Станиславский пишет, "Если нам удастся показать талант Крэга, мы окажем большую услугу искусству. Не скоро и не многие поймут Крэга сразу, так как он опередил век на полстолетия". Эти высказивания явно свидетельствуют, что Крэг, вопреки своей теории актерского искусства, согласно которой актер является супер-марионеткой, высоко оценивал игру актеров МХТа, которая к тому времени уже складывалась в знаменитую "систему Станиславского", а Станиславский же в свою очередь восхищался режиссерскими замыслами Крэга. Автор в заключении еще раз упомянув о примечаниях комментатора собрания сочинений Станиславского, ссылается на слова известного театрального критика Т. Бачелиса; "Сегодня читать эти примечания и смешно и горько. Но что делать, читать надо, это своего рода документ эпохи".

著者

齋藤 宏文

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.72-83, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

53

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This research focuses on the process by which scientific information on Soviet genetics—particularly the Lysenko Doctrine—was accepted by Japanese academic groups in the field of biological science. Nakamura (1967) studied the Lysenko Controversy in Japan and illustrated the process whereby this debate resulted in the inevitable political conflict among Japanese biologists after the conference of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in August 1948. In order to examine the possibility of the purely scientific debate on Soviet genetics, it is necessary to investigate the various types of literatures available in the few years immediately following Japan's defeat in World War II. In addition, there are three approaches that complement Nakamura's research. First, it is necessary to measure the ideological control given to Soviet science by the Soviet Government's scientific policies, because this control directly affected the quality of information on Soviet genetics. In particular, the discussion prepared by the editorial board of the Pod znamenem marksizma in 1939 will be highlighted as the turning point of this control. Second, Western scientific literatures were the most important channel of information transfer for Japanese biologists; in this case, it is necessary to consider the acceptance of this literature and the extent to which it influenced Japanese biologists. Third, Japanese academic groups lagged behind the West in accepting information, at least in the two years after the Japanese defeat in World War II; therefore, it is interesting to compare the acceptance times between the West and Japan. In 1946, the ideological control granted to Soviet science was at its weakest, and it was at this time that western biologists accepted the most detailed literatures and wrote numerous scientific criticisms on the Lysenko Doctrine. On the other hand, at this time, Japanese biologists were still concerned with the lack of availability of scientific literatures.

著者

藤井 陽一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.70-86, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

参考文献数

69

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This article is devoted to examining the formation of Soviet bioethics since the 1970s by focusing on the activities and viewpoints of Ivan Frolov, who played a prominent role in laying the ground-work for this interdisciplinary study, and who would later become an adviser to the General Secretary of the CPSU in the Gorbachev era. In doing so, this paper aims to demonstrate the differences between the Soviet bioethics and that of the Western school of thought, as well as to identify the shortcomings of Frolov’s attempt to establish the field in the USSR. Soon after Trofim Lysenko’s group lost its power in the Soviet academic community in 1964, not only the field of genetics but also eugenics were resurrected with a new look supported by leading-edge molecular biological and genetic engineering; which had hitherto been developed mainly in the West. In 1970, the Soviet journal “Questions of Philosophy” held a round-table discussion chaired by Frolov with the title “Human Genetics, and its Philosophical, Social-Ethical Problems”. There an embryologist, a general geneticist, a demographer, as well as an ethicist and philosophers argued over the social-ethical aspects of science, especially in regard to gene manipulation and neo-eugenics. Today this round-table is regarded as the main origin of the Soviet, —and later— Russian bioethics. Since the 1970s, influenced by a global trend towards regulating recombinant DNA experiments, and opposition to human enhancement, Frolov published his works. These introduced the new world currents in genetic engineering and neo-eugenics; criticised human enhancement from the Marxist paradigm of the “new human”, whose personality must be developed all-roundly; supported the Western scholars, who were struggling against neo-eugenics; and appealed for the necessity of an international approach to controlling biology and genetics. At the same time, the Soviet bio-philosopher developed networks of contacts within UNESCO alongside US bioethics institutes, and gave presentations on the socio-ethical aspects of genome science for those foreign associates. Since the middle of the 1980s until the 1990s, Frolov made attempts to get Soviet bioethics recognised by his Western counterparts, by forming a panel of experts engaged in bioethics in various areas. As a result, Soviet bioethics, based on talks among biologists, doctors, philosophers, lawyers, in addition to an Orthodox priest, was established at the end of 1980s. In April of 1991, the Soviet national bioethics committee was established in the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the wake of Frolov’s appeal to the Presidium. In May, the International Meeting on Bioethics and the Social Consequences of Biomedical Research was held in Moscow under the auspices of UNESCO. Therefore, it is indeed clear that Frolov contributed to the foundation of bioethics in the Soviet academic community, but he failed in his moral obligation to develop an interest in bioethics amongst the general public, and to involve them in the debate, whereas in the West national debates centring on bioethics had been flourishing since the 1970s. The result of Frolov’s ignorance was evident in a 1993 survey, which demonstrated broad support for neo-eugenic treatments by the Russian populace. Now Boris Yudin, Frolov’s successor, highlights the importance of familiarising oneself with this theme and inspiring popular debate on the topic through mass media and education.

著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.21-42, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

41

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This essay traces on the evolvements of Russian political class over the issue of Ukraine from the demise of the USSR to 2014 crisis, culminating in the annexation of the Crimea peninsula. Russian attitudes towards the rebirth of Ukraine nationalism were ambiguous, especially among elite level. The August coup against the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Ukraine, where its nationalistic elements were independent oriented, while the conservatives, including the military industrial complex were negative. After the December 1991 referendum, where opinions were in favor for independence, Leonid Kravchuk, once ideological secretary of the Ukraine communist party could rely on the support of the West oriented voice of western Ukraine, where European and Catholic influence was vocal. From the Russian point of view, this region was alien from the Orthodox tradition and was never been part of the Russian Empire. Thus, Ukraine as the nation state was weak and far from united as political identity was concerned. Economy was also divided between agrarian west and the east, where Soviet type of military industrial complex was dominant. This east-west divide caused political instability in Ukraine, that was revealed when Kravchuk was replaced by Kuchima who first relied on the support of Russian speaking east, though he eventually turned to the west. Moscow was particularly concerned the fate of the Black Sea fleet and Crimea, where Russians were dominant and never belonged to Ukraine until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, Ukrainian oriented Soviet leader changed the status of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Though Russian President Boris Yel’tsin was in favor for the Ukraine status quo, his nationalistic minded semi-oppositionists like Moscow Mayor Luzhkov were against the Ukraine position overt the fleet and Crimea. It was only pragmatism of Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister, who could pass the bill on the partnership in 1997. New President Vladimir Putin was more oriented Russian nationalism, and was particularly against the color revolution, when western oriented President Yushchenko won over the East oriented Yanukovich in a 2004 election. East-West divide, coupled with the corruption and ungovernavility, became Kremlins worry on Ukraine. Still they succeeded in winning Yanukovich victory in the following election and could deal over the 25 years continuation of the Black Sea Fleet, in turn for cheaper gas supply in 2010. Ukraine thus became a grand over which domestic East-West divide was coupled by the influence of the NATO-EU and Moscow contested. The Maidan revolution was thus seen from Kremlins nationalists oriented policy makers to be an attempt to cut the influence of Russia over Ukraine. The Izborskii club or another religious-Orthodox oriented politicians were thus backing sudden policy changes of the President Putin, who took Maidan revolution as another attempt of regime change by the West, and eventually annexed the Crimea Peninsula. Thus, in turn, brought about the civil war situation, particularly in the east Ukraine, that was already uncontrolled by neither Moscow nor Kiev authority.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.19-40, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

48

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In this study, I tried to survey economic effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Russia and other Eurasian Countries as its transit nations. Economic effects can be categorized into ‘investment effects,’ ‘transport effects’ and ‘areal effects.’I found that ‘investment effects’ of BRI on the railway sector of Eurasian countries were rather limited. Few fulfilled projects include China Eximbank’s loan to finance construction of Kamchik railway tunnel in Uzbekistan, China Eximbank’s loan to finance electrification of Belarus’s railway and, though the details were unknown, China’s commitment to invest in establishing the special economic zone ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate.’ Other investment projects on the list of prospective joint works by Eurasian Economic Union members and China, such as the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project and the project to connect rail networks of Armenia and Iran, had not been materialized so far.As for ‘transport effects,’ thus far the most remarkable success story is the rapid growth of China Railway Express connecting China and Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus by container trains, which is believed to bring about over 100 million US dollars of transit revenue annually to each of them. Companies from European regions of Russia and Belarus also begin to explore the Chinese market by virtue of China Railway Express, which may play some positive role in expanding non-resource, non-energy exports, a priority for Putin administration. One must, however, put it into consideration that according to balance of payment statistics railway service export revenue of the three countries is stagnating. In addition, China-Europe container transport is still dominated by maritime modal, not railway. Beijing plans to reduce subsidies by local governments to container trains, which also makes the future of China Railway Express uncertain.Lastly, we can regard the development of ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate’ in Kazakhstan and the birth of industrial park ‘Great Stone’ in Belarus, both with investments from China, as typical cases of ‘areal effects,’ while the ambitious Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project in Russia came to a deadlock because it needs larger investments and more complicated arrangements.